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Abstract
Multicast functionality can be used to enable group communication more effi-
ciently than the traditional unicast networks. Like unicast environments, mul-
ticast or group-based applications are expected to deliver same level of service
to both end users and service or content providers. One of the problem areas
concerns with provision of secure group communication is the management
of keying material, which is primarily managed by an infrastructure, referred
to as a group key management framework (GKMF). The main function of a
GKMF is providing common cryptographic key(s) to all group members of a
multicast group communication.
While security issues pertaining to deployment of secure group communica-
tion in fixed unicast networks are widely research, very little consideration is
given for establishing such communications in wireless mobile environments
(WMobEs). Inherent characteristics of WMobEs such as restricted capabili-
ties of mobile devices, as well as mobility of group members provide further
challenge for deploying secure group communication in such environments.
Thus, this thesis concerns key management frameworks for secure group com-
munication in WMobEs.
There are three main parts to the work. First, we begin with an introduction
to multicast technology, including its capability to enable group (or multicast)
communication. Second, we focus the work on one area, the management of
group keying material within a GKMF, including its main components and
processes (or protocols). Third, we propose a specification for a GKMF for
secure group communication, based on a specific wireless mobile architecture.
Finally, we conclude our work by identifying future research directions.
The main contribution of this thesis is to design, specify and analyze a GKMF
for group communication in WMobEs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the direction of our work, the motivation that drives
us into carrying out this research, and the contributions of the work.
In Section 1.1, we introduce our work and identify the motivation for this
research. In Section 1.3, we present our main research contributions. Finally,
in Section 1.4, we briefly outline the main structure of the thesis.
1.1 Research Motivation
In recent years, group-based applications have significantly grown in popular-
ity. These include:
• Multimedia conferencing, such as video, audio or tele-conferencing.
• Information dissemination services (often referred to as push technolo-
gies), such as stock quotes, special news or software updates.
• Satellite TV distribution services, such as Pay Per View (PPV) channels.
• Online interactive forums, such as virtual classrooms.
As a result, there has been a rejuvenation in the interest shown in mul-
ticast technology first proposed by Deering (Deering, 1989) in late 1980s.
This multicast technology exhibits special functionality which enables effi-
cient deployment of group communication, where a message can be sent from
1
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a single sender to multiple receivers in one go (Deering, 1989), (Almeroth,
2000), (Hardjono and Tsudik, 2000).
In this thesis we are particularly concerned with the provision of security
for group communication. According to the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), one of the three main problem areas in secure multicast is concerned
with the management of cryptographic keying material, which includes the
generation, distribution and updating (or re-keying) of keys (MSEC, 2007).
As a result, there has been considerable research activity in this area.
A vital component of any security architecture for group communication based
on cryptographic services is the design of a group key management framework
(GKMF). A GKMF specifies the entities and processes involved in governing
all aspects of the management of cryptographic keys. It is important to en-
sure that protocols for handling cryptographic keys are secure and uphold the
security objectives of particular applications. It is also imperative to protect
multicast group applications from security threats such as eavesdropping on
confidential traffic, injecting false data traffic, modifying key values, or mas-
querading to join a multicast group.
The main security objectives for multicast communications are similar to tra-
ditional (unicast) communications, namely the provision of confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authentication security services. These are intended to ensure that
confidential information remains unexposed, information received by the group
members is correct and has not been modified during transit, and that com-
municating entities (including the group members of a multicast group) are
the ones who they claim to be. A GKMF provides all the management tasks
to maintain and protect the keys required to implement all of these services.
The first GKMF for secure multicast communication was proposed as part of
the Internet Standards pertaining to key management (Harney and Mucken-
hirn, 1997). Subsequent research on GKMFs has attempted to improve on this
framework (Mittra, 1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Waldvogel et al., 1999), (Hard-
jono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono et al., 2000b) and (Baugher et al., 2003). How-
ever, all of these GKMFs are intended for deployment in wired environments
2
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(such as the original Internet).
However, very little consideration has been given to developing GKMFs for
wireless mobile environments (WMobEs). Such environments place additional
constraints on the design of a GKMF since, for example, many devices that
operate in wireless environments have low computing power and storage ca-
pacity (Forman and Zahorjan, 1994) and (Chlamtac and Redi, 1998). Further-
more, hosts that are wireless and mobile aggravate the complexity of designing
a secure GKMF since, for example, group members from one area may be al-
lowed to move to another area while still remaining in a group session.
Currently, there is no detailed specification of a GKMF for WMobEs. The
main contribution of this thesis is to design, specify and analyze a GKMF for
group communication in WMobEs.
1.2 Research Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to design, specify and analyze a group key management
framework for secure group communication in wireless mobile environments.
The main research objectives of this thesis are, as follows:
• To provide backgrounds on multicast technology and its capability to
enable group communication.
• To identify different security challenges for establishing secure group
communication in WMobEs.
• To establish a generic GKMF, which includes main components and
processes (protocols) if a GKMF for secure group communication in
WMobEs is to be specified and designed.
• To design a specification of GKMF for secure group communication in
WMobEs.
3
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• To provide a basic analysis of the proposed GKMF to see to what ex-
tent that the framework meets its design requirements and its security
objectives.
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis provides a specification of a GKMF for a WMobE. We believe
that our work makes the following contributions to knowledge of secure group
communications in mobile environments:
(1) We provide a critical analysis of the different challenges of secure multicast
between wired and wireless mobile environments.
(2) We establish a generic group key management framework, which describes
the essential and desirable components that need to be addressed if a
group key management framework for wireless mobile environments is to
be specified.
(3) We design a specific group key management framework for wireless mo-
bile environments. This includes a specification of the main group key
management protocols.
(4) We conduct a basic analysis of the proposed framework, in terms of func-
tionality, security and performance.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 Introduction to Multicast and Group Commu-
nication... We introduce multicast and group communication.
4
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This includes defining the terms that we use throughout the
thesis.
Chapter 3 Security in Group Communication... We discuss
the security (research) issues pertaining to multicast group com-
munication, and give an overview of activities and standards for
establishing secure group communication.
Chapter 4 Group KeyManagement Frameworks (GKMF)...
We discuss the provision of key management for group commu-
nication; referred to as a Group Key Management Framework
(GKMF).
Chapter 5 GKMF: Design Challenges in Wireless Mobile
Environments (WMobEs)... We identify specific issues that
pose further challenge for establishing GKMFs in wireless mo-
bile environments (WMobEs).
Chapter 6 A Generic GKMF Model for Wireless Mo-
bile Environments... Here, we propose a generic model of
a GKMF for WMobEs.
Chapter 7 Existing GKMFs... We look at existing GKMFs to
show to what extent they fit into our generic model proposed
in Chapter 6.
Chapter 8 GKMF for WMobE: Scope and Requirements...
Based on the blueprint of the generic model, we specify in detail
our GKMF proposal for WMobEs. This chapter presents the
scope and requirements of our framework.
Chapter 9 GKMF for WMobE: GKMF Protocols... We
describe the design of protocols for our GKMF.
Chapter 10 GKMF: Analysis of the Proposal... We pro-
vide a basic analysis of the proposed framework. This includes
analysis each of protocol, and general analysis with regard to
performance and scalability of the proposed GKMF.
Chapter 11 Conclusions and Future Work... We conclude
our work, and provide suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Multicast and Group Com-
munication
This chapter gives an introduction to multicast (including definition of terms)
and its relationship to group communication.
In Section 2.1, we introduce the main terms and definitions that we will use
throughout the thesis. In Section 2.2, we look at the environments within
which multicast group communications operate. Finally, in Section 2.3, we
identify different types of multicast application.
2.1 Terms and Definitions
Since the successful testing of Audiocast at the 1992 Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) meeting in San Diego, U.S.A (Casner and Deering, 1992), the
idea of incorporating multicast features in network products has been highly
attractive to many vendors. Progress has been slow since initial deployment,
especially compared to the likes of the World Wide Web (WWW) and the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The reason for this is because multicast
features require additional intelligence in the network which introduces non-
trivial amounts of state and complexity in both core and edge routers (Gong
and Shacham, 1995). However, multicast communication is becoming increas-
ingly important and is a subject of great research interest.
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Before we proceed further, it is necessary for us to clarify some basic ter-
minology that we will use throughout this thesis. In the following sections,
we explain the differences between multicast, broadcast and unicast. We also
demonstrate the advantages that multicast offers for enabling group commu-
nication.
2.1.1 Unicast vs Multicast
Extrapolating from definitions in (Deering, 1989), (Miller, 1999), (Ammer,
2000), (Wittmann and Zitterbart, 2001), (Goyeneche, 2004) and (Ciscosystem,
2006), the term multicast can be defined as,
An internetwork function that allows data to be delivered to a spe-
cific group of nodes (or recipients) by a single transmission.
From a data sender point of view, multicasting allows data to be sent from
the source (which is the sender) only once, and the network will make copies
of data and transmit the data to multiple destinations (which are known as
the recipients of the multicast data) which have been determined prior to
transmission. This special feature enables data to be efficiently sent to a group
of recipients, and is therefore attractive for group-based application services
such as video conferencing, as well as data delivery services such as stock quote,
news or weather updates. Multicast is much more efficient then traditional
unicast methods, which only transmit data to one intended recipient.
We illustrate an example of unicast versus multicast data communication in
Figure 2.1. The left figure shows unicast data communication, while the right
figure shows multicast data communication. From Figure 2.1, unicast and
multicast data transmissions are indicated with bold arrows. Based on one-
to-many relationship (see Section 2.3), it shows a single sender (S) sending
data to a group of receivers (R).
If group communication is to be accomplished via conventional data commu-
nication based on unicast, as shown on the left of Figure 2.1, data to all group
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Figure 2.1: An example of unicast vs. multicast communication.
members needs to be sent across the network separately. Thus, in order to
transmit to n recipients (group members), n pieces of data need to be trans-
mitted. As illustrated on the right however, multicast allows a sender of data
to transmit only one copy of the data to n recipients. This is achieved when
a router (with a built-in multicast function at the network level) makes copies
of the data and transmits it to the intended recipients via the nearest routers.
End routers (closest to the recipients) will then complete the transmission, and
send the data to the intended recipients.
2.1.2 Multicast vs Broadcast
A closely related concept to multicast is broadcast. Commonly used in radio
and TV transmission, broadcast is easily understood as a way to transmit
data or messages to all recipient nodes in a network. Both broadcast and
multicast allow data to be transmitted to more than one recipient at a time.
However, in regards to group communication, multicast offers a better solu-
tion than broadcast in several aspects (Gong and Shacham, 1995), (Huitema,
1995), (Reid, 1997), (Almeroth, 2000), (Comer, 2001), (Hardjono and Dondeti,
2003) and (Perrig and Tygar, 2003):
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• Host coverage. Broadcast includes everyone (all hosts) in the network.
This is due to its indiscriminate transmission which can be received by
anyone having the correct equipment in place. For example:
(i) houses with a specific dish can receive satellite channels cast by a
satellite station.
(ii) computers connected to an Ethernet can receive messages cast by
the network.
On the other hand, multicast data is not sent to all hosts, but is rather
targeted to a predetermined group of hosts which have specific network
addresses.
• Internet Protocol (IP) context. Broadcast is usually designated by a
single address assigned to all stations in the network (such as an Ethernet
packet with a MAC address that can be received by all stations) (Reid,
1997). On the other hand, multicast offers more restricted access with
an IP multicast address (Deering, 1989) designating a certain group of
hosts in such a way that any transmission from one host in the group
is received by all other hosts within the group. More precisely, data
packets can only be processed by multicast group members with a correct
multicast address. For this to work, a particular address is reserved for
that purpose and is found in the destination address field of the message
(see Section 2.2).
• From a recipient’s context. With broadcast, all recipients will act upon
the received message, whereas with multicast only those recipients that
have been configured to respond to the destination address in the message
will do so. Thus, multicast saves network resources (such as the CPU
time) by allowing only the intended group of recipients to further process
the message received.
2.1.3 Group Communication vs Multicast Communication
Throughout this thesis, the terms group and multicast group carry the same
meaning and will be used interchangeably. Informed by various sources such as
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those in (Deering, 1989), (Forman and Zahorjan, 1994), (Gong and Shacham,
1995), (Chlamtac and Redi, 1998), (Canetti et al., 1999), (Diot et al., 2000),
(Hardjono and Tsudik, 2000), (Bruschi and Rosti, 2002), (Hardjono and Don-
deti, 2003) and (Baugher et al., 2005), we will avoid formal definitions and in-
terchange the terms multicast communication, group communication and mul-
ticast group communication. This approach is also supported by the following
sources gathered from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage as well as from the Cisco Internetworking Terms and Acronyms (Ammer,
2000) and (Ciscosystem, 2006), where both terms carry similar meanings, as
follows:
Multicast communication (Ciscosystem, 2006). A single communi-
cation (like an audio, a video or packets) made and copied by the
network and sent across a network to a specific subset of network
address.
Group communication (Ammer, 2000). A communication that oc-
curs in an assemblage of persons or objects, all interconnected and
capable of communicating with each other, in ways that are se-
curely isolated from all other users on the network.
2.2 Multicast Environments
The popularity of multicast has grown considerably with the wide use of the
Internet, as well as the increasing demand for group-based applications such as
online forums, pay per view channels (PPV), various information dissemination
services (such as news, weather, or share prices updates), as well as multimedia
conferences including video and audio conferencing.
While many internet applications use the conventional point-to-point or unicast
transmission, one-to-multipoint or one-to-many transmission was limited to
local network applications. The emergence of new applications over recent
years has seen changes in the earlier trend of unicast transmission seen as being
inadequate to support group-based applications. Thus, multicast transmission
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is becoming more popular as the demand for these new group applications
increases.
The original protocol that allowed the transmission of data on the Internet
is the Internet Protocol (IP), which supports unicast communication. For
multicast to function, an extension was designed to the original IP architecture
to incorporate the interesting features of multicast. This extension is known
as IP multicast. IP multicast is defined as a transmission of an IP datagram to
a group of hosts, identified by a single IP destination address (Deering, 1989).
This address must be one of the special addresses designated for the purpose
of multicast communication.
Based on the sources in (Deering, 1989), (Davies, 2003), (IANA, 2005) and (Hin-
den and Deering, 2006), we illustrate the allocation of IP multicast addresses
in the form of two tables. Table 2.1 gives the allocation of multicast addresses
in IPv4 (IP version 4), while Table 2.2 gives the IPv6 (IP version 6) version
of multicast address allocation. While an IP multicast group is identified by a
class D IPv4 address which ranges from 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255, in IPv6
multicast addresses always begin with 1111 1111 (binary), or FF (hex). This
set of addresses can be used for defining different multicast groups (except for
several designated addresses which are reserved and will never be used).
Table 2.1: Multicast address range in IPv4.
Just like conventional communications that are based on unicast, IP multicast
is an unreliable, unordered, and best-effort datagram service. In other words,
it does not guarantee that a datagram will arrive at all the destination group
nodes, and it is possible that the order of receiving the datagram at the end
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Table 2.2: Multicast address prefix in IPv6.
nodes may change during transmission.
In this early age of multicast technology, when multicast functionality has not
yet been widely integrated into traditional network routers, an experimen-
tal multicast network called multicast bone (MBONE) (Savetz et al., 1998),
(Goyeneche, 2004), (Devereaux-Weber, 2006) was constructed as a test bed
to realize multicast communication. The original purpose was to carry out the
first audiocast of IETF meetings. MBONE is a virtual network consisting of IP
tunnels (with virtual point-to-point links) between multicast routers that join
the multicast network together. As a consequence, MBONE’s main functional
aspect was providing an environment for multimedia conferences for various
groups of people from across the Internet.
These tunnels are particularly useful in many conventional unicast networks
where many network routers are not multicast capable. For this to work, both
end routers (nearest to a group of multicast hosts) need to be multicast capable
routers, and IP packets that are addressed to a multicast group are tunneled
between these multicast routers. In practice, the datagram of a multicast group
is encapsulated into another IP datagram by the nearest multicast router, and
sent across the network through one (or more) unicast routers as unicast data-
grams, which then forward it to the next multicast router of another multicast
group.
We illustrate a multicast communication over a unicast network in Figure 2.2,
with Figure 2.2(a) showing a set of multicast hosts wishing to form a group
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communication over a unicast network and Figure 2.2(b) depicting the tunnel-
ing of IP datagrams that occurs between these multicast hosts.
Figure 2.2(a) illustrates communication that occurs between several multi-
cast hosts over a traditional unicast network. This is supported by multicast
routers (MR) at both ends of multicast hosts. Here, we show that as this
communication occurs over a traditional network, the transmission link may
have to go through unicast routers (UR) which normally do not support mul-
ticast. One way for this to work is by using a technique called tunneling (see
Figure 2.2(b)).
Figure 2.2(b) illustrates two multicast hosts communicating with one another
over a unicast network (as shown in Figure 2.2(a)) via a multicast tunnel.
This is achieved as follows. When multicast IP datagrams leave the host to
the nearest multicast router (MR), encapsulation of multicast packets into uni-
cast IP datagrams is done, before transmitting it over a unicast network with
unicast router(s) (UR). At the receiving host, when the datagrams reach the
multicast router, the same datagrams will go through a de-capsulation process
to recover the original multicast IP datagrams, before being transmitted to
the host. This process of encapsulation and de-capsulation creates a multicast
tunnel between multicast hosts for enabling multicast communication over a
traditional unicast network.
2.3 Multicast Applications
We have now presented an overview of multicast, including the terms that we
will use throughout this thesis. We have also demonstrated that multicast
technology is more efficient than broadcast and unicast when enabling group
communication.
In this section, we look at different types of multicast application, as well
as several instances of group-based applications that could utilize multicast
technology. The main types of multicast application can be divided into two
13
2.3 Multicast Applications
(a) A set of multicast hosts forming a group communication over a unicast network.
(b) Tunneling of IP datagrams that occurs from (a).
Figure 2.2: An illustration of a multicast communication over a unicast net-
work.
categories, which are one-to-many and many-to-many relationships (Harney
and Muckenhirn, 1997), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Wittmann and Zitterbart,
14
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Figure 2.3: A one-to-many multicast (or group-based) communication.
2001). Each of these determines the relationship between the sender (S) and
the recipients (R) of multicast data.
2.3.1 One-to-Many Relationships
One-to-many relationships correspond to one-Sender to many-Recipients. In
this case, there is one entity that is the sender of the group, while one or
more entities will be the recipients of the group communication. Figure 2.3
illustrates this type of relationship within a multicast group, where there is
one entity that acts as the sole sender of the multicast data, while the others
are the recipients.
Amongst the examples of such group communications are the following:
• Data distribution. Push technologies such as stock quote services, weather
or news data, updating of sales information or, price list to all branches,
15
2.3 Multicast Applications
as well as advertisement dissemination based on consumer habits or place
of residence.
• Streamed data delivery. Widely referred to as broadcasting, such as TV
broadcasting as well as Pay Per View (PPV) channels.
• Software distribution. Software upgrades in a company, as well as the
distribution of updates by software manufacturers of their products over
the Internet.
2.3.2 Many-to-Many Relationships
In this type of relationship, many-to-many corresponds to many-Senders to
many-Recipients. In this case, there are one or more entities that will be the
sender (s) and/or the recipients of the multicast group. Thus, an entity can
be a sender, a recipient, or both. Figure 2.4 illustrates this type of multicast
application. Figure 2.4(a) shows a multicast group with two entities acting as
the senders of data, while Figure 2.4(b) illustrates that every entity within a
multicast group can potentially be both the sender and the recipient of data.
Amongst the examples of such group communications are:
• Audio/video and Teleconferencing. Also referred to as Computer-Supported
Cooperative Work (CSCW), group members that are located in differ-
ent sites will share white board tools designed for coordination between
members.
• Distance Learning. For example teleteaching, which refers to a scenario
in which a student in one place is able to participate in a class some-
where else. This requires group communication between those teaching
and those learning, since questions have to be asked and solutions need to
be discussed. Another example is virtual classrooms, where course par-
ticipants use the Internet to obtain teaching materials, deliver their as-
signments, as well as receive feedback from course instructors. Similarly,
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(a) With two entities as senders.
(b) With every entity can either be the sender, the recipient or both.
Figure 2.4: Many-to-many multicast (or group-based) communications.
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the instructor distributes papers to the virtual class and assignments are
collected from the course participants.
Note that some of the above group applications already existed before multicast
functionality was designed. These pre-multicast era applications are called
applications that emulate group communication. In these applications, very
simple group communication mechanisms are implemented in the applications
themselves, but not supported by the communication system that underlies
them. While this seems to outdate the need for a multicast function, its
implementation and performance are very simple. These were literally designed
to emulate group communication properties in the application itself. One
example is Electronic Mail Systems that allow you to send the same message
to groups of recipients, who are normally specified through mailing lists. Other
examples are the distribution of news, chatting on the Internet (such as the
Internet Relay Chat (IRC)), as well as game servers that allow web users to
play games like Backgammon, Chess and Life together on the Internet.
2.4 Summary
The need for multicast functionality has introduced new challenges, particu-
larly with respect to provision of secure environments for such applications.
Consequently, the security aspects and security objectives achieved in unicast
as well as in broadcast environments should also be deployed and achieved in
multicast environments. We will look at these issues in the next chapter.
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Security in Group Communication
This chapter discusses security in group communication, including the main
security issues specific to group communication.
First, in Section 3.1, we look at the current activities and standards pertaining
to the provision of security in group communication. Then, in Section 3.2, we
look at the main security issues of multicast group communication.
3.1 Security Activities and Standards
The first reference to multicast can be found in the PhD dissertation by Deer-
ing in the late 1980s, which was proposed as an Internet Standard in (Deering,
1989). Since then, multicast has become part of the research area of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (IETF, 2007), in particular propos-
ing security solutions for group-based communication such as those in (Deer-
ing, 1989), (Ballardie, 1996), (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997), (Wallner et al.,
1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono et al., 2000b), (Baugher et al.,
2003), (Hardjono and Weis, 2004) and (Baugher et al., 2005).
As a large open international Internet community, the IETF formed an Internet
Research Task Force (IRTF) (IRTF, 2007) to become a sister organization
of the IETF, one of whose active research groups is on multicast security.
This Secure Multicast Research Group (SMuG) (SMuG, 2007) was formed to
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discuss issues related to multicast security, as well as to investigate standards
for secure multicast. SMuG’s main intentions were to focus on the security
problems relating to IP multicast, with the aim of providing common solutions
for a variety of applications. The results obtained were presented to the IETF
for potential standardization. In order to expand its research scope, SMuG
was replaced by The Group Security Research Group (GSEC) (GSEC, 2007),
which was another short-lived research group of the IRTF.
With GSEC no longer active, the Working Group (WG) that is currently active
in research on multicast, as well as group communication security, is known
as Multicast Security (MSEC) (MSEC, 2007). Established directly under the
IETF organisation, MSEC is anticipated to continue the process of standard-
izing protocols pertaining to security provision of group communications over
the global Internet.
Three main problem areas have been defined by MSEC as the central research
areas concerning secure multicast by IETF (IETF, 2007). They are:
• Multicast data handling. This covers problems pertaining to the treat-
ment of multicast data by the entities involved in the communication,
such as encryption algorithms, as well as data integrity techniques.
• Management of keying material. This is concerned with the management
of all keying material of a multicast group, including distribution and
updating (or re-keying) of all cryptographic keys as well as other security
parameters related to the keys (such as information on key expiration
periods, or key usage).
• Multicast security policies. This area is concerned with all aspects of mul-
ticast group security policies, including creation, translation and repre-
sentation of policy of a multicast group. It is important that group policy
is managed properly since policies may be expressed in different ways,
they may exist at different levels and they may be interpreted differently
according to the context in which they are specified and implemented.
For example, policy negotiation and translation (if necessary) should be
performed as part of a host joining a multicast group. Otherwise, it is
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meaningless as new members will not be able to participate in the group
communication due to incorrect or inappropriate policies.
Published works in these problem areas can be found in (MSEC, 2007)
and (GSEC, 2007).
These problem areas are equally important and ought to receive equal treat-
ment in order to accomplish secure group communication. While some gen-
uinely new solutions are required, some of these problems can also be addressed
by adapting accomplishments in traditional unicast environments.
Our interest in particular concerns with security issues that are specific to
multicast group communication. We look at this in the following section.
3.2 Security Research Issues Specific to Group
Communication
In this section, we present the main security issues pertaining to group com-
munication. Like unicast, provision of security services for multicast group
communications is concerned with confidentiality, integrity, authenticity as
well as availability of group communications. As in unicast, an adversary may
carry out both passive and active attacks against a multicast communication,
such as:
• eavesdropping on confidential communication,
• disrupting a group session,
• blocking data transmission,
• injecting false data traffic,
• masquerading to join a group session,
• initiating a bogus group session, or
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• colluding members exchanging information in order to gain unauthorized
access to data which may contain cryptographic key and other group
related information.
Thus, it is crucial to provide a secure data exchange between group members,
which includes use of mechanisms or methods to:
(a) Establish the identity of the originator of a message.
(b) Protect transmitted data, including cryptographic keys, from unauthorized
disclosure and modification.
(c) Control group members’ access to data.
(d) Enable any member to verify the nature of the session in which he partic-
ipated.
With no regard to the order of importance, we address the main issues con-
cerned with the provision of security for group (multicast) communication in
the following sections.
3.2.1 Group Membership Policy
Multicast’s capability of sending data only to a specific group of hosts (group
members) requires some additional processing to restrict access to the specific
group. This processing includes the management of group membership.
The status of group membership of a multicast group is determined by the
group membership policy. This is defined during the creation of a multicast
group. The policy of group membership can be categorized into two types, as
follows (Gong and Shacham, 1995), (Bruschi and Rosti, 2002), (Hardjono and
Dondeti, 2003):
• Static policy. Often referred to as closed membership, group member-
ship with a static policy offers a restricted approach to allowing hosts
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to take part in a multicast group. In this case, group membership of a
multicast group is predetermined prior to the commencement of a group
communication and all group members belong to a certain multicast
group throughout its lifetime. For example, a video conferencing facility
for a global organization might have a predefined group of hosts corre-
sponding to its multiple branch sites. While no increment in the group
size is possible (no new members are allowed to join the group), some
circumstances need to be considered with regards to members leaving
the group:
(a) Group members may be permitted to leave during a group session.
(b) Group members may be allowed to re-join (after leaving) the group
session, except for cases where group members are deliberately
evicted from the group session. (This is a reasonable policy since
group members may well leave a group due to a disconnection that
is beyond their control.)
• Dynamic policy. Also referred to as open membership, a dynamic pol-
icy allows any hosts to join (or leave) a multicast group at any time
throughout the lifetime of the multicast group.
It is essential to define this group membership policy because it determines
the entire set of procedures for a particular multicast group communication.
3.2.2 Key Management
Key management for multicast communication is generally more complex than
for unicast environments. In a secure environment, presuming that a request
to establish a multicast session amongst a group of hosts is granted, a common
group key needs to be distributed to each of the group members prior to the
start of the group session.
In secure group communication, specific problems for managing the keying ma-
terial can be divided into two approaches depending on the group membership
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policy in place, as follows (Caronni et al., 1996), (Mittra, 1997), (Waldvogel
et al., 1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Noubir et al., 2002) and (Hardjono and
Dondeti, 2003):
• Static approach. Due to its fixed membership policy, the static approach
requires almost no change (or update) in keying material throughout
the lifetime of a multicast group except for periodic re-keying (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). This implies that a new multicast group will need to be
created to cope with new members joining the multicast group.
• Dynamic approach. The dynamic approach, where any hosts can join
(and leave) a multicast group at any time, potentially requires that cryp-
tographic keys be updated whenever there is a change in group member-
ship. The precise need for updating the keys is primarily determined by
whether the following services are required:
(a) Backward secrecy. This ensures that past communications, includ-
ing group keys and their related information, are inaccessible to
newly joined members. For provision of backward secrecy, group
keying material has to be updated whenever a new join to the group
occurs.
(b) Forward secrecy. This ensures that future communications remain
inaccessible to departed members. For provision of forward secrecy,
re-keying of keying material has to occur whenever an existing mem-
ber leaves the multicast group.
One of the main challenges in key management for group communication is
the distribution of the keys needed by group members of a multicast group.
Dynamic group membership aggravates the complexity of the protocols which
handle the distribution of cryptographic keys. In particular, it is important
to ensure that each group member gets keys for the right group sessions. Ad-
ditionally, if backward or forward secrecy is required, it is necessary to deny
some group members access to specific cryptographic keys.
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3.2.3 Group Security and Authentication
In secure multicast environments, as mentioned in Section 3.2, provision of
security services such as entity authentication, data confidentiality and data
integrity are required. However, secure multicast group communication has
some specific requirements in these areas (Gong and Shacham, 1995), (Canetti
et al., 1999), (Hardjono and Tsudik, 2000), (Almeroth, 2000), (Pessi, 2003)
and (Hardjono and Dondeti, 2003):
(a) As hosts may wish to join specific groups, and different groups may have
their own security requirements (for example, concerning who can join), it
is imperative that:
• Group managers verify that the service provided by a multicast group
is accessible only to authorized group members.
• Group members verify that the service they participate in is provided
by a genuine source.
• Both (group managers and group members) verify each other’s iden-
tities.
(b) Different policies (static or dynamic) may require different needs for man-
aging group keys (due to joins and leaves). In a dynamic policy, if back-
ward and forward secrecy are required then re-keying of group keys will
have to occur whenever there is a change in group membership.
3.2.4 Scalability
In general, the term scalability refers to the ability of a framework (or mech-
anisms within a framework) to be extended to cover a larger group of hosts
over a wider physical region without too much delay and deterioration in the
level of service provided.
In the context of secure group communication, the need for scalability primarily
affects the management of keying material. In particular, it affects the choice
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of types of cryptographic key that are needed for group communication, and
the methods by which the keys are updated, keeping in mind that in dynamic
environments the size of the group membership may gradually change over
time.
While the problem of hosts joining seems to be straightforward (if the provision
of backward secrecy is not necessary) and distribution of new cryptographic
keys can be supported by the old cryptographic keys, group members leaving
poses a much more difficult scalability problem. If the provision of forward
secrecy is necessary, new keying material must be sent to the remaining group
members in a way that excludes the leaving member. One method that can
be used is to send the key updates to each group member separately (each of
which is protected by an individual key). This creates a scalability problem
if the group is large and/or has a very dynamic group membership (Mittra,
1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Waldvogel et al., 1999), (Rodeh et al., 2000), (Setia
et al., 2000), (Setia et al., 2002) and (Noubir et al., 2002).
Thus, the scalability issues for secure group communication need to be ad-
dressed from an early design stage of any key management framework.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed security issues in group communication and
identified several issues specific to this type of environment. Our main interest
is in the management of keying material, in particular the distribution and
updating of cryptographic keys, which is crucial to ensure the security of any
multicast group communication.
In the next chapter we look at the provision of a key management framework
for group communication.
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Group Key Management Frameworks (GKMF)
This chapter discusses group key management frameworks (GKMF) for mul-
ticast group communications.
In Section 4.1 we introduce GKMFs. In Section 4.2 we discuss methods that
can be used to design a GKMF. Section 4.3 describes the main components
of a GKMF. Section 4.4 discusses security threats that could compromise the
multicast group communication security. In Section 4.5 we describe the main
GKMF security requirements for group communication. Section 4.6 discusses
general aspects of key management. Finally, in Section 4.7, we present the
important features necessary for a good GKMF design. Part of the work in
this chapter has been published in (MatKiah and Martin, 2005).
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, the IETF multicast research group (MSEC) de-
fined three main problem areas pertaining to multicast group communication
security. One of these was key management.
A group key management framework (GKMF) is an infrastructure comprising
the basic entities and functions necessary to provide common cryptographic
key(s) to all the members. In particular a GKMF specifies:
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• Entities and relationships. The placement of entities involved in group
communications and their relationships, as well as determining roles and
responsibilities for managing the cryptographic keys necessary for mul-
ticast groups.
• Key management processes. The management operations necessary to
control the cryptographic keys that are needed for group members to
engage securely in group communications. This includes generation, dis-
tribution, as well as updating (or re-keying) of keys. These are expressed
in terms of the protocols required to support these key management pro-
cesses. These include protocols for creating multicast groups, registration
of group members to multicast groups, as well as distribution of keys to
group members.
4.2 Design Approaches
Design approaches for establishing a GKMF can be classified in a number of
different ways. One way is to distinguish between static and dynamic key
management (see Section 3.2.2). Static approaches clearly have limited appli-
cation and more commonly dynamic approaches are required. Group key man-
agement frameworks can be further distinguished by two design approaches,
depending on whether a designated central entity can be relied upon for key
management purposes:
(i) Centralized schemes
Centralized schemes, including those in (Ballardie, 1996), (Wong et al.,
1998), (McDaniel et al., 1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a) and (Baugher
et al., 2003), require a central entity to govern and manage group keying
material. As the main point of security reference, all group members
are required to trust this entity. The advantages of adopting centralized
schemes are that:
(a) They are easy to manage, since the provision of trust is focused on
one entity.
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(b) They save some transmission overheads, since authentication of a
central entity (such as a group or key manager) may only need to be
done once by group members during a multicast group session.
On the other hand, centralized schemes share inherent drawbacks as fol-
lows:
(a) Bottlenecks may occur if there is implosion of transmissions where
group members send messages to the central entity at the same time,
and vice versa.
(b) Having a central entity as the only point of reference creates a single
point of failure. If the central entity fails then the whole system
collapses, which then results in paralysis of the multicast groups in
place.
(c) A central entity requires a large capacity for storing keying materials
for the entire system.
(ii) Distributed schemes
Distributed schemes, such as those in (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997),
(Steiner et al., 1998) and (Waldvogel et al., 1999) avoid the need for a
central entity. In these schemes, each member of a multicast group is
equally trusted, and all (or a few) members are required to take part
in managing the keying material, including generation of cryptographic
keys. For example, one method that can be used is that group members
who join early generate the keys and then distribute them to others who
join the group later.
The advantage of distributed schemes is that they offer more flexibility.
On the other hand, drawbacks of these schemes are that:
(a) They do not always scale well, since distribution of management tasks
across larger multicast groups can be complex.
(b) In large networks, the messages exchanged between group members
can be prohibitively large.
(c) There is always a risk that colluding members may exchange security
information.
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(iii) Hybrid schemes
Hybrid schemes, such those in (Mittra, 1997) and (Hardjono et al.,
2000b) are a combination of the two earlier approaches (centralized and
distributed). These schemes are based on a distributed hierarchy of
trusted entities for key management purposes. For example, in a two-
level hierarchy one or more entities are responsible (at the first-level) for
managing sub-entities (at the second-level). A sub-entity at the second-
level may govern other lower-level entities. From a bottom-up view, lower
entities are dependent on the higher-level entities.
These schemes potentially share both the advantages and disadvantages
exhibited in centralized and distributed schemes. Since the properties
can be fine-tuned using varying levels of hierarchy, the hybrid approach
is quite attractive for designing a GKMF.
4.3 Main Components
In this section we look at the main elements that form a GKMF. As mentioned
in Section 4.1, these fall into two categories:
4.3.1 Entities and Relationships
The main entities involved in a GKMF are:
• Group members. Group members consist of at least one sender (who
sends the data) and at least one recipient (who receives the data).
• Group manager(s). Often referred to as a group controller, key server or
key manager, a group manager (GM) controls all group processes, such
as registration of group members to a multicast group. In particular, the
GM manages the cryptographic keys that are needed for group commu-
nication, including the generation and distribution of such keys to group
members.
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Note that a group manager’s role may be performed by separate entities,
one of which is responsible for all general activities that concern a multi-
cast group, such as group membership policy, while the other is primarily
concerned with security aspects such as group key management.
4.3.2 Key Management Processes
The essential processes identified within a GKMF are described as follows:
• Formation of groups. Formation of a multicast group can be further
divided into two processes:
(a) Creation of multicast groups
At the network level, creation of a multicast group can be done by a
host sending a request to a network using the Internet Group Man-
agement Protocol (IGMP) (Deering, 1989) and (Williamson, 2000).
In return, the network kernel assigns a specific multicast address
for the group (see Section 2.2). At this point, all the information
related to a multicast group such as group membership policy, as
well as the cryptographic keys needed for a group communication,
is determined.
(b) Initial registration of group members
Once the interest to join a particular multicast group is determined,
a host instructs the network that he wishes to receive data sent to
a specific multicast group (at the application level, this is usually
indicated by a host requesting a group service on the Internet).
When that happens, it is considered that the host joins the group.
From another perspective, any host who wishes to join a multicast
group sends a join request to a group manager. Presuming that
the host is granted permission to join the group, group related-
information, in particular the cryptographic keys needed for group
communication, is exchanged between the group manager and the
group member.
31
4.3 Main Components
• Generation and distribution of cryptographic keys. Cryptographic
keys can be symmetric, asymmetric or a combination of both, depending
on the security objectives or preferences of particular multicast appli-
cations. Most GKMF proposals such as (Mittra, 1997), (Wong et al.,
1998), (Waldvogel et al., 1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Baugher et al.,
2003), (Hardjono andWeis, 2004) and (Baugher et al., 2005) use symmet-
ric keys because symmetric algorithms have lower computational com-
plexity and are faster than asymmetric algorithms (Gove, 2000), (Ikbal,
2003), (Dankers et al., 2004).
Using symmetric cryptography, the main keys needed for a multicast
group communication normally consist of:
(a) Individual keys
Often referred to as long-term keys, an individual key is unique for
every host (potential group member), and is typically shared with
a group manager. Individual keys are generated by a trusted entity
in the GKMF (such as a group manager). These keys are usually
established prior to the commencement of a multicast group.
(b) Group keys
Often referred to as traffic encryption keys (TEKs), a group key is
shared by the group members of a multicast group, and is primarily
used for securing the actual data communication. Group keys are
also generated by a trusted entity such as a group manager. Group
keys are usually distributed to every member of a multicast group
under the protection of individual keys.
Where asymmetric cryptography is used, all entities involved in the
group communication are assigned asymmetric key pairs (Harney
and Muckenhirn, 1997) and (Hardjono et al., 2000b).
Note that apart from the aforementioned keys, an auxiliary key may
be needed for the secure and efficient distribution of a group key to
group members of multicast groups (Wong et al., 1998), (Hardjono et al.,
2000b), and (Baugher et al., 2003). Thus, instead of having to send the
group key separately under the protection of individual keys of group
members, it can be sent once via a multicast message protected under
the auxiliary key.
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• New member joins. This process is quite similar to initial registration
of group members. Any host who wishes to join a multicast group will
need to send a join request message to a governing entity such as a GM.
If the member is granted permission to join the multicast group then
relevant keys need to be delivered to the newly joined member.
If backward secrecy is required then it may be necessary to re-key crypto-
graphic keys whenever a new member joins a multicast group. This will
result in all group members including the newly joined member obtaining
a new group key.
Note that new member joins may only be allowed in dynamic policies,
since static policies suggest no increment in group members (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1).
• Existing member leaves. The process of an existing member leaving
requires that any member who wishes to leave a multicast group sends
a leave request message to a governing entity such as a GM. If forward
secrecy is needed then re-keying will need to occur in order to update
the group with a new set of group keys.
Unlike members joining, members leaving are considered special because
a leave can be:
(a) Voluntary
This type of leave occurs at the request of a group member. A
group member may leave a multicast group at any time.
(b) Non-voluntary
This type of leave is not requested by a group member (for example
the ejection of a group member). A managing entity such as a
group or a key manager is responsible for managing and initiating
non-voluntary leaves.
Depending on group security requirements, an eviction of a group
member (non-voluntary leave) may require re-keying to occur.
• Re-keying. The process of re-keying group members with new crypto-
graphic keys may occur due to:
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(a) Group membership change
Due to new joins (for backward secrecy), or due to existing member
leaves (for forward secrecy). See Section 3.2.2 for more information.
(b) Periodic re-keying
A pre-determined plan to re-key a multicast group after a certain
interval (which is often dictated by a group policy, as well as se-
curity requirements of a particular application). This is normally
determined prior to the creation of a multicast group.
(c) Expiration of cryptographic keys
When a key has reached the end of its validity period. Often this
type of re-keying is synchronized with the periodic re-keying (as in
(b)), whichever occurs first.
(d) Compromised keys
When a key used is believed (or suspected) to have been compro-
mised and is no longer considered safe to use.
Re-keying events are normally initiated by governing entities such as
group or key managers. When re-keying occurs within a group, new
keys will be generated and distributed to all group members.
4.4 Security Threats
From the perspective of key management, threats (active or passive threats, or
a combination of both) that may compromise the security of multicast group
communications may in particular be targeted at data traffic of a group, which
includes messages (the actual data communication), and keying materials (the
cryptographic keys and related information).
In this section, we discuss security threats that could potentially compromise
multicast group communication security (Stallings, 1999), (Nichols and Lekkas,
2002), (Vines, 2002). They are listed as follows:
• Eavesdropping on group data traffic that contains confidential data or
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messages as well as keying materials.
• Intercepting data traffic that could result in further malicious use includ-
ing:
(a) Modifying the contents by inserting part or whole new messages (or
parameters) into the group data traffic.
(b) Keeping the contents for further cryptanalysis.
(c) Deleting messages so that the intended member never receives them.
• Recording messages (such as between two targeted group members or
key managers) to re-send (replay) at a later time.
• Disrupting or blocking a group session by an adversary (such as flooding
the key entities with bogus requests, which could result in denial of
service).
• Masquerading as a member to join a multicast group, or to create a
bogus session.
• Gaining unauthorized access from exchange of information by colluding
members.
It is thus important to address these threats when designing a GKMF.
4.5 Main Security Requirements
We have looked at the main components of a GKMF and identified the key
management processes and potential security threats in multicast group com-
munications. In this section, we look at the main security requirements which
are specific to multicast group communication.
Based on existing standard definitions ISO 7498-2 (ISO, 1989), ISO/IEC 11770-
2 (ISO, 1996b), BS ISO/IEC 9798-1 (BS, 1997) and FIPS PUB 199 (FIPS,
2004), we derive the security and trust requirements identified with a GKMF
as follows:
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• Entity authentication. Both group members and key manager en-
tity(s) need to be able to authenticate and verify each other’s identities,
and by doing so each entity believes that an entity is who it claims to
be. This usually occurs via unicast communication between two entities,
such as when a host first contacts the key manager to join a multicast
group.
• Backward and forward Secrecy. All necessary key materials must be
re-keyed whenever there is a change in group membership (either due to
new joins or member leaves). While backward secrecy controls access to
previous communication from the newly joined members, forward secrecy
controls access to future communication from the leaving members.
• Data (Message) integrity and authentication. Both group mem-
bers and key manager(s) need to be able to check that the data received
originates from the claimed entity(s) and that it has not been altered in
an unauthorized way. Depending on the level of security of an applica-
tion, there are two types of checking that can be done, as follows:
(a) Group authentication
All members within a multicast group need to be able to check that a
message received originated within the group, and that the message
has not been altered by entities outside the group. This type of
data authentication is usually useful in multicast communication
that occurs between entities who share a common key, such as the
real data communication between members of a particular multicast
group.
(b) Origin (Source) authentication
Each member (group member or key manager entity) needs to be
able to corroborate that the source of data (message) received is as
claimed. This type of authentication is often important when one
entity needs to verify that the security parameters (keys) received
are coming from the claimed entity. For instance, a sub-group key
manager will need to be able to corroborate that all messages con-
taining the keys originate from the main key manager.
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• Need for trust model. For secure multicast group communication, we
need a trust model that includes:
(a) An architecture that is compatible with the existing network pro-
tocols.
(b) A framework which is scalable for expansion without affecting too
much the level of service and overall system performance.
(c) A trusted managing entity(s) for managing keying material (in par-
ticular generation and distribution of cryptographic keys).
• Secure key distribution. All necessary key materials need to be se-
curely distributed to all group members prior to group communication.
• Secure key updates (re-keying). Key updates must be done securely,
since a new set of key materials may need to be distributed whenever
a key compromise is suspected, the current keys expire, or whenever
there is a change in group membership. Group members need to be
informed by the managing entity(s) whenever there is a change in the
key materials that they are using and when key updates are on the way.
The re-keying process should be conducted without disrupting any on-
going communication.
4.6 Aspects of Key Management
Secure and proper handling of all aspects of key management is one of the
fundamental requirements of any GKMF design in order to form a secure and
trusted model for the deployment of group communication. Based on ISO/IEC
11770-1 (ISO, 1996a), (Stallings, 1999), (Murray, 2000) and (Zou and Thukral,
2006), the main aspects of key management are the provision of the following
basic key services:
• Key generation. The generation of cryptographic keys for a particular
cryptographic algorithm. This needs to be done in a secure and proper
manner.
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• Key registration. The registration of cryptographic keys with entities.
Registration of keys is usually done by a trusted registration authority,
and usually applied when symmetric cryptographic techniques are used.
• Key certification. This applies to public key cryptography, to ensure the
association of a public key with an entity. Key certification is provided
by a certification authority.
• Key distribution. The dissemination of cryptographic keys to the com-
municating entities. Key distribution can be performed using physical
(or manual) techniques, or using a trusted third party such as a key dis-
tribution centre (KDC) or a key translation centre (KTC), where keys
can be delivered to users by using other keys (often called key encrypting
keys).
• Key installation. The installation of a key prior to its use.
• Key update (re-keying). The ending of the use of one key and beginning
of use of another key (see Section 4.3.2).
• Key storage. The secure storage of cryptographic keys prior to use, for
short-term use, or for back-up. For security reasons, keys are usually
stored physically in a secure environment, for instance using tamper-
resistant hardware. Keys can also be protected by other means, such as
by encipherment with other keys, or by controlling access to keys using
passwords or PINs.
• Key derivation. A special form of key generation, where a key is derived
from other keys using some transformation process. It is important to
ensure that compromise of the derived key does not reveal the derivation
key or other derived keys.
• Key archiving. The provision of secure long-term storage for keys. Archived
keys may be needed at a later time for generation of new keys or to verify
certain claims after the key has expired.
• Key revocation. The revocation of a key after key compromise is sus-
pected, or known, or when it has reached its expiration date. Similar
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to the process of key update, except that there are no subsequent keys
involved.
• Key de-registration. Part of the key disposal process, a key association
with an entity is removed. This is done by a key registration authority.
• Key disposal. The disposal or destruction of a key that is no longer
needed. This process includes all materials (both physical and electronic
documents) associated with a key. This should be done in a secure and
proper manner so that after the key is disposed, no other remaining
information can be used to recover the disposed key.
Note that while all of these processes require attention, the majority of GKMFs
for group communication (Mittra, 1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Waldvogel
et al., 1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Baugher et al., 2003), (Hardjono and
Weis, 2004), (Baugher et al., 2005) and key management standards ISO/IEC
8732 (ISO, 1988), ISO/IEC 11770-1 (ISO, 1996a) and ISO/IEC 11770-2 (ISO,
1996b) are mainly concerned with distribution and updating (re-keying) of
cryptographic keys. Other aspects of key management are implicitly assumed
to be available and securely managed by trusted entity(s), since their provision
is handled by generic key management processes that are not specific to group
key environments.
4.7 Important Features
We have identified the main entities and processes that form a GKMF. In this
section, we identify features that in our opinion a good GKMF should have.
4.7.1 Historic Development
Note that the initial designs of GKMFs, such those in (Ballardie, 1996),
(Caronni et al., 1996), (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997), (Harkins and Car-
rel, 1998) and (Maughan et al., 1998) considered only the basic features suffi-
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cient to support multicast group communication, without considering further
needs for security (note that IP multicast was never intended to provide secure
multicasting).
From the early 1990s we have witnessed the emergence of applications (see Sec-
tion 2.3) that require secure multicast technology. Thus, the need for secure,
reliable and scalable GKMFs has become increasingly important.
Another aspect of this is that, as the demands for group-based applications
have increased, service providers have realized that they want more out of the
multicast facility. In particular there has been demand to:
(a) control access to information to certain groups of hosts.
(b) restrict access to valid group members during specific time periods (while
they are registered (valid) members of a multicast group).
(c) preclude members who have ceased to be group members of a multicast
group.
4.7.2 Different Features for Different Applications
An additional challenge for GKMF design is that different applications typi-
cally require different features. There is normally no such thing as one solution
fit for all applications, and GKMFs for secure multicast group solutions are no
exception. A particular design of a GKMF may be sufficient to meet certain
requirements of some multicast group applications, while lacking for others.
Consider three applications mentioned in Section 2.3: stock quotes distribution,
PPV (Pay per View) channels and conference events.
• Stock quotes. A service providing stock quote information may not re-
quire confidentiality (since such data is often public), but the recipients
may wish to ensure the integrity of data received and that it originates
from a valid sender.
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Table 4.1: Multicast applications and their security requirements
• Pay per view. Viewers of PPV channel (the recipients) may not care
about source authentication (as long as they obtain the right channels).
However, the PPV service providers may wish to restrict access to chan-
nels only to users who are actually paying for the service. Note that, due
to the nature of application, both viewers and service providers may not
require confidentiality services.
• Conference events. Conference events, where only members who have
registered for a conference should be granted access to conference mate-
rials, may require a confidentiality service. Conference organizers may
wish to control access to materials and ensure that only registered mem-
bers are able to view them.
We summarize the security requirements of the aforementioned applications in
Table 4.1.
The provision of these different security requirements all involve some kind
of cryptographic keys being managed properly and securely within a GKMF,
although the precise security services required depend on the requirements of
particular multicast applications.
4.7.3 Specification of Features
We attempt here to identify the key features that a GKMF should have.
From various studies on existing GKMFs (Mittra, 1997), (Harney and Muck-
enhirn, 1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Waldvogel et al., 1999), (Wallner et al.,
1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono et al., 2000b), (Decleene et al.,
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2001), (Baugher et al., 2003), (Hardjono and Weis, 2004) and (Baugher et al.,
2005), we have extracted the important features of a GKMF and divided them
into two parts; essential properties that every GKMF should have and desirable
properties that are optional depending on the specific requirements.
4.7.3.1 Essential features
As discussed in Section 4.7.2, different applications may require different prop-
erties depending on their specific requirements. We thus classify the essential
features that a secure GKMF should have into two further categories:
(1) Independent of application
Independent of application in place, the essential features that a secure
GKMF should have are:
• Dynamic group membership policy. To allow a framework to be as
flexible as possible group members should be free to join and/or leave
any time during any session throughout the multicast group lifetime.
• Backward and forward Secrecy. A good GKMF should ideally provide
these on a default basis, maintaining the secrecy of information to
valid group members at all times.
• Dynamic and efficient re-keying processes. To efficiently manage any
re-keying that will need to occur. Re-keying processes should be
conducted without disrupting any on-going communications.
• Scalability. Group communications can potentially involve tens of
thousands of members, many of whom may be constantly joining and
leaving groups. A GKMF should thus be scalable with respect to the
efficient distribution and management of keying material.
• A trust model. A trust model is crucial for a GKMF in order for it
to properly function. This should include a security architecture that
is compatible with the existing network protocols, as well as scalable
and transparent to higher level applications and services. This also
includes determination of delivery point(s) of keys.
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• Reliable and trustworthy key manager. Whether key managers are
centralized or distributed, they should be sufficiently reliable that
other entities (including group members) trust them.
(2) Dependent of application
Dependent of application, the essential features that a secure GKMF
should have are:
• Secure data exchange. This includes mechanisms for protecting trans-
mitted data, regulating group members’ access to data and verifying
to any member the nature of the group session in which they partic-
ipated.
• Group and member authentication. Apart from the initial registra-
tion with a trusted group manager upon joining a multicast group,
GKMF protocols ought to consider not just verifying that a member
is valid and belongs to a valid group (group authentication) but may
also choose to verify the actual member (member authentication)
participating in the group communication.
4.7.3.2 Desirable features
In this section, independent of application, we identify other desirable but
optional features of a GKMF as follows:
• Minimizing computational and storage efforts. Keeping to a minimum
the amount of computation that needs to be done, and keys that need to
be managed and securely stored, by all communicating entities during a
multicast group communication.
• Minimizing traffic implosion. Keeping to a minimum the number of
messages that needs to be exchanged during GKMF protocols.
• Reduced trust in third party and intermediate nodes. To minimize the
reliance upon third party nodes which may be needed to support a secure
GKMF.
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• Minimizing risk of attack vulnerabilities. Protecting and minimizing the
risk of group data and any keying materials from both passive and ac-
tive attacks that would compromise the security objectives of the group
communication.
• Minimizing risk of colluding members. Minimizing the impact of group
members who exchange information in order to gain additional unautho-
rized access to the group data traffic.
• Coping with system and network failures. Any good and reliable com-
munication architecture should be able to deal with system and network
failures, either caused by human errors or natural disasters.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we described the basic components of a GKMF and established
desirable features which are generic for any networking environments (wired
or wireless networks).
In the next chapter we provide additional challenges for deploying multicast
group communications in wireless mobile networks.
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GKMF: Design Challenges in Wireless Mo-
bile Environments (WMobEs)
This chapter briefly looks at the additional challenges faced by establishing
GKMFs for wireless mobile environments (WMobEs).
In Section 5.1 we identify several types of WMobEs. In Section 5.2 we look
at inherent characteristics of WMobEs which introduce new challenge for mul-
ticast group communication in such environments. In Section 5.3 we identify
specific problems associated with the establishment of multicast group com-
munication in WMobEs.
5.1 Types of Wireless Mobile Environments
While issues concerning group communication are widely researched and the
development of secure multicast becoming more pertinent in wired networks,
its implementation in mobile environments (wireless networks) is still in its in-
fancy. Applications and services which are available in wired networks should
also be made available in wireless networks and vice versa. There are similar
expectations for providing secure and reliable communication in both environ-
ments.
Main types of WMobE can be categorized as:
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(a) Fixed-based networks
A collection or a group of wireless mobile nodes communicating or using
the services usually provided by corporate enterprise networks or small
office home offices (SOHO) over wireless mediums such as wireless lo-
cal area networks (WLANs), or cellular-based networks such as GSM or
UMTS (Lin and Chlamtac, 2001), (Hillebrand, 2002). This kind of group
communications operates with the help of fixed infrastructures such as
base stations, access points or satellites.
(b) Non Fixed-based networks
Operating without the help of any infrastructure, non fixed-based networks
can be further classified into:
• Adhoc networks. A collection of wireless mobile nodes communicating
among themselves, possibly over multi-hop paths, without the help
of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points (IIyas,
2003), (Michiardi and Molva, 2006).
• Sensor networks. A special form of adhoc networks, sensor networks
consist of a collection of individual nodes (usually battery operated),
each of which transmits data signals also without the help of any
infrastructure. Typical use of an individual sensor is for collecting
specific data such as sudden changes in climate across a geographical
area (Wadaa et al., 2004).
We note that the WMobEs concerned with our work rely on fixed network
infrastructures where reliable entities such as domain key managers and area
key managers are assumed available. We will not consider ad-hoc or sensor
networks in this thesis.
5.2 Inherent Characteristics of WMobEs
Our list of desirable features for a GKMF in Section 4.7.3 is generic, and
equally applicable to wired and wireless networks (WMobEs). However, there
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are three main aspects in which WMobEs are significantly different. We look
at each of these in the following subsections.
5.2.1 Non-fixed and Wireless Network Connectivity
In comparison to fixed wired networks, wireless mobile networks have some
very different security issues:
• More susceptible to security attacks. Compared to wired data transmis-
sions, wireless data transmission is more susceptible to attacks discussed
in Section 4.4, particularly passive attacks such as eavesdropping and
monitoring of data traffic. These attacks are more acute in WMobEs
since they are easier to carry out in such environments because an ad-
versary does not have to physically tap into a network (Vines, 2002)
and (Nichols and Lekkas, 2002). This could result in further security
breaches if certain measures are not in place. For example, messages or
group data that are not encrypted can easily be read and understood by
an adversary who is eavesdropping on the group data traffic.
• Trust within foreign networks. As mobile environments allow members
to move around, changes in location may require group members to occa-
sionally communicate via foreign networks that cannot always be trusted.
This affects the amount of trust to impart on governing entity(s) within
foreign networks (including how much information they want to share).
Likewise, foreign networks may want to consider the amount of trust
they want to place on the visiting mobile hosts, since they may gather
information about the local security services for the areas they visit,
which can lead to security threats if not contained.
• Susceptible for disconnections. Compared to wired networks, transmis-
sions in wireless networks have high tendencies for disconnection. Host
mobility in such environments aggravates this issue further. Frequent
disconnections during data transmission may cause unnecessary disrup-
tions to group communication. In this case, minimal delay during key
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management processes may be useful in such environments.
5.2.2 Nature of Mobile Devices
Many mobile devices such as mini PDAs or smart phones exhibit special char-
acteristics with regards to having limited power consumption (or energy sup-
ply), limited data (key) storage as well as having lower processing speed, which
hinder intensive and heavyweight processing. With such constraints, the de-
sign of a GKMF should employ:
• As little cryptographic computation as possible.
• Minimal messaging bandwidth usage (in other words, minimum message
exchange between communicating entities).
• Efficient storage (normally associated with minimizing numbers of keys
that a mobile device needs to store).
5.2.3 User (Host) Mobility
Wireless mobile environments allow user (host) mobility. As group members
are allowed to move between areas, the mobility issue exhibits problems that
do not occur in wired networks such as:
• Hand-off operations. When group members move from one area to an-
other, some kind of hand-off operation from the current area to the visited
area (the area where the member is moving to) is required.
• Management of keying material. Problems pertaining to management
of cryptographic keys needed during host mobility include deciding who
governs the moves and who keeps track of keying material.
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• Network disconnection. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, network trans-
missions between communicating entities may change over time, and be
prone to failure (disconnection).
The issues discussed so far are, to an extent, the common security problems
associated with wireless mobile networks. The implementation of multicast
group communications in such environments introduces further issues that
need to be addressed by a GKMF. We look at these issues in the next section.
5.3 Issues Specific to Group Communications in
WMobEs
We have mentioned the main security issues pertaining to group communica-
tions in Section 3.2. In this section we present specific security issues concern-
ing group communications for deployment in wireless mobile networks.
5.3.1 New Reasons for Joins and Leaves
Group members no longer just join and leave a multicast group for reasons
discussed in Section 4.3 but are also allowed to join and leave as they move
between areas while still remaining in a group session. Thus, in addition to the
processes discussed in Section 4.3.2, a specific protocol is required to govern
members’ movement between areas, which is also referred to as host mobility.
The process of a member moving to other areas may be treated as a leave from
one area followed by a join to another. Any member who wishes to move will
need to notify a key manager, prior to moving. Similarly to a member joining
and a member leaving (see Section 4.3.2), a member moving to another area
may require the provision of backward and/or forward secrecy (since different
areas may have their own security requirements). In this case, controlling
access to visited areas may be necessary.
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In dynamic environments, group members may be allowed to freely move be-
tween areas while still remaining in a group session.
5.3.2 Additional Key Management to Support Mobility
The generation of new keying material may be required in order to support
host mobility. For example:
(a) Moving members may still hold cryptographic keys of the areas they visited
even after they leave a multicast group, which may lead to compromise.
(b) Host mobility may require group members to occasionally communicate
via a foreign network (the visiting area) that may not be fully trusted.
Thus, it is important to ensure that group members that are moving from
one area to another are protected (via different sets of keys).
(c) Group members that move between areas may gather the area’s local se-
curity information. It is imperative to ensure that the area is protected
from members who are moving from one area to another in order to collect
the security information (keys) of each area for malicious purposes.
5.3.3 Performance Requirements
We have looked at the security and key management requirements in Sec-
tion 4.7.3, which also apply for designing a GKMF for WMobEs. In this
section, we discuss the performance requirements of a GKMF in a WMobE.
The performance requirements can be divided into several categories as follows:
• Computation, energy and storage requirements. All computa-
tions related to group security should be resource efficient, since mobile
nodes are usually equipped with limited power and storage, which re-
stricts their ability to do rigorous computations and to store a large
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amount of data. Therefore, any security-related operations to be done
by mobile devices are to be kept as low as possible. This also includes the
number of keys that each member needs to store throughout a multicast
group session.
• Communication and bandwidth requirements. In WMobEs, since
frequent connection cut-offs are likely to happen and the bandwidth avail-
able is limited compared to wired environments, the number of messages
exchanged (such as between key manager entities sending and/or receiv-
ing keys and other security related information) should be kept as low
as possible. As battery life is also a big problem in many mobile devices,
less messages that need to be processed and sent may be necessary since
more messages will drain batteries life.
• Mobility requirement. All security-related information associated
with each member during his mobility, including the distribution of new
keys or key updates, needs to be managed in a proper manner so that
the performance (quality of service) of the framework should not be sig-
nificantly reduced by host mobility.
5.4 Summary
We have looked at the additional challenges faced by establishing GKMFs for
wireless mobile environments.
In the next chapter we provide a generic GKMF model suitable for such envi-
ronments.
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A Generic GKMF Model for Wireless Mo-
bile Environments
This chapter proposes a generic GKMF model for WMobEs. The purpose of
this generic model is to act as a blueprint within which we can later specify
particular frameworks.
The generic framework is divided into two main parts. Section 6.1 describes the
main components of the framework. Section 6.2 presents the main protocols
(or processes) of a GKMF that are needed for multicast group operations in
WMobEs. Part of the work in this chapter has been published in (MatKiah
and Martin, 2006).
6.1 Main Components
In this section we describe the main functional components that a GKMF
should have for secure multicast group communication. This includes the
general architecture of typical entities that form a GKMF, their relationships
and cryptographic keys used. It also includes other aspects of the framework
such as options for assigning key managers, and group membership policy.
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6.1.1 General Architecture
The main components that comprise an architecture can be listed as follows:
(a) Main entities
The main entities identified within a framework for group key management
are typically:
• Server(s). Typical roles of servers are as key managers, group man-
agers, group controllers, or as supporting nodes for multicast group
communication.
• Hosts. Hosts or group members are the lowest level entities within a
GKMF. Also referred to as key users, group members engage in the
actual group communication. Group members consist of at least one
sender of data, and one (or more) recipients of data.
Figure 6.1 illustrates a basic model for group key management with a cen-
tral entity. From the figure, a key server (which can also be referred to as
group manager) is the central managing entity for group members; one as
a sender and another as a recipient. Both members need to establish se-
curity parameters prior to group communication, and this is done through
key and security association (SA) management (denoted by ←→ arrows).
Any subsequent communications such as key updates that need to occur
are done through a control channel between the key server and the group
members (denoted by dashed arrows). The actual group communication
among the group members is denoted by a bold −→ arrow.
(b) Domain(s) and Area(s)
Domain(s) and area(s) in wireless mobile environments (WMobEs) can be
described, as follows:
• Domains. Logically, a domain can be viewed as a bigger system which
comprises a group of subsystems, which can consist of hundreds or
thousands of services. From another perspective, a domain can cover
a physical large geographic area (such as a UK region), which consists
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Figure 6.1: A basic model for group key management with central entity.
of smaller areas (such as counties). Each domain may have its own
purpose, common goals and objectives.
• Areas. Smaller versions of domains, areas can be viewed logically
as subsystems which operate under the governance of bigger systems
(such as domain system). Similarly, an area can cover a physical
geographic area (such as one or more counties) which can be part of
larger system (such as a region). While all areas in a domain may
share the domain’s general goals and objectives, each area may have
its own unique requirements.
Typically for the purpose of key management, in a wireless mobile
network (such as GSM network), a domain can be one large physical
area which may be governed by physical entity (such as a group con-
troller or a key manager). For efficient key management, the domain
can be further divided into smaller manageable physical areas, each
of which may have its own governing entity.
WMobEs allow group members to move from one place to another while
54
6.1 Main Components
still participating in a group session. For ease of managing host mobility
in such environments, group members are typically placed in these man-
ageable areas.
As WMobEs can consist of multiple domains and areas that can be overlap-
ping logically and physically, we use intra-domain to describe relationships
within a domain, and inter-domain to describe relationships between two
(or more) distinctive domains.
An example of domains and areas is depicted in Figure 6.2. Domain DA
and DB each consists of several areas. The inter and intra domain rela-
tionships are shown between and within the domains.
Figure 6.2: An example of domains and areas.
(c) Placement of entities
The entities in the framework identified in (a) must be placed in the do-
mains and areas identified in (b). As discussed in (b), a domain can be
further divided into smaller (or multiple) areas (see Figure 6.2). Thus,
these areas need to be placed within a domain and group members within
these areas. Domain(s) and areas may have their own managing entity.
Typical placement of entities based on a centralized framework is illus-
trated in Figure 6.3. Here, domain j is depicted to consist of at least
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two independent areas, which are Area a and Area b, with one managing
entity at the domain level referred to as the domain entity. Similarly, at
the area level, each area consists of one managing entity referred to as an
area entity. Group members M can be positioned in any of the areas in
domain j, and each area entity is responsible for group members residing
in its area.
Figure 6.3: An example of placement of entities in a domain j.
(d) Trust Relationships
Trust relationships between the entities need to be specified. Typically,
trust relationships within a GKMF revolve around key managers (as the
main key distributors). Key managers are often configured and maintained
by human administration and implemented using secure technology, since
they represent the best point of attack.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, all entities involved in multicast group com-
munication in a centralized scheme trust the centralized key manager in
the domain, which is the primary source of security parameters (such as
cryptographic keys) needed for group communication. When the need
arises, this entity can also take on the role of a certification authority.
On the other hand, distributed schemes require having multiple entities
acting as key managers, who are jointly trusted for the generation and dis-
tribution of the security parameters needed for the group communication.
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(e) Types of Key
The types of key used in the framework need to be specified. As mentioned
in Section 4.3.2, cryptographic keys can be symmetric, asymmetric or a
combination of both.
Where symmetric keys are used, they can typically be classified into:
• Traffic keys. Primarily used for securing actual data communica-
tions (also referred to as traffic encryption keys or traffic protection
keys), and shared amongst all group members of a particular multi-
cast group. Typically, a traffic key is unique for a multicast group.
• Domain keys. These keys are typically shared and used by key man-
agers for secure distribution of traffic keys within a domain (also
referred to as group keys or key encryption keys). In WMobEs where
multiple domains may exist, every domain should have its own do-
main key.
• Area keys. These keys are typically unique to an area and shared
between key managers and group members residing in the area (also
referred to as area control keys). Used for secure distribution of keys
by an area key manager to members within an area. They also form
auxiliary keys (at the area level) which may be used by members
to send secure messages amongst one another within that particular
area.
• Individual keys. These keys are long-term secrets between key man-
agers and group members. These keys typically need to be established
prior to any request to create multicast groups.
In cases where asymmetric keys are used, all entities are normally assigned
asymmetric key pairs. Each member is assumed to have a copy of the public-
keys of relevant key managers. Key managers are also assumed to have copies
of public keys of any other key managers they need to communicate with.
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6.1.2 Group Membership Policy
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, group membership can be categorized as:
(a) Static, or closed membership;
(b) Dynamic, or open membership.
As noted in Section 4.3.2, we normally assume that dynamic membership is
supported in any GKMF for WMobEs.
6.1.3 Design Approach
As mentioned in Section 4.2, this can be:
(a) Centralized scheme,
(b) Distributed scheme, or
(c) Hybrid scheme.
6.2 Main Protocols
In this section we describe the main protocols needed for designing a GKMF
for deployment in a WMobE. While many of these are generic GKMF protocols
mentioned in Section 4.3.2, we also need a protocol for host mobility to govern
the movement of group members between areas throughout their membership
of a multicast group.
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6.2.1 Protocol for Creating New Group
This protocol governs the creation of new multicast groups. It also includes
the initial registration of group members to a multicast group and initial dis-
tribution of keys to that particular member. Note that, typically, any host
who requests the creation of a multicast group is considered to be the first
host to register (or join) the group.
At this point, the information related to group membership policy, as well
as the relevant keys (see Section 6.1) necessary for group communication, are
determined.
6.2.2 Protocol for New Member Joining
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, this process is similar to the initial registration
of group members. In particular, this protocol governs new joins of group
members into a multicast group. It also includes the distribution of all crypto-
graphic keys needed for the group communication to the newly joined members.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, different membership policy affects the way we
manage the cryptographic keys. Thus, this protocol introduces two options
which can be adopted in admitting any hosts to become group members of a
multicast group:
(a) Members joining with backward secrecy
In the first option, typically when a newly joined member is to be prevented
from accessing previous group traffic or old group keys, all cryptographic
keys associated with the multicast group, including the area where the
group member is residing, need to be re-keyed.
(b) Members joining without backward secrecy
In the second option, no such restriction applies, and re-keying may not
need to occur. New group members are given the same set of keys that
are currently used by existing members.
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6.2.3 Protocol for Existing Member Leaving
This protocol governs existing members leaving a multicast group. As men-
tioned in Section 4.3.2, members leaving can be:
(a) Voluntary, or
(b) Non-voluntary.
Like members joining, two options can be adopted due to members leaving:
(a) Members leaving with forward secrecy
In the first option, if controlling access to future group communication
is necessary then re-keying needs to occur whenever an existing member
leaves a multicast group. All relevant keys will need to be generated and
distributed to all remaining group members.
(b) Members leaving without forward secrecy
In the second option, no such restriction applies. Re-keying may not need
to occur.
6.2.4 Protocol for Member Moving to Other Areas
As mentioned in Section 5.3, we need a protocol for host mobility. This protocol
governs members moving to other areas. Hand-off operations between affected
areas (areas where group members are moving from and moving to) may need
to occur prior to members moving in order to establish relevant keys.
As the security requirements for a member moving to another area is quite
similar to that of a new member joining (see Section 5.3), two options can be
adopted due to host mobility:
(a) Members moving with backward secrecy
In the first option, typically if a moving member is to be denied access to
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an area’s security information (the area where the member is moving to),
all cryptographic keys associated with that area need to be re-keyed.
(b) Members moving without backward secrecy
In the second option, no such restriction applies, and re-keying within an
area may not need to occur. Moving members are given the same set of
keys that are currently used in that area.
6.2.5 Protocol for Re-keying
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, re-keying may need to occur due to:
(a) Group membership change.
(b) Periodic re-keying.
(c) Expiration of cryptographic keys.
(d) Compromised keys.
WMobEs may also require re-keying due to host mobility (see Section 5.3).
Each of these processes results in all group members obtaining the new cryp-
tographic keys needed for secure group communication.
In WMobEs where domains and areas may have their own managing entities,
re-keying can be divided into two levels:
(a) At the domain level
Re-keying at the domain level is normally initiated and controlled by a
domain manager. For example, for the provision of backward secrecy,
whenever a new host joins a multicast group, the group’s traffic key must
be re-keyed. The domain governing entity will have to initiate re-keying
of the traffic key by generating a new traffic key and delivering it to all
area manager entities and group members.
61
6.3 Summary
(b) At the area level
Re-keying at the area level is initiated and controlled by an area manager
governing that area. Similarly, for the provision of backward secrecy, the
area key of an area (where the new join occurs) must be re-keyed. The area
manager will have to initiate the re-keying of its area key by generating a
new area key and sending it to group members in that area (including the
newly joined member).
6.3 Summary
We have proposed a generic GKMFmodel for group communication forWMobEs.
In the next chapter, we will illustrate how a number of GKMFs in the literature
fit into this generic model.
62
Chapter 7
Existing GKMFs
This chapter looks at existing GKMFs. We show how they fit into our generic
model of Chapter 6, and identify where they are deficient for our purpose of
establishing a GKMF for a WMobE. None of them provide the full functionality
we require, but this exercise will influence our design of a specific GKMF in
the remaining chapters of the thesis.
In Section 7.2 we present the existing frameworks. In Section 7.3 we show how
these frameworks fit into our generic model.
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we look at existing architectures that are relevant in identify-
ing certain attributes that are useful for our purpose. A number of GKMFs
have been proposed in the literature, including (Mittra, 1997), (Harney and
Muckenhirn, 1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Waldvogel et al., 1999), (Wallner
et al., 1999), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono et al., 2000b), (Baugher
et al., 2003), (Hardjono and Weis, 2004) and (Baugher et al., 2005).
We will present a brief review of the architectures of (Harney and Muckenhirn,
1997), (Mittra, 1997), (Wong et al., 1998), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono
et al., 2000b) and (Baugher et al., 2003), since they particularly influenced our
later design.
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We choose these proposals instead of others (as mentioned) because of the
following reasons:
• GKMP-A (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997) was the first GKMF proposed
for multicast communication. As such, it provides a benchmark against
which subsequent research can be measured.
• Key-graph (Wong et al., 1998) was the first framework to propose the
notion of secure group communication based on a hierarchy of keys. Its
idea of having high level keys to protect low level keys is interesting from
the perspective of designing scalable frameworks.
• Iolus (Mittra, 1997) was the first GKMF to introduce the idea of sub-
groups to mitigate scalability problems, due to re-keying events that may
need to occur during group operations.
• F-MSEC (Hardjono et al., 2000a) proposed the idea of regions, where
each region associates with a different cryptographic key. The idea of
multiple regions is natural for most wireless mobile networks and so F-
MSEC is relevant to our study.
• Intra-domain GKMP (Hardjono et al., 2000b) is based on the F-MSEC
(Hardjono et al., 2000a) framework, and extends the idea of regions by
introducing domains and areas, each of which is independently managed.
This concept fits well with the types of wireless mobile architecture that
we have in mind.
• GKM-A (Baugher et al., 2003) is an extension of GKMP-A, and in-
troduced the idea of exchanging multiple security associations (SAs) to
establish secure group communication. It also includes improvements in
processes such as registration of group members that are of relevance to
our requirements.
We do not consider other frameworks which exhibit similar features to the six
chosen frameworks. For instance, other tree-based frameworks such as (Wald-
vogel et al., 1999) and (Wallner et al., 1999) are similar to Key-graph (Wong
et al., 1998). We observe that works in (Waldvogel et al., 1999) and (Wallner
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et al., 1999) do not alter the original idea of Key-graph, but rather improve
other aspects of group communication which are covered by our chosen frame-
works. The frameworks in (Hardjono and Weis, 2004) and (Baugher et al.,
2005) are closely related to GKM-A, Intra-domain and GKMP-A.
Note that the majority of the chosen proposals are part of IETF WG (MSEC,
2007) research.
7.2 Related Frameworks
In this section we present the existing frameworks relevant to our purpose:
7.2.1 GKMP-A
GKMP-A (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997) was the first proposal to introduce
protocols for group key management in multicast communication.
The framework can operate in two different modes; sender initiated, or receiver
initiated. In sender initiated mode, the sender will act as the group key con-
troller of the multicast group. Otherwise, it will be one of the receivers of the
multicast group who controls the key.
The sender-initiated model operates in the form of a group key management
application, operating on behalf of the originator as well as the group key con-
troller of a multicast group. In the receiver-initiated model, a group member
is made responsible for initial group key establishment, as well as the periodic
generation and dissemination of new keys.
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7.2.1.1 Main Architecture
GKMP-A does not require a centralized key manager (with the exception made
for an entity who manages the distribution of security certificates).
The main entities involved in the protocol are:
(a) Group key controller (GKC)
The GKC is appointed by the group key management application to be
the main group key controller of the group. Either the sender or one of
the receivers will be the GKC, depending on the mode of operation. The
GKC manages the aspects of key management, including the generation
and distribution of cryptographic keys to all members of the group.
(b) Security manager
Responsible for creating and distributing authentic identification and secu-
rity information (such as certificates needed for communicating entities).
We observe that because of the introduction of two operational modes, which
then determine who will be the GKC for the multicast group, GKMP-A avoids
having a centralized key manager as the only parties involved in key manage-
ment are the same parties (group members) who will be participating in the
group communication.
GKMP-A does not address other aspects of a framework such as placement of
entities in the architecture, group membership policy, and trust relationships.
7.2.1.2 Keys
Keys that are used in the protocol are classified into three categories:
(a) Group key packet (GKP), which contains two keys:
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• Group traffic encrypting key (GTEK) is the current traffic key for
encrypting group data traffic.
• Group key encrypting key (GKEK) is the future key used for secure
distribution of a new GTEK.
(b) Session key package (SKP), which is unique for each member and contains
two keys:
• Session traffic encrypting key (STEK) is the key used for encrypting
unicast data traffic between a member and the key controller.
• Session key encrypting key (SKEK) is the key used for secure distri-
bution of a new STEK to a particular member.
(c) Group rekey package (GRP)
The GRP contains a new GKP encrypted with a key encrypting key
(GTEK or SKEK) and signed by the originator’s private signature key.
A GKP is created by the application prior to the establishment of an SKP and
GRP.
Although GKMP-A claims to use a combination of both symmetric and asym-
metric cryptography, we note that the main focus is on symmetric cryptog-
raphy, and asymmetric cryptography is only used to provide the originator’s
(GKC) certificate. It is assumed that all group members have a means to
verify the originator’s signature.
7.2.1.3 Main Processes
Based on the two aforementioned operational modes, two processes are intro-
duced:
(a) Generation and distribution of keys
For sender initiated operation, group keys (see Section 7.2.1.2) are gener-
ated by the application in the form of a GKP. The GKP is distributed to
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one of the group members selected by the application, which then becomes
the GKC of the multicast group. The GKC then contacts each member
of the group, creates an SKP (which is unique to each member), creates
a GRP (which contains the GKP) and sends these to each of the group
members.
For receiver initiated, a GKP is created by the application with the first
member to initiate contact, which is then distributed to the member. The
rest of the operation is similar to sender initiated, where other group mem-
bers are each keyed with an SKP and a GRP.
(b) Re-keying of group keys
Re-keying of group keys was briefly addressed. For both modes of opera-
tion, when a re-key is required, the application selects a member, creates
a new GKP and a new GRP, and distributes the keys to other members.
With the exception of these processes, GKMP-A does not address other GKMF
protocols such as creation of multicast group, or member joining and leaving
protocols.
7.2.2 Key-graph
Key-graph (Wong et al., 1998) was the first proposal to conduct secure group
key management by employing a hierarchy of keys in order to reduce the
number of messages required for re-keying.
The notion of a secure group is organized in the form of a logical tree, as
illustrated in Figure 7.1.
From Figure 7.1, there are two main groups of nodes ; K-nodes and U -nodes.
Every K-node in the tree is assigned a key, and each user (U1..U5) is associated
with a U -node and placed as a leaf node. Each user is assigned keys along the
path from its leaf to the root node. For example, user U1 is assigned the keys
K1, K123, K12345.
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Figure 7.1: An example of Key Tree Graph.
7.2.2.1 Main architecture
The main entities involved in this architecture are:
• User : Consisting all group members.
• A server (s): With primary responsibilities for managing group members
and keys, it is assumed that the server also acts as the group controller
for all group users.
Key-graph does not address other aspects of a GKMF such as placement of
these entities in the architecture, trust relationships, and group membership
policies.
We observe that Key-graph adopts a centralized scheme in its design.
7.2.2.2 Keys
Symmetric keys that are used in this architecture are:
(a) Individual keys
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Also referred to as leaf keys, an individual key is shared only between
a user and the key server (or the group controller). Used primarily for
communication between a user and the key server. For example, K1..K5
are individual keys, each associated with user U1..U5 respectively (see
Figure 7.1).
(b) Subgroup keys
Also referred to as internal keys (keys which are in-between leaf and root
nodes) or key encrypting keys (since they are normally used for encrypting
other keys). For example, K123 and K45 are subgroup keys, associated
with subgroups {U1, U2, U3} and {U4, U5} respectively (see Figure 7.1).
(c) Group keys
Also referred to as root keys (the highest nodes in the tree hierarchy), a
group key is shared between all users and the key server. A group key
is primarily used for encrypting group data and is also called a traffic
encryption key. For example, K12345 is a group key shared by all users
(see Figure 7.1).
These symmetric keys are generated and distributed to users prior to group
communication.
7.2.2.3 Main Processes
The main processes described in the framework are re-keying due to hosts
joining and leaving. When a new user joins a group, the K-nodes along the
path from the new leaf (which is added to assign the new user) to the root are
re-keyed with new keys.
Based on Figure 7.2, when U6 joins the subgroup {U4, U5}, subgroup key
K45 and group key K12345 need to be re-keyed as new K456 and K123456
keys. This results in all users of the subgroup (where the new join occurs)
including the new user U6, obtaining new K456 and K123456 keys, and all
other subgroup users {U1, U2, U3}, obtaining the new K123456 key.
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Figure 7.2: Key Tree Graph: A new join by user U6 into the group.
When a user leaves, a similar re-keying process applies. For example, when
user U6 leaves its subgroup {U4, U5, U6} (see Figure 7.2), all users in its
subgroup (where the leave occurs) obtain a new subgroup key K45, and all
users excluding the leaving user U6, obtain a new group key K12345.
With the intention of reducing the number of messages sent during re-keying,
three approaches for re-keying are suggested:
(i) User-oriented
In this approach, for each user, the key server sends a re-key message
that contains the new key, encrypted with a key held by the user. For
example, during a new join of user U6 (see Figure 7.2), the server needs
to send users:
• U1, U2, U3, new group key K123456 encrypted with K12345.
• U4, U5, new group key K123456 and new subgroup key K456 en-
crypted with K45.
• U6 (new user), new group key K123456 and new subgroup key K456
encrypted with K6.
(ii) Key-oriented
In this approach, each new key is encrypted individually (except keys
for the joining user). A user may have to get multiple rekey messages
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in order to get all the new keys it needs. For example, as in the user-
oriented case, when a user U6 joins the group, the server sends a new
group key K123456 and new subgroup key K456 to users U4 and U5
separately, as follows:
• New group key K123456, encrypted with K45.
• New subgroup key K456, encrypted with K45.
It is observed that in order to save re-key costs, these re-key messages
can be combined and sent to users as one message. Note that these keys
need to be sent to the new user U6 separately.
(iii) Group-oriented
In this approach, each new key is sent to users (except keys for the joining
user) as a group. In this case the server sends a single rekey message
containing all new keys via multicast to the entire group. For example,
as in the user and key-oriented cases, when a new user U6 joins, the
server needs to send users:
• U1..U5, new group key K123456 encrypted with K12345.
• U4 and U5, new subgroup key K456, encrypted with K45.
Note that these keys are sent in one combined multicast message. As
with the key-oriented case, the new user U6 still needs to be sent these
keys individually.
It is observed that the group-oriented re-keying approach has the advantage
over the user and key-oriented approaches, in that it requires less re-key mes-
sages.
Key-graph does not address other GKMF protocols.
7.2.3 Iolus
While Key-graph (Wong et al., 1998) (see Section 7.2.2) introduced the notion
of secure group key management based on a hierarchy of keys, Iolus (Mit-
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tra, 1997) introduced the notion of secure group communication based on a
hierarchy of nodes.
Iolus proposed a framework for securing multicast communication by address-
ing two scalability problems; 1 affect n and 1 does not equal n, where n is the
number of group members of a multicast group.
The first scalability problem occurs when an action of one member affects the
entire group. For example, from a key management perspective, when a new
host joins a multicast group, an old group key may need to be replaced with
a new one. If that is the case, we observe that a join operation exhibits the
1 affect n scalability problem because the protocol requires all members to
process the change of obtaining a new key when the new join occurs.
On similar grounds, the second problem occurs when the protocol cannot deal
with the group as a whole but rather has to treat each member individually.
For example, when a member leaves a multicast group, a new group key may be
generated and distributed to the remaining members of the group, excluding
the leaving member. Given this situation, a simple solution would be to use
unicast keys (belonging to each member) to distribute the new group key
securely.
Nevertheless, the basic problem is that each member must be considered in-
dividually every time a leave occurs. Thus, we observe that a leave operation
exhibits both of the aforementioned scalability problems.
7.2.3.1 Main Architecture
Iolus addresses these problems by adopting a number of smaller multicast
subgroups.
The main entities that are involved in the Iolus framework are:
(a) Group security controller (GSC)
73
7.2 Related Frameworks
Figure 7.3: An example of hierarchy of nodes in Iolus.
GSC is the root of the hierarchy that maintains and controls the top level
subgroup entities.
(b) Group security intermediaries (GSIs)
GSIs (also referred to as group security agents, (GSAs)) are the top level
subgroup entities. One per subgroup, GSIs manage and connect each of
the other subgroups.
We illustrate the hierarchy of nodes consisting of these main entities of Iolus in
Figure 7.3. Each subgroup is treated independently from another subgroup in
the sense that actions within a subgroup do not affect other subgroups. Iolus
is thus a hybrid scheme (see Section 4.2) by design.
We observe that although it is not clearly addressed, it is assumed that all
group members trust GSIs and GSIs trust the GSC for multicast communica-
tion.
We also assume that Iolus considers dynamic policy for its group membership.
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7.2.3.2 Keys
The Iolus framework uses two symmetric keys, which are:
(a) GSI-Member key
This key is unique to every member of the multicast group and shared only
with the member’s GSI. Used for unicast communication between the GSI
and the member, including secure distribution of the subgroup key to the
particular member.
(b) Subgroup key
Primarily used for data communication, this key is unique to a subgroup
and is shared by all group members within the subgroup.
7.2.3.3 Main Processes
The main process described in the framework is for establishing secure mul-
ticast data transmission, and Iolus views the whole framework as one virtual
group. Iolus does not address creation of multicast groups.
For starting secure multicast, Iolus requires a GSC to initiate, which then
decides who can or cannot join the group via an access control list (ACL).
Once the GSC is established, other hosts such as GSIs and group members
can join the group. It is assumed that the GSI-Member key and Subgroup key
are established during the joining process of a particular member to the group.
Iolus limits the re-keying that needs to occur due to host joining and leaving
to the subgroup level. When a new join occurs, a member joins its local
subgroup. In order to protect access to previous data traffic from the newly
joined member (i.e. backward secrecy), the subgroup key needs to be changed.
We observe that Iolus tackles the 1 affect n scalability problem by limiting the
effect of re-keying at the subgroup level.
Similarly, when a member leaves the group, the subgroup key needs to be re-
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keyed, and the new key needs to be sent to the remaining group members by
excluding the leaving member. As previously mentioned, leave can result in
both the 1 affect n and 1 does not equal n scalability problems, because each
member has to be treated separately to exclude the leaving member.
Similarly to member joining, the 1 affect n scalability problem due to member
leaving is limited to the subgroup level. We observe that Iolus does not solve
the 1 does not equal n scalability problem, but rather proposes a mitigation
technique for sending the new subgroup key to the remaining members.
For this to work, Iolus uses each member’s GSI-Member key. Instead of sending
unicast messages containing the new key to every member separately, one
multicast message containing n copies (assuming n remaining members) of the
new subgroup key, each encrypted with a different GSI-Member key, is sent to
the remaining member.
7.2.4 F-MSEC
Motivated by three aspects specific to multicast security; multicast application,
scalability and trust relationships among entities, Hardjono et al. (Hardjono
et al., 2000a) described a simple framework (referred to here as F-MSEC) for
group key management from two aspects:
(a) Network infrastructure plane, consisting of entities and functions which
define the network aspect of the framework, such as routers, hosts, as well
as the routing protocols that they use.
(b) Key management plane, consisting of entities and functions which define
the security aspect of the framework such as key managers, policy servers,
as well as the security protocols that they use.
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7.2.4.1 Main Architecture
The key management plane is further divided into ‘regions’ consisting of:
(a) Trunk regions
A trunk region contains only key managers, each of which is associated
with at least one leaf region.
(b) Leaf regions
A leaf region is where all members are defined to exist. Each leaf region
is associated with one key manager.
Each key management region consists of one trunk region and one or more leaf
region(s). Hardjono et al. (Hardjono et al., 2000a) claim that the purpose of
introducing trunk and leaf regions is for scalability of the framework, by allow-
ing regions to be defined according to the underlying network infrastructure,
as well as the multicast applications that are under consideration. Regions can
be defined to be the size of subnets or larger.
For the purpose of group key management, the main entities introduced in the
framework are:
(a) Key managers (KMs)
Responsible for key management in trunk and leaf regions respectively.
(b) Key translators (KTs)
One KT for each leaf region, it translates (from encryptions under different
keys) transmission payload across regions.
Figure 7.4 depicts the notion of trunk and leaf regions, along with the place-
ment of entities in the regions.
It is assumed that all group members trust KMs and KTs for group key man-
agement.
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Figure 7.4: An example of notion of trunk and leaf regions in F-MSEC.
Although it is not mentioned whether F-MSEC is centralized or distributed in
its design, by having KMs at each of leaf regions we observe that F-MSEC’s
design is based on centralized scheme.
F-MSEC briefly addresses both open and closed policy for its group member-
ship.
7.2.4.2 Keys
In a key management region, F-MSEC introduces two symmetric keys, which
are:
(a) Trunk key, unique for each trunk region.
(b) Leaf key, unique for each leaf region.
F-MSEC makes two interpretations in its view of regions, as well as from the
application of cryptographic keys (the trunk and leaf keys) as follows:
(a) Regions for delivering a group key
Regions can act as secure channels for the purpose of the distribution of a
group key. The group key is then used for protecting the multicast data.
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(b) Regions for delivering multicast data
Different keys that associate with regions (trunk and leaf regions) are used
to protect multicast data as it transits across regions. Thus, each region
applies a different key to the multicast data, and translations of multicast
data across the regions occur in the form of decryption and re-encryption.
7.2.4.3 Main Processes
We observe that F-MSEC does not clearly address any particular GKMF pro-
tocols such as creation of new groups, initial registration of keys, distribution
of keys, as well as host joining and/or leaving.
However, F-MSEC briefly mentions the periodic re-keying that may occur in
trunk and leaf regions, and that re-keying of trunk keys (if necessary) does
not need to occur when a member at the leaf region leaves a multicast group,
because trunk and leaf regions employ different keys.
7.2.5 Intra-domain GKMP
In (Hardjono et al., 2000b), Hardjono et al. proposed Intra-domain GKMP for
intra-domain key management for IP multicast security. This work is based
on the earlier F-MSEC (Hardjono et al., 2000a) framework.
We observe that Intra-domain GKMP extends the idea of regions to introduce
the notion of a domain, where the domain is further divided into a number
of smaller areas. The definition of domain is viewed from an administrative
perspective, where a domain is administered and controlled by one body.
In order to distinguish the multicast groups for key management from the
multicast group for data, Intra-domain GKMP refers to the latter as data
groups, and the former as control groups. Control groups are area-wide and
managed by the area key distributors. Another control group that exists at
the domain level is the All-KD-group. This consists of all key distributors in
79
7.2 Related Frameworks
the domain. There is only one All-KD-group in a domain.
Intra-domain GKMP places group members in one of the areas. Hardjono et
al. (Hardjono et al., 2000b) claim that the purpose of placing group members
in areas is to achieve flexible and efficient key management, especially when
dealing with changes in group membership due to host joining (or host leaving)
that may occur during the lifetime of a multicast group.
Thus, like Iolus and F-MSEC, key management operations such as genera-
tion and distribution of new keys to new members can be contained within a
manageable area.
7.2.5.1 Main Architecture
The main entities that take part in Intra-domain GKMP across a domain are:
(a) Domain key distributor (DKD)
DKD manages and controls key management at the domain level.
(b) Domain multicast address allocation entity (DMAAE)
DMAAE allocates multicast addresses at the domain level.
(c) Router/translating entity (R/TE)
R/TE governs any multicast group that originates from outside of the
domain.
(d) Area key distributor (AKD)
One AKD per area, which manages and controls key management at the
area level.
(e) Area multicast address allocation entity (AMAAE)
One AMAAE per area, which allocates multicast addresses at the area
level.
Trust relationships in the framework revolve around the key distributors (DKD
and AKD). All group members trust these key distributors.
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Although it is not clearly mentioned, we observe that Intra-domain GKMP
addresses both policies for its group membership.
With the introduction of domains and areas, each of which has its own key
managing entity, we note that Intra-domain GKMP is a hybrid scheme in its
design.
7.2.5.2 Keys
Intra-domain GKMP uses both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. How-
ever, for simplicity, it only uses asymmetric cryptography for key distribution
(by DKD and AKDs), as well as by the multicast address allocation entities
(DMAAE and AMAAE) for signing information for the multicast group mem-
bers.
Intra-domain GKMP uses the following group-oriented symmetric keys:
(a) Multicast key
Selected by the DKD, the multicast key is unique to a multicast group.
Its primary use is to secure group data traffic.
(b) Area group key
Selected by the AKD, the area group key is unique for each area and
multicast group pair within that area. It is used for secure distribution of
the multicast key to all group members of a particular multicast group in
an area.
(c) All-KD-Key
Assigned by the DKD, this key is used to secure data traffic amongst all
key distributors in the domain.
Intra-domain GKMP also uses long-term symmetric keys that are issued prior
to the distribution of the group-oriented keys, which are:
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(a) Member-private-key
Unique for each member, this key is shared with the AKD of an area and
is established prior to members joining the multicast group.
(b) AKD-Private-Key
Unique for each AKD, this key is shared with the DKD and is established
before any multicast group exists in the domain.
We observe that both of the long-term keys can be used to assist secure dis-
tribution of the group-oriented keys.
7.2.5.3 Main Processes
The main processes described in the framework are:
• Creation of multicast groups
Intra-domain GKMP described two scenarios in the creation of multicast
groups, each of which includes generation and distribution of multicast
keys and area group keys of the new multicast group:
(a) Group initiation from internal-origin
When an initiator wishes to form a multicast group, it first initiates
the creation of a new multicast group with the help of DMAAE
at the domain level, which then assigns a multicast group address.
The initiator then notifies its local AKD of the new multicast group,
and requests a multicast key.
The request is then passed to DKD by the AKD via a secure channel
(which is encrypted by a secret AKD shares with DKD). DKD then
generates the multicast key, and sends the key to every AKD in the
domain.
Upon receiving the multicast key from DKD, AKD generates and
distributes its area group key to the initiator.
Although it is not clearly mentioned, we assume that the multicast
key is sent to the initiator by the AKD along with the area group
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key.
(b) Group initiation from external-origin
Group initiation from outside the domain can be done by the initia-
tor via a border router, which then notifies the DKD of the request
to create a multicast group. Alternatively, the initiator can make
itself known to the AKD or the DKD directly.
Although it is not clearly mentioned, we assume that the rest of
the group initiation process (i.e. generation and distribution of the
multicast key and area group key) is similar to the group initiation
that occurs internally.
• Re-keying
Intra-domain GKMP addresses re-keying of multicast keys, area group
keys, and the All-KD-Key.
Re-keying of multicast keys is initiated and controlled by the DKD.When
it is necessary to re-key the multicast key, the DKD generates and dis-
tributes a new multicast key to all AKDs in the domain, which then
deliver it to members in their areas.
Re-keying of area group keys is similar to multicast keys, except that it
is initiated and controlled by the AKD of an area. We observe that area
group keys are only known to the AKD and members in that area.
Re-keying of the All-KD-Key is initiated and controlled by the DKD.
When it is necessary to re-key the All-KD-Key, the DKD generates and
distributes the new All-KD-Key to all AKDs in the domain.
• Host joining
Intra-domain GKMP addresses two scenarios pertaining to a host joining
a multicast group:
(a) Host joining with backward confidentiality
If backward confidentiality is required, re-keying of the multicast
key and area group key is conducted. When a new host joins, re-
keying of the multicast key is initiated by the DKD, and re-keying
of the area group key is performed by the AKD.
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(b) Host joining without backward confidentiality
If no provision of backward confidentiality is required, re-keying
does not need to occur, and the newly joined member is given keys
that are currently in use by the group.
• Host leaving
Intra-domain GKMP addresses host leaving from the perspective that re-
keying must occur to preserve forward confidentiality. Like host joining,
re-keying of the multicast key and area group key (where the member
leaving resides) is conducted, which results in all AKDs and group mem-
bers of the multicast group (excluding the leaving member) in the domain
obtaining new keys.
Intra-domain does not consider host leaving without forward confiden-
tiality.
7.2.6 GKM-A
This proposal (Baugher et al., 2003) is an extension of GKMP-A (see Sec-
tion 7.2.1). GKM-A provides a common architecture for group key manage-
ment protocols in multicast security that supports a variety of protocols. Each
protocol can be specialized for different purposes, depending on the type of
application under consideration.
GKM-A introduces the notion of a Group Security Association (GSA), which
consists of a group of conventional security associations (SA) (which is a set of
security parameters that two entities share, including encryption keys, authen-
tication and integrity keys, as well as other attributes such as cryptographic
policy of the keys and a reference index of the SA), and needs to be established
prior to group communication.
GKM-A uses three types of SA to establish common keys amongst the group
members, which are:
(a) Registration protocol SA
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This SA protects the registration protocol, which occurs between the group
controller and each group member.
(b) Data protocol SA
This SA is to protect the data communication between the communicating
entities.
(c) Re-key protocol SA
This SA is optional because cryptographic keys may not need to be up-
dated. The architecture also suggests that all keys could be delivered by
the registration protocol.
7.2.6.1 Main Architecture
To facilitate establishment of these SAs, the main entities involved in the
architecture are:
(a) Group controller and key server (GCKS)
A separate and logical entity that performs member authentication and
authorization according to the group policy set by the group owner.
(b) Policy infrastructure
A separate entity that dictates group policies for multicast groups.
(c) Authorization infrastructure
A separate entity that provides credentials and certificates needed by any
communicating entities.
We observe that GKM-A adopts a centralized scheme in its design and ad-
dresses both policies for its group membership.
7.2.6.2 Keys
In the architecture, GKM-A uses two types of symmetric key:
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(a) Key encrypting key (KEK)
One (or more) KEKs are used to protect the TPKs and other KEKs.
(b) Traffic protection key (TPK)
TPK is used for securing data traffic.
Like the aforementioned SAs, these keys are generated and established during
the registration protocol and/or re-key protocol.
Although not clearly addressed in the proposal, we observe that GKM-A also
considers asymmetric cryptography through the use of GCKS’ credential (cer-
tificate) by the group members. We assume that the credentials are issued and
managed by the authorization infrastructure.
7.2.6.3 Main Processes
As we have noted, the main processes involved are:
• Registration protocol
In this protocol, both entities (GCKS and group members) establish a
registration SA, where entities authenticate each other, and information
(such as which multicast group a member is registered to, group policy,
and keys) is obtained.
During this protocol, other SAs such as a data SA (for securing group
data traffic) and a re-key SA (if necessary) are established. This includes
generation and distribution of a KEK and TPK to the member.
• Re-key protocol
This is an optional protocol, as dictated by a group policy in cases where
keys (KEK and/or TPK) may need to be updated whenever there is a
change in group membership due to new members joining and/or mem-
bers leaving a multicast group, creation of new keys by GCKS, or when
keys are given expiration periods.
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We observe that the GCKS is responsible for managing the re-key pro-
tocol.
Apart from these protocols, GKM-A does not clearly address other GKMF
protocols such as creation of new multicast groups, new members joining, or
members leaving.
7.2.7 Summary
Although the proposals (Harney andMuckenhirn, 1997), (Mittra, 1997), (Wong
et al., 1998), (Hardjono et al., 2000a), (Hardjono et al., 2000b) and (Baugher
et al., 2003) discussed were not intended for wireless mobile environments,
many of the properties they exhibit are useful for our purpose.
In the following section, we summarize these proposals and identify the com-
ponents that are lacking. These gaps will need to be addressed in our own
GKMF design.
7.3 Mapping to Generic Model for WMobEs
In this section we show how these frameworks fit into the generic model pro-
posed in Chapter 6. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 7.1.
Note that:
• The first column of Table 7.1 lists the main components (including the
main protocols) identified within a GKMF for WMobEs, as proposed in
Section 6.1 and Section 6.2.
• The other columns represent each of the discussed frameworks and give
a general summary showing the extent that these frameworks fit our
purpose (and show which components are lacking, or are not specified).
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Table 7.1: Summary of mapping result from existing frameworks to generic
model for WMobEs in Chapter 6.
We use the
√
notation to indicate components (or protocols) that were
considered in the framework, otherwise they are indicated by a dash.
From Table 7.1, we can see that while these frameworks addressed some issues,
they seem to be lacking in others. In particular:
(a) The first proposal GKMP-A does not address many aspects of GKMF,
in particular host joining and host leaving protocols, which are necessary
for group communication. However, GKMP-A introduced a distributed
approach to managing multicast groups. The same can be said with Key-
graph and F-MSEC.
(b) Unlike the others, F-MSEC addresses both policies for group membership.
(c) Iolus covers most of the components and processes necessary for a GKMF.
Iolus considers desirable protocols such as members joining and leaving
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with the provision of backward and forward secrecy. The same can be said
for Intra-domain GKMP. Neither, however, considered policies for group
membership.
(d) Compared to GKMP-A, some improvements can be seen in GKM-A. How-
ever, it remains only a partial specification from our perspective.
Significantly, none of the frameworks provide components for handling host
mobility. This is not surprising, as these frameworks were not designed with
mobile environments explicitly in mind. However, providing mechanisms to
address these specific problems are fundamental if a GKMF suitable for de-
ployment in wireless mobile environments is to be fully specified.
7.4 Summary
We have looked at existing GKMFs, and showed that although some improve-
ments have been made in more recent proposals, all lack several aspects that
we have identified in our generic model, particularly issues pertaining to host
mobility. We will use the perspectives gained from this study to influence our
own specification of a GKMF for a WMobE in the next chapters.
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Chapter 8
GKMF for WMobE: Scope and Require-
ments
In the remaining chapters, we propose our group key management frame-
work (GKMF) for group communication in a wireless mobile environment
(WMobE).
We comment on the scope of the proposal in Section 8.1, which represents
the boundary aspects of our work. In Section 8.2 we present the main prop-
erties and design of the framework. In Section 8.3 we describe our proposed
architecture. Finally, in Section 8.4 we describe the main functionalities of our
protocol designs.
8.1 Scope of Proposal
Regarding the scope of our GKMF specification, it is important to note the
following:
• Infrastructure-based environment. The framework relies on an in-
frastructure based environment with a basic underlying cellular architec-
ture (Bhargava et al., 2000), (Lin and Chlamtac, 2001) and (Park et al.,
2002) as its networking platform. We do not intend to extend its usage
to non-infrastructure environments such as wireless adhoc networks, or
wireless sensor networks.
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• Group key management. Our proposal focuses solely on the GKMF,
whose main goal is to provide fundamental security support by providing
all communicating entities with the necessary cryptographic keys, and
providing a means to distribute these keys for the purpose of group com-
munication. It is not the aim of the proposal to specify the details of
the real data communication and how keys are used during the course of
such communication.
• Key distributions and key updates. The aspects of key management
that the framework is primarily concerned with are key distribution and
key updates (or, re-keying).
We do not consider other aspects of key management in detail (such as
the generation, storage and the disposal of cryptographic keys). Each
of these is important and should be conducted in a proper and secure
manner as required by the multicast application in place. We do not
treat these here because they can be handled by generic techniques that
are not specific to multicast group communication (see Section 4.6 for
discussion of these aspects of key management).
• Type of Multicast Applications. As mentioned in Section 2.3, mul-
ticast applications can be categorized as one-to-many or many-to-many
relationships, depending on whether a single (or, many) sender(s) trans-
mit data traffic to many receivers (group members) in the multicast group
communication.
Since the scope of the proposal is primarily concerned with key manage-
ment and is not concerned with the real data communication, the type
of multicast application in place does not matter and does not affect the
proposal design. Therefore, our proposal does not impose any restriction
on the type of multicast application in place.
• Generic model. The framework proposed is stated in sufficient abstrac-
tion that it can easily be made compatible with existing network proto-
cols, as well as application-layer security protocols to allow for practical
implementation for group communication in WMobEs. In order to fur-
ther support this, we suggest the use of mechanisms and techniques that
are based on standards (such ISO/IEC and Internet Standards).
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8.2 Properties and Design Requirements
In this section, we present the main properties and design requirements neces-
sary for our proposal. We divide the requirements into three categories; general
requirements, security and trust requirements, and performance requirements.
These requirements follow from discussions held in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
Each of these is presented in the following subsections.
8.2.1 General Requirements
As discussed in Section 4.3, Section 4.7.3, and Section 5.3, we list the general
requirements necessary for our proposal, as follows:
• Dynamic group membership policy. Group members should be allowed
to join and/or leave a multicast group at any time.
• Provision for host mobility. A protocol should be provided for allowing
group members to move to other areas while still remaining in a group
session.
• Scalability. A GKMF should be scalable enough to expand its group size
over time.
• Reliable and trustworthy key manager. All key managers managing the
cryptographic keys and governing group operations should be trusted by
group members.
8.2.2 Security and Trust Requirements
As discussed in Section 4.3, Section 4.5, and Section 5.3, we list the main
security and trust requirements for our proposal:
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• Entity authentication. Both group members and key manager entities
should be able to authenticate and verify each other’s identities.
• Backward and forward Secrecy. From the aspect of key management, re-
keying needs to occur whenever there is a change in group membership
(either due to new joins, member leaves, or member moves) for provision
of backward and forward secrecy.
• Data (Message) integrity and authentication. Both group members and
key manager(s) should be able to verify the integrity of data received.
• Secure data exchange. Communications amongst group members should
be protected (and remained confidential), where authorized access is
given only to group members.
• Key distribution. All necessary keys should be securely distributed to all
group members prior to group communication.
• Key updates (re-keying). Key updates should be done in a secure and
proper manner. Group members should be informed when an update of
keys is required.
• Additional key management during host mobility. Generation, distribu-
tion and re-keying of new cryptographic keys may be required to support
host mobility.
• Trust model. A trust model is crucial for a GKMF in order for it to
properly function. This includes a security architecture that is compat-
ible with existing network protocols, scalable and transparent to higher
level applications and services.
8.2.3 Performance Requirements
As discussed in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.3, we list the performance require-
ments necessary for our proposal:
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• Computation, energy and storage requirements. Many mobile devices
have limited processing power, as well as storage capacity, and these
should be kept to minimal. This includes requirements for:
(a) keeping the number of encryptions (or decryptions) involved to a
minimum.
(b) using encryption (or decryption) techniques that are not computa-
tionally intensive.
(c) keeping the number of keys that a member (device) needs to store
to a minimum.
• Communication and bandwidth requirements. As wireless mobile net-
works are susceptible to frequent disconnection, and available bandwidth
is limited, the communication overhead between group entities should be
kept to a minimum.
8.3 Main Architecture
In this section, we propose the architecture that we will use for our framework.
We use the main structural components identified in Section 6.1.1 to describe
the architecture in detail.
We first determine the aspects that influenced our design decision.
8.3.1 Design Influence
In this section, we review components from the existing architectures in Chap-
ter 7 that we adopt in order to satisfy the design requirements of Section 8.2.
(a) Domains and Areas
We will adopt the notion of domains and areas (see Section 7.2.5) as
the main structural components in the framework architecture. This idea
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facilitates scalable and efficient distribution of keys to all group members,
as group members are defined to exist in individual areas that are locally
managed by a trusted entity.
We will extend these ideas by introducing inter-domain relationships for
group communications that originate from other domains. This was not
considered in existing proposals. See Section 8.3.3.1 for more details.
(b) Subgroups
By placing group members in individual areas, we can associate them
with the concept of subgroups (see Section 7.2.3). In other words, group
members are subgrouped in particular areas. By doing so, we seek to
overcome scalability problems that may occur whenever there is a change
in group membership. When a new member joins (or an existing member
leaves) a multicast group, it joins (or leaves) its local area and does not
affect the other subgroups (in other areas) in the domain.
Host mobility between areas can also be managed in a more efficient way.
(c) Symmetric cryptography
We follow previous GKMF proposals, and adopt symmetric cryptography
in our proposal. This is primarily due to reasons pertaining to the nature
of the wireless mobile environments (see Section 5.2) that our framework
is intended for. See Section 8.3.6 for more details.
(d) Key hierarchies
Hierarchies of keys are very useful for group communication in WMobEs
where group members may move between areas that may have their own
security requirements. We will adopt the concept of key hierarchies in our
framework (see Section 8.3.6).
In the following sections, we describe how each of these fits into our GKMF.
8.3.2 Main Entities and Their Roles
In this section, we present the main entities needed in the architecture.
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The main controlling entities in both domain and area(s)(see Section 8.3.3)
are the following:
(a) Domain key manager (DKM)
At the domain level, a DKM is defined to exist, whose main responsibility
is generating, distributing, storing and deleting all keying materials that
may be required.
We also assume that the DKM plays the role of group controller, which
includes managing group policies, group membership, re-keying events and
security policies.
However, in practice, the domain key manager and group controller can be
separate entities, as observed in (Harney and Muckenhirn, 1997), (Mittra,
1997), (Hardjono et al., 2000b) and (Baugher et al., 2003). We assume
that there is only one DKM per domain, and that it is the main reference
for security parameters for other key managers in the domain. In collab-
oration with other key managers, the DKM governs host mobility across
the domain.
In summary, the DKM’s main roles are:
• main key manager of a domain,
• collaborating with other key managers (at the area level) to provide
secure and efficient key management services within a domain,
• generating and distributing cryptographic keys to all area key man-
agers in the domain,
• governing all re-keying events that may occur during the lifetime of
a multicast group,
• working closely with area key managers to govern host mobility.
(b) Area key manager (AKM)
One AKM is defined for each area. The main responsibility of an AKM is
running the key management aspects relating to an area, including those
of the group members residing within that area. Operating under the
DKM’s jurisdiction, an AKM is responsible for any re-keying event that
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may occur at the area level. The AKM also works closely with the DKM
to manage host mobility that may occur across the domain.
In summary, the AKM’s main roles are:
• main key manager of an area,
• assisting the DKM to provide secure and efficient key management
services to group members in areas,
• generating and distributing cryptographic keys to all group members
residing in an area,
• governing re-keying events at the area level, operating under the
DKM’s jurisdiction,
• working closely with the DKM and other AKMs to govern host mo-
bility.
(c) Group members (M)
From a group communication perspective, group members consist of sender(s)
and receiver(s). A group member is defined to reside within one area at
any given time.
8.3.3 Domain(s) and Area(s)
In this section, we look more closely at the domain(s) and area(s) within the
architecture. We also discuss multiple domain relationships, in the cases where
inter-domain group communication is permitted.
The notion of domain(s) and area(s) provides a means to have an administra-
tively manageable environment for group communication to take place, most
importantly for efficient key management.
In our proposal, a domain can be logically or physically defined. Either way,
it is controlled and managed by a trusted entity operating under one system,
for instance the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) operator’s
network (Lin and Chlamtac, 2001).
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Figure 8.1: An example showing the notion of domain and area.
The domain is further divided into a number of smaller manageable areas,
each of which is managed by an AKM, operating closely with the DKM with
regards to key management. We illustrate the notion of domain and areas in
Figure 8.1 where, Domain j is further divided into several areas labeled Area a
to e, each of which can be logically or physically overlapping with one another.
Since a domain is controlled by one DKM, all corresponding entities across a
domain should be able to interface successfully with one another. Although
areas within a domain may be using similar systems for interoperability, this
does not change the fact that each area is unique and that a group member
that moves from its local area to another area must obtain security information
(i.e. keys) associated with that area prior to, or during, the move.
In addition, different areas may contain security information that is meant only
for group members residing in that area, hence access control must be in place
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to protect the local information. Furthermore, in WMobEs host mobility may
place group members in different areas, each of which has its own restriction
on what information may or may not be accessed by the mobile members.
We use the following definitions to differentiate areas during group operations:
(a) Local areas
The term local area is used to refer to the area where hosts (potential
group members) first join a multicast group.
(b) Visited areas
The term visited area is used to refer to other areas in a domain, where
group members may or may notmove to (during host mobility) throughout
the lifetime of their group membership.
8.3.3.1 Inter-domain Relationship
In this section, we introduce the idea of inter-domain relationships. This
is useful in cases where group operations originating from outside the local
domain are permitted (for example, when a host or potential member wishes
to join a multicast group that is managed by other domain). This kind of
request is called a cross-domain request.
There are two approaches that can be adopted in dealing with inter-domain
communication:
(a) Use of an intermediate entity
The first approach is to have a separate entity, which can be in the form
of a server or a router, to deal with any inter-domain communication (if
it occurs). For example, any request to join a multicast group that is
not in the current domain where the request originates from is transferred
to the aforementioned entity, which deals with the inter-domain requests.
This entity thus acts as an intermediate node or a bridge between the two
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distinctive domains. An intermediate host may cater for two or more inter-
domains communications depending on its hardware or software capacity.
This intermediate entity is similar to existing proposals in (Hardjono et al.,
2000a) and (Hardjono et al., 2000b). Briefly, (Hardjono et al., 2000a)
and (Hardjono et al., 2000b) discuss the need for a translation entity or a
router that is able to translate any cryptographic messages protected by
foreign keys that are unintelligible to the current domain.
(b) Cross-referencing between DKMs
An alternative approach is the cross-referencing between DKMs. In this
case, DKMs from both affected domains are the ones governing the inter-
domain requests.
For example, let Di and Dj denote domain i and domain j. Any host who
wishes to join a multicast group outside its local domain Di (the point of
where it is residing at the time of the request), is managed by its domain
key manager (DKM). The DKM then liaises with the DKM in Dj to govern
the request, including any security relationship exchange that may occur
during the course of the host request. Both DKMs need to collaborate in
order to realize inter-domain communication.
Cross-referencing between DKMs avoids the need for an additional en-
tity or node, and is similar to the inter-Base Station handoff concept of
IS-41 (Lin and Chlamtac, 2001), in which base stations under the same
controlling entity collaborate to govern handoff for members that move
from one area of a base station to another area of another base station.
8.3.4 Placement of Entities
In this section, we place the entities specified in Section 8.3.2 in the domains
and areas specified in Section 8.3.3.
As mentioned in Section 8.3.2, a DKM oversees key management at the domain
level, and an AKM oversees key management at the area level. We illustrate
placement of entities in two instances in Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.2: Placement of entities in domain i and area j.
Figure 8.2 shows placement of entities in domain i and area j. From the
illustration, while DKM is the main key manager of domain i and AKM is
the key manager of the area j, we assume there is a sender and a receiver to
represent the group members of the multicast group in place.
The horizontal dotted-line shows a logical division between domain i and area
j. The dotted-arrow lines from DKM to AKM, as well as from AKM to both
sender and receiver, show control channels which can be used by the DKM
and AKM for transmitting control messages, such as notification on re-keying
that has taken place, or acknowledgement of messages received.
While double-arrow lines show the exchange of key and SA management be-
tween pairs of entities, the single-arrow line from sender to receiver shows
the data channel of real group communication which may take place after the
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Figure 8.3: Placement of group members throughout areas.
exchange of key and SA management occurs.
On the other hand, Figure 8.3 shows placement of group members M across
a domain j, where distribution of members occurs throughout the areas a to
e. The arrows denote the movement of group members between the areas.
8.3.5 Trust Relationships
As mentioned in Section 6.1, trust relationships often revolve around key man-
agers, who are the main key distributors. In our framework, we assume that
all key managers (DKM and AKMs) in a domain are trustworthy and reliable.
All group members of multicast groups trust these key managers, particularly
for providing secure key management services (see Section 4.6).
There are two levels of trust relationships:
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(a) At the domain level
At the domain level, all AKMs trust the DKM as the primary key dis-
tributor, as well as the main group manager for various multicast groups
operating in that domain.
(b) At the area level
At the area level, all group members (residing in that area) trust their
AKM as the main reference point for security parameters needed for group
communication.
8.3.6 Types of Key
In this section, we look at another of the fundamental components of the
proposed architecture, namely the cryptographic keys.
We base our framework on symmetric key cryptography because most mo-
bile devices that operate in WMobEs exhibit special characteristics (see Sec-
tion 5.2), which benefit from the computationally faster and less complex tech-
niques offered by the symmetric approach.
In the following sections, we look at the symmetric keys used in our frame-
work, which are categorized into two main groups; long-term and short-term
secret keys. We assume that all symmetric keys used are of an appropriate
recommended length (at the time of writing we recommend 128 bits), allowing
the use of standard algorithm such as AES (FIPS, 2001).
We end this section by looking at the aspects of key management that we
assume are in place and available for the purpose of group key management,
and that we will thus not fully specify in the framework.
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8.3.6.1 Long-term Keys
Long-term keys are assumed to have been established prior to any host joining
a multicast group.
Entities in the framework use these keys to securely initiate secure group com-
munications, including when disseminating short-term keys.
There are three types of long-terms key in the framework; Domain-Area keys,
Domain keys and Area-Member keys. The following subsections describe each
key in turn, and their details are summarized in Table 8.1.
• Domain-Area Key, DAi−Key
The Domain-Area key is the unique long-term key shared between the
DKM and a specific AKM in a domain. More precisely, DAi−Key cor-
responds to the symmetric key shared between DKM and the area key
manager AKMi of area i.
This unique key is established with every AKM in the domain prior
to any request to create multicast groups in the domain. Each key is
generated and distributed by the DKM to every AKM by an appropriate
secure means (see Section 8.3.6.3).
We assume that the membership of all key managers in a domain is
predetermined and fixed (see Section 3.2.1). Thus, each Domain-Area
key is static and valid until the policy determines otherwise. Once a
Domain-Area key expires (or is revoked), a new key must be generated
and distributed to the affected AKM.
The function of each Domain-Area key is restricted only to unicast com-
munication between the DKM and a particular AKM.
• Domain Key, D
−
Key
The Domain key D
−
Key is the long-term key shared by all key managers
(i.e. DKM and all AKMs) in a domain. Like the Domain-Area key, the
domain key is established prior to any request to create multicast groups
in the domain. D
−
Key is generated and distributed by the DKM to all
104
8.3 Main Architecture
AKMs via secure channels. One such channel is created by unicasting
under the appropriate Domain-Area keys.
Since the group membership of all key managers is static, D
−
Key is also
fixed and valid until the policy determines otherwise. A new domain key
must be generated and distributed to all AKMs to replace the old one
on its expiry.
Although D
−
Key is often used to assist secure distribution of other keys
needed for group communication, it is also referred to as a control key
because it can be used by the DKM to send control messages, such as
to notify all AKMs in the domain of a new multicast group, re-keying
events that are taking place, as well as any notification concerning host
mobility.
A desirable function of D
−
Key is that it provides a means for multicast
transmission of messages among all key managers in a domain.
• Area-Member Key, AiM−Key
Another long-term key used is a unique Area-Member key shared between
the AKM of an area and every group member residing in that particular
area. More precisely, AiM−Key corresponds to a symmetric key shared
between area key manager AKMi and a group member M .
This key is obtained during the first contact that a host (who soon will
become a member of a multicast group) makes to the AKM of a particular
area to register with a particular multicast group.
We assume that the Area-Member key is established prior to any request
to join the group, and is generated and sent by the DKM to a particular
AKM, which then sends it to the group member M . More precisely,
at the domain level, the DKM uses the Domain-Area key to secure the
distribution of the Area-Member key to a particular AKM of an area.
Then, at the area level an AKM uses a secure means (see Section 8.3.6.3)
to distribute the key to the group member M .
Since group membership can be dynamic, we assume that the Area-
Member key remains valid throughout the lifetime of a particular mul-
ticast group, or until the group member has ceased to be a member of
that particular multicast group.
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Table 8.1: Summary of long-term keys and their functions.
Like the Domain-Area key, the function of each Area-Member key is
restricted only to unicast communication between the AKM of an area
and a group member of that area.
8.3.6.2 Short-term Keys
Short-term symmetric keys are assumed to have been established after group
members join multicast groups (or after the long-term secrets have been estab-
lished). As group members are already in possession of long-term keys, these
are often used to assist secure distribution of short-terms keys.
There are three short-terms keys introduced in the framework; traffic encryp-
tion keys, area keys and session mobility keys. The following sections describe
each type of key in turn, and at the end their details are summarized in Ta-
ble 8.2.
• Traffic Encryption Key, T
−
Key
The Traffic Encryption Key (or traffic key) T
−
Key is a short-term key
shared by all group members of a particular multicast group in a domain.
There is a unique traffic key for a specific multicast group. T
−
Key is
generated and distributed by the DKM to all AKMs in the domain,
which then in turn disseminate this key to all group members residing in
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their area. The establishment of the key takes place only after the first
host creates (and joins) a multicast group.
There are several options for securing the distribution of the traffic key
to all group members in the domain. One option is for the DKM to use
unicast, by protecting the key under each Domain-Area key and thus
sending it to every AKM independently. At the area level, an AKM uses
the same method using each Area-Member key.
Another option is for the DKM to use multicast and send a single mes-
sage containing the traffic key to all AKMs protected under the domain
key D
−
Key. Each AKM in turn distributes the traffic key to all group
members in the area. If all group members residing in the area belong
to the same multicast group, AKM can send the traffic key by multicast
using the area key A
−
Key (see next subsection). Otherwise, AKM will
have to unicast to every member protected under the Area-Member key.
The main function of the traffic key is to protect the real data in commu-
nication. The traffic key is valid throughout the lifetime of a multicast
group, or until the policy determines otherwise. To replace a traffic key,
a new traffic key must be generated and distributed to all group members
in the domain.
• Area Key, A
−
Key
The Area key is a short-term key unique to an area. Every area has a
different A
−
Key. An area key is generated and distributed by the AKM
of a particular area, and shared only by group members residing in that
area.
An area key is established with a group member after it joins a multicast
group. The dissemination of the area key to all group members is done
by the AKM via unicast methods using each Area-Member key.
The main purpose of having an area key, which is unique to an area, is:
(a) To securely manage host mobility across areas in the domain
Without proper control, group members that are moving from one
area to another may collect security information, including old keys
not authorized to them. In addition, different areas may have differ-
ent access control pertaining to their local information. By having
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adequate access control, one can prevent such security violations by
unauthorized moving members.
(b) To provide efficient and scalable re-keying
Unique area keys are useful for efficient re-keying and promote scal-
ability, since group members within an area are managed under one
unique key.
Note that while group members of a multicast group can be dispersed
across the domain due to host mobility, each group member may have
in his possession a different set of area keys. The first area key that a
host may possess is from the area where it resides the first time it joins
a multicast group, in other words the local area (see Section 8.3.3).
An area key is often used to assist secure multicast distribution of the
traffic key to all group members in an area in a single transmission.
An area key is assumed valid as long as there are members residing in
that area, or until the policy determines otherwise.
• Session Mobility Key, Sm−Keyiv
The Session mobility key Sm−Keyiv is a short-term symmetric key shared
between an AKM and a moving group member. More precisely, Sm−Keyiv
is a session mobility key shared between an area key manager AKMv
and a group member Mi. This key is only used for host mobility and
exchanged during the hand-off operation.
This key is established between a moving member and the AKM of a
visited area prior to host mobility. The generation and initial distribution
of this key is conducted by the DKM in a domain, then delivered to
the group member via an AKM in the local area (where the member is
currently residing). The same key is then delivered to the AKM of a
visited area by the DKM. The delivery of the session mobility key must
be done using secure channels (see Section 8.3.6.4).
This key is used for any unicast communication that may occur between
the AKM of the visited area and the mobile member throughout its
residence period in that area. This includes the secure distribution of
the visited area’s area key to the mobile member.
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Table 8.2: Summary of short-term keys and their functions.
In the case where a mobile member is moving to another area from its
visited area, it then has to establish another session mobility key with
another area key manager of the area it is moving into. Unless policy
determines otherwise, a group member may possess a session mobility
key for every area that it visits throughout the lifetime of its group
membership. This session mobility key is valid throughout the member’s
residing period in that area or until it ceases to be a member of the
multicast group.
The function of the session mobility key is restricted only to unicast
communication between the AKM and a particular group member of a
multicast group.
8.3.6.3 Assumptions on Aspects of Key Management
As mentioned in Section 8.1, we will focus on distribution and updating of
(mainly short-term) cryptographic keys. Other operations are not treated here
in detail because their provision can be achieved by generic solutions which
are not specific to group communication. The following assumptions regarding
key management operations are made:
(a) Key generation is conducted in a secure and proper manner by all key
managers (DKM and AKMs) in a domain. We assume that key managers
use recognized key generators to generate keys as randomly as possible.
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(b) Long-term key distribution is conducted in a secure manner, prior to any
group being established. These keys can be established using various key
establishment methods in ISO/IEC 8732 (ISO, 1988), ISO/IEC 11770-
1 (ISO, 1996a) and ISO/IEC 11770-2 (ISO, 1996b). There are several
accepted methods that can be used to distribute keys to the communi-
cating entities, including via physical (manual) delivery techniques, using
other key to encrypt keys (key encrypting keys), or using a trusted third
party.
(c) Key storage is managed in environments equipped with secure technology.
For example, tamper-resistant hardware can be used to increase the level
of security of the stored keys.
(d) Key installation is performed securely by all key managers (DKM and
AKMs). We assume that a DKM is responsible for key installation at the
domain level, and an AKM is responsible for key installation at the area
level.
(e) Key revocation is conducted in a secure and proper manner by all key
managers in a domain. We assume that a DKM governs any process to
revoke keys at the domain level, and likewise an AKM at the area level.
(f) Key disposal is handled in a secure and proper manner by all key managers
such that no other information can be used to recover the disposed keys.
We assume that DKMs and AKMs manage key disposal processes.
8.3.6.4 Secure Channels
We use the term secure channel to mean that communication between group
entities (key managers and group members) within the GKMF is protected by
careful application of symmetric keys. This is achieved as follows:
(a) Key managers (DKM and AKMs) at the domain level secure the com-
munications between them by using either a common key such as domain
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key for protecting communications between all key managers, or Domain-
Area keys for secure communications between the DKM and each AKM
separately.
(b) Area key managers and group members in the same area secure communi-
cations either by using a common area key for protecting communications
between the AKM and all group members (residing within that area),
Area-Member keys between the AKM and a group member separately, or
session mobility keys between an AKM and a mobile member.
Secure channels are created when group entities (DKM, AKMs and group
members) use these keys in the course of group communication.
8.3.7 Group Membership Policy
In our proposal, while dynamic group membership (see Section 3.2.1) is as-
sumed throughout the framework design, the option for static group member-
ship is also made available.
8.3.8 Design Approach
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the assignment of key manager(s) can be central-
ized, distributed, or hybrid. Our proposal adopts the hybrid approach in the
assignment of key managers, and is based on a distributed hierarchy of trusted
entities (DKM and AKMs) for key management.
8.4 Protocol Functionalities
In this section, based on the main protocols identified in the generic model
in Section 6.2, we describe the required functionalities of each protocol in our
GKMF. The protocols themselves are specified in Chapter 9.
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8.4.1 Creating New Group and Initial Distribution of Keys
This protocol governs the creation of a multicast group and describes the
initial key distribution to all key managers and the first host (group member)
to create a multicast group.
The main functional requirements of this protocol are to:
• create a multicast group for the purpose of group communication.
• distribute a traffic key T
−
Key by the domain key manager to all area
key managers.
• distribute a traffic key T
−
Key and an area key A
−
Key by the area key
manager (of an area where the host residing) to the first host to create
a multicast group.
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• only an authorized host is allowed to create a multicast group.
• communication between the domain key manager and area key managers
is secure.
• communication between the area key manager and the host (or group
initiator) is secure.
• the distribution of the traffic key T
−
Key and the area key A
−
Key to the
area key manager and the host is protected.
The main information disseminated during this protocol includes:
• Group membership policy
The type of group membership policy of a multicast group is indicated by
a 1-bit flag value. A 0 flag indicates that the group membership policy is
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static, while a 1 flag indicates that the policy is dynamic. This flag value
is depicted in the protocol message contents as gm (group membership).
• Backward and forward secrecy
The need for these confidentiality services is indicated by a 2-bit binary
flag value, as shown in Table 8.3, where these services are presented as
on for a required service, or off for a not required service.
Flag value Confidentiality Service Security Requirement
Backward Secrecy Forward Secrecy
00 Off Off None
01 Off On Only forward secrecy
10 On Off Only backward secrecy
11 On On Both
Table 8.3: Requirements for backward and forward secrecy.
This flag value is indicated in the protocol message contents as conR
(confidentiality requirement).
Other related information, such as the lifetime of each key and the type of
algorithm, are also distributed during this protocol. However, we do not ex-
plicitly address these here and assume that this information exists in the text
field of the protocol message (see Section 9.1.5).
8.4.2 New Member Joining
For a group communication to take place, a multicast group should have at
least two (or more) entities in place. This protocol governs the join (or reg-
istration) of group members into the multicast group. As discussed in Sec-
tion 6.2.2, when a host wishes to join a multicast group, two approaches can
be adopted based on whether providing backward secrecy is necessary or not.
If providing backward secrecy is required then any new host that wishes to join
the group must not be allowed to access previous traffic prior to its admission
to the group. Otherwise, no such restriction applies. Thus, this protocol will
consider both options of hosts joining without and with backward secrecy.
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In the first option, any host that joins the group is given the same set of keys
that are currently used by the group members, and the protocol does not need
to update (or re-key) the current keys. On the other hand, the second option
requires the protocol to re-key the group with a new set of keys. Similarly
to the first join to the multicast group by the group initiator, subsequent
group members also receive the traffic key T
−
Key and the area key A
−
Key
along with other information associated with the multicast group joined (see
Section 8.4.1). In the event that a join request originates from outside the
current domain, the request is managed by a governing entity in place (see
Section 8.3.3.1).
The main functional requirements of this protocol are categorized in two parts,
corresponding to the aforementioned join options:
(a) For host joining without backward secrecy, the main functional require-
ments are to:
• add new group members into a multicast group.
• deliver a set of keys (which are traffic key T
−
Key and area key
A
−
Key) to the newly joined member.
(b) For host joining with backward secrecy, in addition to those listed in (a),
other functional requirements are to:
• initiate a re-keying of a traffic key T
−
Key in the domain.
• initiate a re-keying of an area key A
−
Key in the area (where the join
occurs).
• deliver a new set of keys (which are a new traffic key T
−
Keynew and
a new area key A
−
Keynew) to the newly joined member.
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• only an authorized host is allowed to join a multicast group.
• communications between the domain key manager and the area key man-
ager are secure.
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• communications between the area key manager and the requesting host
are secure.
• for member joining without backward secrecy, the distribution of the
traffic key T
−
Key and the area key A
−
Key to the newly joined member
is protected.
• for member joining with backward secrecy, the distribution of the new
traffic key T
−
Keynew and the new area key A−Keynew to all area key
managers and all group members (including the newly joined member)
in a domain is protected.
8.4.3 Existing Member Leaving
Dynamic environments allow group members to leave multicast groups at any-
time. This protocol governs the leaves (or de-registration) of a group member
from a multicast group. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, two options can be
adopted depending on whether the provision of forward secrecy is necessary,
or not. If it is, then past group members (including the ones who are leaving)
must not be allowed to access future communications. Otherwise, no such re-
striction applies. This protocol will consider both options of members leaving
with and without forward secrecy.
Unlike members joining, leave cases can be voluntary, or involuntary (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). Involuntary leaves in particular may require protection from the
ejected members (in such cases forward secrecy is necessary).
As in members joining, while members leaving without forward secrecy will
not affect the current group keys (no updates of keys are necessary), members
leaving with forward secrecy require the protocol to re-key the group with a
new set of keys. In the event that a leave notification originates from outside
the current domain, the request is managed accordingly by the governing entity
in place (see Section 8.3.3.1).
If it is deemed necessary for key managers (such as a DKM) to keep track of the
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group members who leave a multicast group (regardless of whether it occurs
due to voluntary or involuntary reasons), a key manager will need to maintain
a table containing information on the leaving members. The key manager may
need this information for future reference should the same members wish to
later re-join a multicast group. This list is referred to as HisList, which stands
for History List (see Section 9.1.4).
The main functional requirements of this protocol depend on the aforemen-
tioned leave options, and are listed as follows:
(a) For members leaving without forward secrecy, the main functional require-
ment is to remove existing group members from a multicast group.
(b) For members leaving with forward secrecy, in addition to those listed in
(a), the other main functional requirements are to:
• initiate a re-keying of a traffic key T
−
Key in the domain.
• initiate a re-keying of an area key A
−
Key in the area where the leave
occurs, as well as in area(s) visited by the leaving member.
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• only leave notifications coming from authorized entities (such as group
members or a domain key manager) are processed.
• communications between the domain key manager and the area key man-
ager are secure.
• communications between the area key manager and the group member
are secure.
8.4.4 Member Moving to Other Areas
In dynamic wireless mobile environments, group members are not just allowed
to join (and/or leave) a multicast group, but are also allowed to move between
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areas while remaining in a group session. As each area may have different
security requirements, as well as keeps its own security information (such as
old keys), members moving to other areas can be viewed as new joins, each of
which may require protection of its local information from an entering member.
Because a moving member may accumulate information for each area it visits,
two options can be adopted depending on whether the provision of backward
secrecy is necessary or not for controlling access to an area’s past security
information (which could be used for malicious purposes). This protocol will
thus consider both options of members moving with and without backward
secrecy.
In the first option, where provision of backward secrecy is not necessary, no
update of keying material will occur (in particular an AKM of a visited area
does not need to re-key its area key). On the other hand, the second option
requires an AKM to re-key its area key when a group member moves in.
In dynamic mobile environments, group members may frequently move be-
tween a number of areas while still remaining in a group session. Every time
a member moves into an area, re-keying of an area key may need to occur. As
frequent re-keying may cause disruption of group communication, it may be
necessary to keep track of the mobility of a highly dynamic group member.
This can be useful to avoid frequent re-keying of an area key. This protocol
will thus consider this circumstance.
To facilitate this, each key manager in a domain (DKM and AKMs) will need
to maintain a list which contains information on the moving member, such
as area(s) visited (which also indicates how many area keys the member pos-
sesses). This list is referred to as a mobility list (MobList) and is discussed in
Section 9.1.4. In cases where a group member moves back into an area that
it recently visited, an AKM can look up its MobList, and if the member is
on the list (and is still a valid member of the multicast group) the AKM can
determine that the member is a returning member who is moving back into
the area. In this case, the area key of that particular area may not need to be
re-keyed.
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On the other hand, the area key of the visited area may need to be re-keyed if
such a member is not on theMobList, and it is the member’s first time entering
the area.
Note that this process is completely separate to the re-keying that needs to
occur whenever there is a change in group membership due to new member
joins and/or existing member leaves. In any of these circumstances, group
members (including the moving member) will need to be updated with new
cryptographic keys.
The main functional requirements of this protocol are divided into the two
moving options, as follows:
(a) For members moving without backward secrecy, the main functional re-
quirements are to:
• transfer a group member from one area to another area.
• deliver an area key of a visited area to a moving member.
(b) For members moving with backward secrecy, in addition to those specified
in (a), the other main functional requirements are to:
• initiate a re-keying of an area key of a visiting area.
• deliver a new area key of a visited area to a moving member.
A further protocol is required to govern the establishment of a short-term
key to support host mobility.
For secure transfer of a group member from one area to another, secu-
rity information (such as cryptographic keys) may need to be exchanged
between communicating entities (in particular between a moving member
and an AKM of a visited area) via a secure channel. This requires both
entities (the moving member and the AKM of a visited area) to share a
common secret key prior to the commencement of the move protocol. This
type of key is referred to as a session mobility key (see Section 8.3.6.2).
This protocol governs the establishment of a session mobility key between
a group member that wishes to move to another area and an AKM of a
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visited area. The generation and initial distribution of a session mobility
key is conducted by a DKM in a domain and the key is delivered to the
intended member via an AKM in the area where the member is currently
residing. The same key is delivered to an AKM of a visited area by the
DKM.
(c) The main functional requirements of this protocol are to:
• establish a session mobility key between a moving member and an
AKM of a visited area.
• deliver a session mobility key to a moving member and to an AKM
of a visited area.
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• only transfers from authorized group members are processed.
• communications between the group member and the area key manager
are secure.
• communications between the area key manager and the domain key man-
ager are secure.
• for member moving without backward secrecy, the distribution of area
key A
−
Key of the visited area to the moving member is protected.
• for member moving with backward secrecy, the distribution of new area
key A
−
Keynew of the visited area to the moving member is protected.
• the establishment of session mobility key between a moving member and
an area key manager of the visited area is secure.
• the distribution of session mobility key to the moving member and to
the area key manager of the visited area is protected.
119
8.4 Protocol Functionalities
8.4.5 Re-keying
This section describes re-keying protocols of the cryptographic keys that are
needed for a multicast group communication, in particular the traffic key
T
−
Key and the area key A
−
Key.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, re-keying may need to occur if the provision
of backward and/or forward secrecy is necessary for a multicast group com-
munication. In addition, dynamic mobile environments may also require a
multicast group to re-key (or update) group members with a new set of keys
(see Section 5.3).
We explicitly describe re-keying operations for the following two types of key:
(a) Re-keying the traffic key
This protocol governs re-keying of a traffic key of a multicast group. In par-
ticular, re-keying of a traffic key occurs to satisfy the design requirements
of Protocol II(b): Member joining with backward secrecy (see Section 9.4),
and Protocol III(b): Member leaving with forward secrecy (see Section 9.6).
Note that re-keying of a traffic key does not always need to occur during
a host mobility protocol (see Section 8.4.4).
The main functional requirements of this protocol are to distribute a new
traffic key to:
• all group members of a multicast group (including the newly joined
member) during the commencement of Protocol II(b) (see Section 9.4).
• all remaining group members of a multicast group (excluding the
leaving member) during the commencement of Protocol III(b) (see
Section 9.6).
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• the distribution of the new traffic key T
−
Keynew to all group members
of a multicast group (including the newly joined member) during
Protocol II(b) (see Section 9.4) is protected.
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• the distribution of the new traffic key T
−
Keynew to all remaining
members (excluding the leaving member) during Protocol III(b) (see
Section 9.6) is protected.
(b) Re-keying the area key
This protocol governs re-keying of an area key. In particular, re-keying of
an area key occurs not only to satisfy the design requirements of Proto-
col II(b) (see Section 9.4) and Protocol III(b) (see Section 9.6), but also
Protocol IV(b): Member moving with backward secrecy (see Section 9.8).
The main functional requirements of this protocol are to distribute a new
area key to:
• all group members in an area (including the newly joined member)
during the commencement of Protocol II(b) (see Section 9.4).
• all remaining group members in an area (excluding the leaving mem-
ber) during the commencement of Protocol III(b) (see Section 9.6).
• all group members in a visited area (including the moving member)
during the commencement of Protocol IV(b) (see Section 9.8).
The main security requirements of this protocol are to ensure that:
• the distribution of the new area key A
−
Keynew to all group members in
an area (including the newly joined member) during Protocol II(b) (see
Section 9.4) is protected.
• the distribution of the new area key A
−
Keynew to all remaining members
in an area (excluding the leaving member) during Protocol III(b) (see
Section 9.6) is protected.
• the distribution of the new area key A
−
Keynew to all group members in
a visited area (including the moving member) during Protocol IV(b) (see
Section 9.8) is protected.
As discussed in Section 6.2.5, re-keying operations in a domain can be divided
into two levels, depending on the entity responsible for re-keying. In this
protocol, re-keying is initiated by trusted key managers:
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(a) At the domain level
A domain key manager (DKM) is responsible for the initiation and control
of the re-keying of keys, in particular the traffic keys.
(b) At the area level
Each area key manager (AKM) is responsible for the initiation and control
of the re-keying of an area key within its area.
Only re-keying of a traffic key and an area key are described here because
these keys are the ones which need regular updates to achieve secure group
communication. Other cryptographic keys such as Domain-Area key, Domain
key and Area-Member key (which are long-term keys) are not explicitly treated
here because they do not need to be updated so often.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we determined the scope of our GKMF, and looked at the main
components in the proposed architecture. We have also stated our reasons
for choosing the design and have described each of the underlying protocol
requirements identified within our GKMF.
In the next chapter we specify the design of the main protocols.
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GKMF for WMobE: GKMF Protocols
This chapter specifies the design of the main protocols identified with our group
key management framework (GKMF).
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 9.1 we introduce the notation
and assumptions used in the protocol designs. Our protocol designs begin in
Section 9.2 with creation of new group and initial distribution of keys. In
Section 9.3 and Section 9.4, we specify the protocols for new member joining
without and with provision of backward secrecy. In Section 9.5 and Section 9.6,
we describe the protocols for existing member leaving without and with provi-
sion of forward secrecy. In Section 9.7 and Section 9.8, we specify the protocols
for members moving without and with provision of backward secrecy. Finally,
in Section 9.10 and Section 9.11, we describe the re-keying protocols for traffic
key and area key.
9.1 Introduction
In this section, we describe notation as well as important assumptions that we
will make during our protocol designs. We also introduce the use of lists as
part of our protocol design, in particular for members moving to other areas.
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9.1.1 Notation
In this section, we introduce the notation that we will use for describing the
proposed protocols. This is presented in the form of four tables. Table 9.1
presents the notations for entities. Table 9.2 gives the notations for keys.
Table 9.3 shows the notations for other operatives necessary for group opera-
tions. Table 9.4 presents the notations for tokens that we use for distribution
of security parameters during group operations.
Table 9.1: Summary of notation for entities.
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Table 9.2: Summary of notation for keys.
Table 9.3: Summary of notation for other operatives.
9.1.2 Provision of Security Services
The security requirements identified within the framework in Section 8.2 in-
clude the requirements for entity authentication, backward and forward secrecy,
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Table 9.4: Summary of notation for tokens.
as well as data integrity security services.
As discussed in Section 4.5, we describe how these security requirements can
be achieved via the use of various security mechanisms such as those in ISO
7498-2 (ISO, 1989), ISO/IEC 11770-1 (ISO, 1996a), ISO/IEC 11770-2 (ISO,
1996b), BS ISO/IEC 9798-1 (BS, 1997), ISO/IEC 9798-2 (ISO, 1999a) and
ISO/IEC 9798-4 (ISO, 1999b).
The provision of the aforementioned security services based on symmetric key
cryptography is as follows:
• Entity authentication
Entity authentication can be achieved when an entity to be authenticated
corroborates its claimed identity by demonstrating its knowledge of a
secret key. The mechanisms that can be used to provide this include
ISO/IEC 9798-2 (ISO, 1999a), ISO/IEC 9798-4 (ISO, 1999b):
(a) Encryption (and decryption)
By careful application of encryption mechanisms on specific data
another entity sharing the secret key can corroborate its claimed
identity.
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(b) Message authentication codes (MACs)
By applying a key to specific data to obtain a MAC value, this
value can be compared to the value sent by the other entity, who
will corroborate the other’s identity when the value received is the
same as the value generated.
Note that demonstration of use of a key does not guarantee the message
is not a replay from previous sessions. Thus, the cryptographic compu-
tations must also include time variant parameters as those in ISO/IEC
9797-2 (ISO, 1994a), ISO/IEC 9797-1 (ISO, 1994b), ISO/IEC 11770-
2 (ISO, 1996b), ISO/IEC 9798-2 (ISO, 1999a) and ISO/IEC 9798-4 (ISO,
1999b), such as time stamps, sequence numbers or, random numbers.
For example, if a received message has a time stamp that falls outside
an agreed window of acceptance (BS, 2002), then the message received
is considered as not fresh and is discarded from further processing.
Entity authentication is typically required at two levels:
(a) Domain level
At the domain level, this involves all key managers (the DKM and
all AKMs). Since all key managers in the domain are assumed to
be trusted by the framework, it is essential for all key managers
to be certain of each other’s identity. Both entities (the DKM and
every AKM in the domain) may verify each other’s identity without
the involvement of third party, such as by adopting ISO/IEC 9798-
2 (ISO, 1999a).
These mechanisms require both DKM and each AKM to share a
long-term common secret key prior to the authentication mecha-
nism taking place (see Section 8.3.6.1, for long-term keys). This
will occur during the assignment of AKM as a key manager in the
domain, before the creation of any multicast groups occurs.
(b) Area level
At the area level, any host wishing to join a multicast group will
first have to establish its identity with an AKM. As in ISO/IEC
9798-2 (ISO, 1999a), this can be achieved either as follows:
– With the involvement of a third party. In this case, entity au-
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thentication can be established between the host and AKM
with the assistance of the DKM. For this to work, both host
and AKM must each share a long-term common secret key with
the DKM prior to invoking the authentication mechanism (see
Section 8.3.6.1, for long-term keys). Through the DKM, a com-
mon secret key will then be established, to be used between the
host and the AKM.
– Without the involvement of a third party. Without the involve-
ment of the DKM, this mechanism requires both host and AKM
to share a long-term common secret key prior to the authentica-
tion mechanism taking place (see Section 8.3.6.1, for long-term
keys). This mechanism is similar to the one that occurs between
the key managers at the domain level.
• Backward and forward secrecy
The provision of backward and forward secrecy is supported by confi-
dentiality services, where it can be achieved by careful application of
encryption mechanisms as in ISO 7498-2 (ISO, 1989). The provision
of backward and/or forward secrecy is primarily determined by suitable
key management techniques for updating (or, re-keying) with new keys
whenever there is a change in group membership.
• Data origin authentication
The provision of data origin authentication (and hence data integrity)
can be achieved by using standard shared key authentication mechanisms
such as MACs in ISO 7498-2 (ISO, 1989), ISO/IEC 9797-2 (ISO, 1994a)
and ISO/IEC 9797-1 (ISO, 1994b).
In our proposal, by using such mechanisms we are particularly concerned
with two types of data authentication, as follows (see also Section 4.5):
(a) Source and data authentication
This type of authentication enables a group member to verify the
source of the message received and that the message was not mod-
ified during transit by anyone, including other group members.
Thus, if data origin authentication is deemed necessary, the best
mechanism that can be used to provide this is a MAC, because
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only the entities who hold the secret key can compute the same
MAC value. Using such mechanisms, an AKM can be sure that the
cryptographic keys it receives originated from the DKM that they
claim to be from.
(b) Group authentication
Group authentication enables a group member to verify that the
data or message he receives originated from some member in the
group, and that it was not modified by anyone that is not a group
member.
This type of authentication may be adequate if there are circum-
stances when it is not essential to provide the precise origin of data
one entity receives. For example, during actual data communica-
tion between the group members, where no security information is
being exchanged.
For these mechanisms to work, all group members are required to
share a common secret key prior to implementing the group com-
munication.
In the event that either of these mechanisms fail, the recipient can
conclude that the message received has been tampered with, and
that the integrity of the message can no longer be guaranteed.
9.1.3 Focus of Simplified Protocol Descriptions
Of all the previously discussed security services, we are primarily interested
in the confidentiality services, in particular the provision of backward and/or
forward secrecy.
Our protocol descriptions will be simplified in order to highlight how the keys
in the GKMF are utilized to provide confidentiality services. This is primarily
for reason of clarity of key usage within the GKMF.
We do not explicitly demonstrate the provision of other security services such
as entity authentication and data integrity, because these can be incorporated
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into the protocols using generic techniques that are not specific to group com-
munication. For example:
(a) The provision of data origin authentication can easily be provided in all our
protocols by adding a MAC to each message, as discussed in Section 9.1.2.
MAC keys can easily be derived from symmetric keys in use.
(b) The provision of entity authentication (when necessary) can then be in-
corporated into these protocols by careful implementation of time variant
parameters into the MAC value, and following standards such as those
identified in Section 9.1.2.
Thus, the protocols in this chapter should be regarded as a blueprint for full
protocols which can be derived using our skeleton protocol specifications.
9.1.4 List(s) Management
In this section, we introduce an important concept that we will use as part
of our group key management protocol designs; lists. We describe the man-
agement of lists, and why they are useful, in particular within the existing
member leaving protocol and the host mobility protocol.
We propose two types of list, each of which is described as follows:
(a) HisList
HisList (history list) is maintained by a domain key manager (DKM) and
contains information of members who have left a multicast group. Each
time a member leaves a multicast group, the following information is logged
in HisList :
• ID of the group member,
• ID of the multicast group the member is leaving,
• ID of the area that the member leaves from,
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• Type of leave; either voluntary or involuntary (see Section 4.3.2).
The information in HisList is used by key managers in a domain for future
reference, in order to keep track of the group members who leave, as well
as the reasons for leaving a multicast group. History lists are particularly
useful when members try to re-join a group that they previously left.
In this case, a key manager may use its HisList to determine the reason
why a user previously left the group. In the case of involuntary leaves the
member may be refused permission to re-join the group.
Examples of use of HisList can be seen in Section 9.5 and Section 9.6.
(b) MobList
MobList (mobility list) is maintained by key managers (DKM and AKMs)
in a domain and contains information on group members that move from
one area to another (while still remaining in group sessions). Each time
a member moves from one area to the next, the following information is
logged in MobList :
• ID of the moving member,
• ID of the multicast group joined by the member,
• ID of the area that a member is moving from (which corresponds to
an AKM of that area),
• ID of the visited area that a member is moving to.
The information inMobList is used by key managers (DKM and AKMs) to
efficiently manage members that may frequently move between a number
of areas while still remaining in a group session. As re-keying of an area key
may need to occur every time a member moves into an area, and frequent
re-keying may cause disruption in group communication, MobList can be
used to keep track of host mobility and frequent re-keying can be avoided
every time a member moves back into an area that it recently visited. This
is because when the same member moves back into that area, an AKM
of a visited area can determine (by looking up its MobList) whether the
member is a returning member who is just moving back into the area, in
which case re-keying of the area’s key may not need to take place.
Examples of use of MobList can be seen in Section 9.7 and Section 9.8.
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We assume that these lists are kept and maintained by key managers in secure
environments.
9.1.5 Use of Text Field(s)
In this section we describe the use of text field(s) specified in the protocol
messages of the protocol designs (see Section 9.2 onwards).
Text fields may contain other information that is also needed in the proto-
col design but is not explicitly shown in the protocol because the content is
dependent upon specific applications. This type of information is considered
optional, and does not affect the overall design of the protocols.
Information that a text field may contain includes those specified in ISO/IEC
11770-1 (ISO, 1996a), ISO/IEC 11770-2 (ISO, 1996b), BS ISO/IEC 9798-
1 (BS, 1997), ISO/IEC 9798-2 (ISO, 1999a) and ISO/IEC 9798-4 (ISO, 1999b),
such as:
• A key lifetime; indicating the validity period of a key,
• A key identifier ; indicating the key usage,
• A cryptographic method ; indicating the type of algorithm used,
• A check value; such as a MAC value to check the integrity of a message,
• A time variant parameter ; such as a time stamp indicating a message’s
age, which can be used to verify that a message is not a replay.
9.2 Protocol I: Creation of New Group and Initial
Distribution of Keys
This protocol describes the creation of a multicast group by a host M , and
initial distribution of a traffic key T
−
Key and an area key A
−
Key by the key
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Figure 9.1: Creation of New Group and Initial Distribution of Keys protocol
message flow.
manager to M . Host M is considered as the first member of the multicast
group.
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.1, and steps involved
are described as follows:
Step 1: A hostM that wishes to form a multicast group sends a create
−
request
message to the area key manager AKMi encrypted under Area-Member
key AiM−Key (which has been established earlier, see Section 8.3.6.1):
M → AKMi : IDM‖{IDAi‖IDM‖text}AiM−Key.
Step 2: On receipt, AKMi checks the message by decrypting it using the se-
cret key AiM−Key shared with the host M . AKMi then passes the
create
−
request message to DKM encrypted under Domain-Area Key
DAi−Key (which has been established earlier, see Section 8.3.6.1),
along with the ID of the requesting entity:
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDAi‖IDM‖text}DAi−Key.
Step 3: On receipt, DKM performs the following:
(a) DKM looks up the list of AKMD with their corresponding secret
keys, and checks the message by decrypting it using the secret key
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DAi−Key shared with AKMi. Assuming that DKM keeps a valid
list of potential hosts, and assuming that host M is in the list, M
is allowed to form a multicast group.
DKM then sends a create
−
granted message to AKMi containing
the information of the newly created multicast group, including
the traffic key T
−
Key, as well as the group policy in the form of
Grp
−
Token:
DKM → AKMi : IDD‖{Grp−Token‖IDD‖text}DAi−Key,
where Grp
−
Token = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖T−Key‖mp‖conR‖text}.
(b) DKM then notifies other AKMs of the creation of the multicast
group via the create
−
notified message, along with theGrp
−
Token
of the multicast group. DKM can send this message via two ways:
• unicast, where DKM sends the message to each AKM individ-
ually (encrypted under Domain-Area key) as in Step 3(a).
• multicast, where DKM sends a single message to all AKMs
(encrypted under the domain key D
−
Key).
DKM ⇒ AKMD : IDD‖{Grp−Token‖IDD‖text}D−Key.
Otherwise, DKM sends a request
−
denied message to AKMi.
Note that the create
−
granted and create
−
notified messages (see Fig-
ure 9.1) can be sent altogether by DKM to all AKMs (including AKMi)
via a multicast message (as in Step 3(b)).
Step 4: On receipt, AKMi performs the following:
(a) AKMi checks the message by decrypting it with the secret key
DAi−Key which it shares with DKM, and assuming that the
create
−
request is granted, AKMi obtains the Grp−Token of the
new multicast group.
(b) AKMi then generates an area key A−Key and updates theGrp−Token
with the area key as follows:
Grp
−
Token = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖T−Key‖A−Key‖mp‖secR‖text}.
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AKMi then sends it via a create−granted message to M encrypted
under AiM−Key:
AKMi → M : IDAi‖{Grp−Token‖text}AiM−Key.
Otherwise, AKMi sends a create−denied message to M .
Step 5: On receipt, M checks the message by decrypting it with AiM−Key.
Assuming that the request to create a multicast group is granted, M
obtains the keys along with other information via the Grp
−
Token.
In summary, assuming that the join request is successful, at this point a new
multicast group is created, with DKM as the domain key manager, AKMi
as the area key manager, and M as the group initiator. The keys that are
distributed through the protocol are the traffic key T
−
Key and the area key
A
−
Key.
9.3 Protocol II(a): New Member Joining without
Backward Secrecy
This protocol describes a new join of a host to a multicast group with no
consideration to secure access to the previous data traffic, in other words no
provision of backward secrecy. The protocol also includes the delivery of a
traffic key T
−
Key and an area key A
−
Key to the newly joined group member
M .
Throughout this protocol, we make the following assumption:
• Any request to join the group only occurs after the successful creation
of the multicast group using Protocol I (Section 9.2).
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.2, and the steps
involved are described as follows:
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Figure 9.2: Member Joining without Backward Secrecy protocol message flow.
Step 1: A host M that wishes to join a multicast group sends a join
−
request
message to the area key manager AKMi encrypted under AiM−Key
(see Section 8.3.6.1):
M → AKMi : IDM‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖text}AiM−Key.
Step 2: On receipt, AKMi performs the following:
(a) AKMi checks the message by decrypting it with the secret key
AiM−Key shared with M . AKMi then passes the join−request
message to DKM encrypted under Domain-Area key DAi−Key
(see Section 8.3.6.1), along with the ID of the requesting entity,
as well as the ID of the multicast group for joining:
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖text}DAi−Key.
(b) Assuming that host M is permitted to join the group, AKMi sends
a join
−
granted message to M encrypted under AiM−Key, along
with the current keys (the traffic key T
−
Key and the area key
A
−
Key) in the form of Join
−
Token:
AKMi → M : IDAi‖{Join−Token‖text}AiM−Key,
where Join
−
Token = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖T−Key‖A−Key‖text}.
Otherwise, AKMi sends a join−denied message to M .
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Note that the keys that are currently in use by group members are
delivered to the newly joined member.
Step 3: Upon receiving the join
−
request message, DKM checks the message
by decrypting it with the secret key DAi−Key which it shares with
AKMi, and assuming that host M is granted permission to join the
multicast group, DKM sends a join
−
granted message to AKMi.
Note that it is not necessary for other AKMs to be notified of the new
join as it does not affect the overall group operation in the domain.
New joins with no provision of backward secrecy simply require DKM
to add a new member to a particular multicast group.
Step 4: Upon receiving the message from AKMi, M checks the message by
decrypting it with his secret key AiM−Key to obtain the Join−Token
which, in particular, contains the cryptographic keys needed for the
group communication.
In summary, assuming that host M is granted permission, using this protocol
M joins a multicast group within an area where AKMi is the area key manager
and DKM is the domain key manager. Group member M is also given the
current set of cryptographic keys; the traffic key T
−
Key and the area key
A
−
Key.
9.4 Protocol II(b): New Member Joining with
Backward Secrecy
This protocol describes a new join of a host to a multicast group with con-
sideration to preventing access to the previous data traffic from the newly
joined member, in other words provision of backward secrecy. This protocol
also includes the delivery of a new traffic key T
−
Keynew and a new area key
A
−
Keynew to the newly joined member M and other group members (if any)
in the area where the join occurs, as well as across the domain.
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Figure 9.3: Member Joining with Backward Secrecy protocol message flow.
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.3. Due to similarity
with Protocol II(a) (see Section 9.3), we only describe the differences as follows:
(a) In addition to Step2 in Protocol II(a) (see Section 9.3), and assuming that
the join is granted, AKMii must re-key its area key. To do so, it initiates
Protocol VI: Re-keying the area key (see Section 9.11). This results in
all existing members in that particular area obtaining the new area key
A
−
Keynew.
Note that only the area where the new host joins the group is re-keyed with
a new area key. (Since the change in current group membership occurs
only within a particular area, other areas should not be affected.)
(b) AKMi then delivers the new area key A−Keynew in the join−granted
message to M in the form of Join
−
Token, as in Step 2(b) Protocol II(a)
(see Section 9.3).
(c) In addition to Step3, upon receiving the join
−
requestmessage from AKMi,
and assuming host M is allowed to join the multicast group, DKM initi-
ates Protocol V: Re-keying the traffic key (see Section 9.10) and sends
the join
−
granted message along with ready
−
to
−
re−key traffic key to all
AKMs in the domain (including AKMi). This results in all AKMs and all
group members in the domain obtaining a new traffic key T
−
Keynew.
DKM can send this message via two ways:
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• unicast, where DKM sends the message to each AKM individually
(encrypted under the Domain-Area key).
• multicast, where DKM sends a single message to all AKMs encrypted
under the domain key D
−
Key.
(d) Upon receiving the new traffic key from DKM, AKMi sends the key to the
newly joined member M .
Note that AKMi can delay the sending of the new area key A−Keynew to M
until it receives the new traffic key T
−
Keynew from the DKM. In this case,
AKMi can send both keys in the Join−Token, such that Join−Token =
{IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖A−Keynew‖T−Keynew‖text}.
The re-keying approach used in this protocol is a strict re-keying policy, where
the re-keying of traffic key T
−
Key and area key A
−
Key are conducted im-
mediately when the new joins occur. Taking a more relaxed approach, the
re-keying tasks could be postponed until the next periodic re-keying (Decleene
et al., 2001), (Zhang et al., 2002).
In summary, assuming that host M is granted permission, using this protocol
M is joined to a multicast group within an area where AKMi is the area
key manager and DKM is the domain key manager. Due to the provision of
backward secrecy, DKM and AKMi must initiate the re-keying protocols of
the current keys (traffic key and area key), which results in all group members
in the domain obtaining a new traffic key, and all group members of an area
where the join occurs obtaining a new area key. The new group member M is
also given a current set of cryptographic keys: new traffic key T
−
Keynew and
new area key A
−
Keynew.
9.5 Protocol III(a): Existing Member Leaving with-
out Forward Secrecy
This protocol describes existing group members leaving the multicast group,
with no consideration to secure access to future data traffic. Since no protec-
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tion of future data traffic from the leaving members is necessary (no forward
secrecy), members leaving is a relatively simple process, and no change in
keying material occurs.
In this protocol, we make the following assumptions:
• It is assumed that there already exists an established multicast group.
• Host mobility may have occurred, and a group member may leave from
a visited area (and not necessarily its local area).
The message flow for each type of leave discussed in Section 8.4.3 is depicted
in Figure 9.4, and the steps involved are described as follows:.
Step 1: From Figure 9.4(a), a host M wishing to leave a multicast group sends
a leave
−
notify message to the area key manager AKMi encrypted
under Area-Member key AiM−Key (see Section 8.3.6.1):
M → AKMi : IDM‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖text}AiM−Key.
Step 2: On receipt, AKMi checks the message by decrypting it using the se-
cret key AiM−Key shared with the host M , and then passes the
leave
−
notify message to the DKM encrypted under Domain-Area Key
DAi−Key (see Section 8.3.6.1), along with the ID of the group mem-
ber and the ID of the multicast group from which M is leaving:
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDM‖text}DAi−Key.
Step 3: On receipt, DKM checks the message by decrypting it using DAi−Key,
(which is shared with AKMi), to obtain the information of the leaving
member M .
Note that like hosts joining, it is not necessary for other AKMs to be notified of
the leaving member. A member leaving with no provision for forward secrecy
simply requires DKM to remove the member from a particular multicast group.
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(a) Voluntary leave.
(b) Involuntary leave.
Figure 9.4: Member Leaving without Forward Secrecy protocol message flow.
In the case of involuntary leaves, DKM will initiate the process to eject a
member by sending an eject
−
notify message along with the ID of the ejected
member to AKM (where the ejecting member resides). The message is sent
via a secure channel (see Section 8.3.6.4) protected under a Domain-Area key.
Upon receiving the eject
−
notify message from DKM, the AKM notifies the
particular member via an eject
−
notify message, protected under an Area-
Member key (see Figure 9.4(b)).
For both cases (voluntary or involuntary leave), DKM will update its HisList
with new information (such as the reason of leaving and/or the reason for
ejecting) concerning the leaving member.
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In summary, using this protocol, M leaves a multicast group. In case of volun-
tary leave, M initiates the protocol. Otherwise, it is initiated by the DKM. For
both cases, information regarding the leaving member is logged into DKM’s
HisList.
9.6 Protocol III(b): Existing Member Leaving with
Forward Secrecy
This protocol describes group members leaving with consideration to control-
ling access to the future data traffic, in which case forward secrecy is necessary.
A multicast group thus needs to be re-keyed with new keying material when-
ever an existing member leaves the group.
The assumptions made in Protocol III(a) (see Section 9.5) also hold for this
protocol. The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.5. Due to
similarity with Protocol III(a) (Section 9.5), we just describe the differences
as follows:
(a) In addition to Step2 in Protocol III(a), AKMi must re-key its area key
A
−
Key, and for that it initiates Protocol VI: Re-keying the area key (see
Section 9.11). This results in all remaining members (excluding the leav-
ing member) in that particular area and in area(s) visited by the leaving
member obtaining the new area key A
−
Keynew.
(b) In addition to Step3, upon receiving the leave
−
notify message from AKMi,
DKM initiates Protocol V: Re-keying the traffic key (see Section 9.10),
which results in all AKMs and group members in the domain obtaining a
new traffic key T
−
Keynew. As in (c) Protocol II(b) (see Section 9.4), DKM
can send this message via two ways either by unicast, where the message is
sent to each AKM individually encrypted under the Domain-Area key or,
by multicast, where a single message is sent to all AKMs encrypted under
the domain key D
−
Key.
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(a) Voluntary leave.
(b) Involuntary leave.
Figure 9.5: Member Leaving with Forward Secrecy protocol message flow.
As in Protocol III(a), in the case of involuntary leaves, an eject
−
notify message
along with the ID of the ejected member will be sent by DKM to all AKMs
via secure channels (see Section 8.3.6.4). The area key manager (where the
ejecting member resides) will then send an eject
−
notify message to member
M (see Figure 9.5(b)). Similarly, DKM will update its HisList with the new
information of the leaving member.
In summary, using this protocol, M leaves a multicast group. Like Protocol
III(a), in case of voluntary leave, M initiates the protocol. Otherwise, it is
initiated by the DKM. For both cases, a new area key A
−
Keynew is obtained
by the remaining members in the area (where the leave occurs and area(s)
visited by the leaving member), and a new traffic key T
−
Keynew is obtained
by all AKMs and group members across a domain. For both cases, information
regarding the leaving member is logged into DKM’s HisList.
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9.7 Protocol IV(a): Member Moving without Back-
ward Secrecy
This protocol describes transfer of a group member from one area to another
with no consideration to secure access to previous keys and group data traffic
(in other words, no provision of backward secrecy). The protocol also includes
the delivery of an area key of a visited area to the moving member.
Throughout this protocol, we make the following assumptions:
• It is assumed that there already exists an established multicast group,
and that a member may be in its local area, or in its visited area at the
time of the move.
• To distinguish between the local and visited areas and the areas involved
in host mobility, we use the following terminology:
(i) The area where a group member is moving from is referred to as
the leaving area.
(ii) The area that a group member is moving into is referred to as the
joining area.
• The generic notation that we use to differentiate the entities from both
affected areas is as follows:
(i) For the leaving area:
An area key manager and a group member are referred to as AKMi
and Mi (with IDMi is the ID of member Mi), and their associ-
ated keys are an area key A
−
Keyi and a unique Area-Member key
AiMi−Key.
(ii) For the joining area:
An area key manager is referred to as AKMv, and is associated with
an area key A
−
Keyv (and a new area key A−Keyvnew). Other group
members in the area are referred to as MAv.
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Figure 9.6: Member Moving without Backward Secrecy protocol message flow.
• It is assumed that a moving member Mi and an AKMv have securely
established a shared short-term session mobility key Sm−Keyiv prior to
moving (see Section 9.9).
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.6, and the steps
involved are described as follows:
Step 1: A group member Mi that wishes to move into another area sends a
move
−
notify message along with the ID of the area that he is moving
into (which corresponds to the IDAv) to:
(a) Its current area key manager AKMi protected under an Area-
Member key AiMi−Key:
Mi → AKMi : IDMi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text}AiMi−Key.
(b) The area key manager of the visited area AKMv protected under
a session mobility key Sm−Keyiv:
Mi → AKMv : IDMi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text}Sm−Keyiv.
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Step 2: Upon receiving the move
−
notify message from Mi, AKMi checks
the message by decrypting it with AiMi−Key and passes the mes-
sage to DKM protected under Domain-Area key DAi−Key (see Sec-
tion 8.3.6.1):
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text}DAi−Key.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message from AKMi, DKM checks the message by
decrypting it with DAi−Key, and sends the move−notify message to
AKMv along with the ID of Mi in the form of Mov−Token, where
Mov
−
TokenD = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text} protected under the
Domain-Area key DAv−Key it shares with AKMv:
DKM → AKMv : IDD‖{Mov−TokenD‖IDD‖text}DAv−Key.
Step 4: Upon receiving the move
−
notify message from DKM and Mi, AKMv
does the following:
(a) It checks the message from DKM by decrypting it with the Domain-
Area key DAv−Key it shares with the DKM.
(b) It checks the message from Mi by decrypting it with the session
mobility key Sm−Keyiv it shares with Mi.
(c) Assuming that the checking is valid, AKMv looks up its MobListv
and if Mi is not in the list (meaning that this is Mi’s first time
to enter the area), AKMv sends a move−welcome message to Mi
and DKM as follows:
• To Mi, protected under the session key Sm−Keyiv along with
its current area key A
−
Keyv in the form of Mov−Token:
AKMv → Mi : IDAv‖{Mov−TokenA‖text}Sm−Keyiv,
where Mov
−
TokenA = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖A−Keyv‖text}.
• To DKM, protected under the Domain-Area key DAv−Key:
AKMv → DKM : IDAv‖{Mov−TokenA‖text}DAv−Key.
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(d) If Mi is already on the MobListv, AKMv will need to check whether
there has been any re-keying of its area key since Mi’s last visit
to the area.
If there is none, AKMv sends a move−welcome message to Mi in
the form of Mov
−
Token, along with its area key A
−
Keyv (as in
Step 4(c)).
Otherwise, AKMv sends a move−welcome message to Mi in the
form of Mov
−
Token, along with its current area key A
−
Keyvnew,
where Mov
−
TokenA = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖A−Keyvnew‖text}.
Step 5: Upon receiving the move
−
welcome message from AKMv, DKM in-
forms AKMi of the successful move of member Mi via amove−welcome
message, protected under a Domain-Area key.
Note that other AKMs do not need to be notified of the member
moving as it is not necessary for them to keep track of host mobility
which occurs outside their areas.
Having the new information concerning member Mi, DKM and AKMs (AKMi
and AKMv) will need to update theirMobList in order to keep track of member
Mi’s mobility, along with the number of area keys that may have been kept
by Mi.
In summary, using this protocol, Mi moves from an area managed by an AKMi
(where it is currently residing), to another visited area in a domain managed
by AKMv while still remaining in the group session. The move is managed by
the DKM via AKMi. Assuming the establishment of the session mobility key
between Mi and AKMv is successful, Mi is given the current area key of the
visited area by AKMv. All affected key managers during host mobility (such as
DKM, AKMi and AKMv) need to update their MobList, and new information
regarding the moving member is logged into the lists.
147
9.8 Protocol IV(b): Member Moving with Backward Secrecy
Figure 9.7: Member Moving with Backward Secrecy protocol message flow.
9.8 Protocol IV(b): Member Moving with Back-
ward Secrecy
This protocol describes transfer of a group member from one area to another
with consideration to secure access to the previous keys, as well as to past group
data traffic (in other words, provision of backward secrecy). The protocol also
includes the delivery of a new area key for the visited area A
−
Keyvnew to the
moving member, as well as to the group members (if any) residing in that area.
Throughout this protocol we will make the same assumptions as in Protocol
IV(a) (see Section 9.7). The message flow of this protocol is depicted in
Figure 9.7, and to avoid being repetitive in demonstrating the steps involved
in this protocol, only the steps that differ from Protocol IV(a) are described,
as follows:
(a) In addition to Step 4 in Protocol IV(a) (see Section 9.7), upon receiving
the move
−
notify message from DKM and Mi, and assuming that both
messages are valid, and that it is Mi’s first time to enter the area (deter-
mined by AKMv checking that Mi is not in MobListv), AKMv must re-key
its area key A
−
Keyv. To do so, AKMv initiates Protocol VI: Re-keying
the area key (see Section 9.11). This results in all group members MAv in
148
9.8 Protocol IV(b): Member Moving with Backward Secrecy
that particular area obtaining the new area key A
−
Keyvnew.
(b) AKMv then delivers the new area key to Mi, protected under a session
mobility key Sm−Keyiv in the form of Mov−Token (as in Step 4, Protocol
IV(a)) where Mov
−
TokenA = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖A−Keyvnew‖text}:
AKMv → Mi : IDAv‖{Mov−TokenA‖text}Sm−Keyiv.
(c) Similarly to Step 4(d) in Protocol IV(a), if Mi is already on the MobListv,
AKMv will need to check whether there has been any re-keying of its area
key since Mi’s last visit to the area. If none, AKMv sends a move−welcome
message to Mi along with its current area key A−Keyv. Otherwise, AKMv
sends an updated area key A
−
Keyvnew to Mi.
Note that, as for members moving without backward secrecy, other AKMs do
not need to be notified of the member moving as it is not necessary for them
to keep track of host mobility which occurs outside their areas. Also, re-keying
of the area key due to host mobility only needs to occur within the visited area
(which the member is moving to) and does not affect other areas.
In summary, using this protocol, Mi moves from an area managed by an AKMi,
to another visited area managed by AKMv while still remaining in the group
session. For provision of backward secrecy, when a member moves to a vis-
ited area, the area key of visited area needs to be re-keyed. This results in
group members (including the moving member) residing in that particular area
obtaining a new area key. Similarly to Protocol IV(a), all affected key man-
agers during host mobility need to update their MobList with new information
regarding the moving member.
We have provided two protocols for facilitating member moves, dependent on
whether backward secrecy is required. These protocols feature a mechanism
(MobList) that allows for efficient processing of members who are returning to
recently visited areas.
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Figure 9.8: Establishment of a Session Mobility Key protocol message flow.
9.9 Protocol IV(c): Establishment of Session Mo-
bility Key
This protocol describes establishment of a session mobility key to be used
for host mobility between a moving member Mi and an area key manager of
a visited area AKMv. The protocol also includes the delivery of the session
mobility key to the moving member Mi, as well as to the area key manager of
a visited area AKMv.
Throughout this protocol we will apply the same assumptions as those for Pro-
tocol IV(a) (see Section 9.7), which include the generic notation for describing
the entities involved during host mobility.
The message flow of this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.8, and the steps
involved are described as follows:
Step 1: A group member Mi who wishes to establish a session mobility key
with an area key manager of a visited area AKMv sends a move−wish
message to its area key manager AKMi (where Mi is currently re-
siding), along with the ID of AKMv protected under AiMi−Key (see
Section 8.3.6.1 for initial key establishment):
Mi → AKMi : IDMi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text}AiMi−Key.
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Step 2: Upon receipt, AKMi checks the message by decrypting it with AiMi−Key,
which it shares with Mi, and passes the move−wish message to the
DKM protected under DAi−Key:
AKMi → DKM : IDAi‖{IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖text}DAi−Key.
Step 3: Upon receipt, DKM does the following:
(a) It checks the message by decrypting it with DAi−Key.
(b) Assuming that the checking is valid, DKM generates a session
mobility key Sm−Keyiv (to be used between Mi and AKMv).
(c) DKM then delivers a wish
−
granted message to AKMi, along with
the session mobility key in the form of SKey
−
TokenD, where
SKey
−
TokenD = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖Sm−Keyiv‖text}, pro-
tected under DAi−Key:
DKM → AKMi : IDD‖{SKey−TokenD‖IDD‖text}DAi−Key.
(d) DKM also delivers a wish
−
granted message along with the session
mobility key (in the form of SKey
−
TokenD) to AKMv, protected
under DAv−Key:
DKM → AKMv : IDD‖{SKey−TokenD‖IDD‖text}DAv−Key.
Note that Step 3c and 3d can take place independently and not
necessarily in the order specified.
Step 4: Upon receiving the wish
−
granted message from the DKM, AKMi does
the following:
(a) It checks the message by decrypting it with the DAi−Key.
(b) AKMi then delivers the session mobility key to Mi in the form of
SKey
−
TokenA, protected under AiMi−Key:
AKMi → Mi : IDAi‖{SKey−TokenA‖text}AiMi−Key,
where, SKey
−
TokenA = {IDG‖IDAi‖IDAv‖IDMi‖Sm−Keyiv‖text}.
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Step 5: Upon receiving the message from AKMi, Mi checks the message by de-
crypting it withAiMi−Key to obtain the session mobility key Sm−Keyiv.
Step 6: Upon receiving the wish
−
granted message from the DKM, AKMv
checks the message by decrypting it with DAv−Key to obtain the ses-
sion mobility key Sm−Keyiv, along with the ID of the moving member
Mi with which it will share the session key.
Note that Step 5 and Step 6 can take place independently and not necessarily
in the order specified.
We have provided a protocol for establishing a short-term session key for host
mobility (in other words, to assist a member who wishes to move to another
area). Like long-term keys (see Section 8.3.6.1), this session key is primarily
used for establishing secure channels (see Section 8.3.6.4) between a moving
member and an area key manager of a visited area. This key is valid throughout
the member’s residing period in the visited area, or until the member ceases
to become a member of a multicast group.
9.10 Protocol V: Re-keying the Traffic Key
This protocol describes the re-keying of a traffic key that needs to occur during
Protocol II(b): New member joining with backward secrecy (see Section 9.4),
and Protocol III(b): Existing member leaving with forward secrecy (see Sec-
tion 9.6). This protocol also includes the delivery of a new traffic key to group
members, including the newly joined member (during Protocol II(b)), and to
remaining members excluding the member who is leaving (during Protocol
III(b)).
Throughout this protocol we make the same assumptions as in Protocol II(b)
(see Section 9.4) and Protocol III(b) (see Section 9.6). The message flow of
this protocol is depicted in Figure 9.9, and the steps involved are as follows:
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Figure 9.9: Re-keying of a Traffic Key protocol message flow.
Step 1: In order to re-key the traffic key T
−
Key, DKM does the following:
(a) DKM generates a new traffic key T
−
Keynew.
(b) DKM then sends a ready
−
to
−
re−key message, along with the new
traffic key and the ID of the multicast group, to all area key man-
agers AKMD in the form ofRkey−TokenD, where Rkey−TokenD =
{IDG‖T−Keynew‖text}. DKM can send this message either by:
• unicast, where each message is protected under a Domain-
Area key.
• multicast, where the message is protected under the domain
key D
−
Key (see earlier protocols, such as those in Section 9.2
and Section 9.4).
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, each AKM does the following:
(a) Checks the message by decrypting it with the key it shares with
the DKM to obtain the new traffic key T
−
Keynew.
(b) Sends a ready
−
to
−
re−key message to all group members in the
area, along with the new traffic key in the form of Rkey
−
TokenA,
where Rkey
−
TokenA = {IDG‖IDAi‖T−Keynew‖text}. AKM can
send this message either by:
• unicast, where AKM sends the message to each member sep-
arately, protected under either an Area-Member key or a ses-
sion mobility key for mobile members.
153
9.11 Protocol VI: Re-keying the Area Key
• multicast, where AKM sends a single message to all group
members protected under the area key of an area.
Note that in Protocol III(b) for members leaving with forward
secrecy, the delivery of a new traffic key to the remaining group
members may need to be done via unicast to exclude the leaving
member.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message from an AKM, a group member checks
the message by decrypting it with the key it shares with the AKM to
obtain the new traffic key T
−
Keynew.
Note that in Protocol II(b) for new host joining, the delivery of a new traffic
key T
−
Keynew can be delayed until after the re-keying of the area key has taken
place, so that the AKM can use the area key to support secure distribution
of the new traffic key to the group members in the area (in other words, via
multicast).
We have provided the re-keying of the traffic key protocol that may need to
run whenever there is a change in group membership.
9.11 Protocol VI: Re-keying the Area Key
This protocol describes the re-keying of an area key that needs to occur during
Protocol II(b): New member joining with backward secrecy (see Section 9.4),
Protocol III(b): Existing member leaving with forward secrecy (see Section 9.6),
and Protocol IV(b): Member moving with backward secrecy (see Section 9.8).
This protocol also includes the delivery of a new area key to group members,
including the newly joined member (during Protocol II(b)) and the moving
member (during Protocol IV(b)), as well as to remaining members excluding
the member who is leaving (during Protocol III(b)).
Like Protocol V (see Section 9.10), we will make the same assumptions as
in Protocol II(b) and Protocol III(b), as well as making the assumptions of
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(a) Due to host joining or member moving to other areas.
(b) Due to existing member leaving.
Figure 9.10: Re-keying of an Area Key protocol message flow.
Protocol IV(b) (see Section 9.8). The message flow of this protocol is depicted
in Figure 9.10, and the steps involved are as follows:
Step 1: In order to re-key the area key A
−
Key, an AKM does the following:
(a) AKM generates a new area key A
−
Keynew.
(b) AKM then sends a ready
−
to
−
re−key message along with the new
area key A
−
Keynew to all group members in that area in the form
ofRkey
−
TokenA, where Rkey−TokenA = {IDAi‖A−Keynew‖text}.
As in Step 2(b) Protocol V (see Section 9.10), AKM can send this
message either via unicast or multicast.
Note that for Protocol II(b) and Protocol IV(b) (which is associ-
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ated with new host joining and member moving to other areas), an
AKM can use the old area key A
−
Key to secure the distribution
of the new area key A
−
Keynew to group members in that area (see
Figure 9.10(a)).
On the other hand, this may no longer apply for Protocol III(b)
(existing member leaving protocol). In this case an AKM will need
to send the new area key A
−
Keynew to group members separately,
each of which is protected under an Area-Member key, in order to
exclude the leaving member (see Figure 9.10(b)).
Step 2: Upon receiving the message from the AKM, each member M checks
the message by decrypting it with the key it shares with the AKM to
obtain the new area key A
−
Keynew.
We have provided the re-keying of area key protocol that may need to run
whenever there is a change in group membership, or when a member moves to
another area in a domain.
9.12 Summary
In this chapter, we specified the main GKMF protocols for our proposed frame-
work. We have also introduced the use of lists as part of our protocol designs.
In the next chapter we provide the analysis of our proposed GKMF.
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GKMF: Analysis of the Proposal
This chapter provides basic analysis of the proposed GKMF specified in the pre-
vious chapters. This assesses whether the proposed framework meets the nec-
essary requirements for secure deployment of multicast group communications
in wireless mobile environments (WMobEs) that we identified in Chapter 8.
In this chapter we conduct a preliminary analysis of the proposed GKMF. This
is a paper analysis against the requirements identified in Section 8.2. A full
analysis of performance and scalability of the framework can probably only be
verified through practical implementation (see Chapter 11). We believe how-
ever that this preliminary assessment provides useful results on the framework
design.
We divide the assessment of the framework into three layers of analysis:
• General analysis (Section 10.1). The first layer analyzes the proposed
framework as a whole, including whether it satisfies the general require-
ments (see Section 8.2).
• Security analysis (Section 10.2). The second layer covers security anal-
ysis of the framework. We divide this further into two parts. The first
part covers a general security assessment as to whether it satisfies the re-
quirements specified (see Section 8.2.2). The second part covers analysis
of each of the proposed protocols identified within the framework (see
Chapter 9), including whether it satisfies the functionalities requirements
(see Section 8.4).
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• Performance analysis (Section 10.3). The third layer covers analysis
on performance and scalability of the framework as a whole, pertaining
to the performance requirements specified in Section 8.2.3. This paper
analysis includes assessment of costs in terms of:
(a) Operational complexity. Measured by the number of encryptions or
decryptions necessary during a group operation.
(b) Re-keying complexity. Measured by the number of re-keying neces-
sary during group operations.
(c) Storage complexity. Measured by the number of keys each entity
needs to store.
(d) Communication complexity. Measured by the number of messages
sent by entities involved in a group operation.
10.1 General Analysis
In this section, we analyze the proposed GKMF as a whole to see whether
the proposed framework (including its components) meets the requirements
specified in Section 8.2.
10.1.1 General Assessment
This analysis concerns the general requirements specified in Section 8.2.1.
(a) Options for group membership policy
Our GKMF supports dynamic membership policies, which can be managed
using Protocol I: Creation of New Group and initial distribution of keys
(see Section 8.4.1 and Section 9.2).
(b) Provision of host mobility
One important feature of our proposal (as well as one of the main objectives
of this thesis) for group communication in WMobEs is to specify a protocol
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for group member moves to other areas. We have provided this as part
of the protocol designs (see Section 8.4.4, Section 9.7 and Section 9.8),
including the option for provision of backward secrecy.
(c) Reliable and trustworthy key managers
We have assumed that all key manager entities (at the domain and area lev-
els) within the proposed framework are trusted (see Section 8.3.5). These
provide a secure foundation for designing the secure group key manage-
ment services for group communication.
(d) Scalability
Our framework has several features that are designed to support scalabil-
ity:
• The general architecture adopts a hybrid design approach (see Sec-
tion 4.2) consisting of two levels (domain and area) of key managers.
Each level is independently governed by a key manager. As the num-
ber of multicast groups increases, as well as the number of group
members, additional AKMs can be added to support larger group
operations.
• Re-keying due to group membership change is contained. In general,
scalability problems are reduced by designing the architecture in such
a way that any changes in group membership in a particular area do
not go beyond that area, and other areas are not affected by the
change. For example, during the new member joining protocol (with
provision for backward secrecy) only the area key where the new join
occurs needs to be re-keyed.
10.2 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze security of the proposed framework. We divide the
assessment into two parts. Section 10.2.1 provides a general security analysis
of the whole framework. In the remaining sections (from Section 10.2.2 on-
wards), we provide analysis each of the proposed protocols identified within
the framework (see Chapter 9).
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Recall that throughout the protocol designs, we made the following assump-
tions:
(a) Availability of secure encryption algorithms.
(b) Use of secure key establishment techniques to establish long-term keys.
(c) Use of secure entity and data origin authentication mechanisms to extend
simplified protocols, discussed in Chapter 9.
(d) Use of some form of time variant parameter such as a time stamp in the
text field within protocol messages for checking that a message received is
not a replay of previous ones, as discussed in Section 9.1.5.
(e) The key managers (DKM and AKMs) in a domain are fixed and have been
securely established prior to commencement of any multicast group com-
munication, and every AKM has established a long-term Domain-Area key
and a common domain key D
−
Key with the DKM (see Section 8.3.6.1).
(f) All keys managers (DKM and AKMs in a domain) as specified in Sec-
tion 8.3.2 are trusted entities which all group members trust.
(g) Availability of secure storage of cryptographic keys for all group commu-
nication entities (see Section 8.3.6.3).
(h) Availability of secure mechanisms for managing the lists : HisList, and
MobList, as specified in Section 9.1.4.
As mentioned in Section 9.1.3, we do not discuss details of these here because
their provision relies on generic techniques that are not specific to multicast
group communications.
Throughout analysis each of the proposed protocol (from Section 10.2.2 on-
wards), we have assumed that freshness of messages received is provided using
some forms of time variant parameter such as a time stamp. Thus, if an ad-
versary intercepts and later re-sends the message with an old time stamp, the
intended recipient of the data would know that the time stamp received is
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out-of-bounds and not valid at that particular moment in time. If that is the
case, the recipient of the data can conclude that the message received is no
longer guaranteed as fresh, and the message can be discarded.
10.2.1 General Security Assessment
In this section we analyze the security of the proposed GKMF in general to see
that the proposed framework meets the requirements specified in Section 8.2.2.
(a) Provision of entity authentication
We have assumed the use of secure entity authentication mechanisms in
our proposed protocols (see Section 9.1.3). This provides a means for both
group members and key manager entity(s) to authenticate and verify each
other’s identities.
(b) Provision of backward and/or forward secrecy
A particular security service that is specific to multicast group commu-
nication is the provision of confidentiality with respect to backward and
forward secrecy. As mentioned in Section 4.7.3, a good design of GKMFs
for secure multicast group communications should offer this as a default
option. Our framework has provided these options for backward and/or
forward secrecy, which can be managed using Protocol I: Creation of new
Group and initial distribution of keys (see Section 8.4.1). Also, we have
provided separate protocols for these options in new member joining, ex-
isting member leaving and member moving protocols (see Chapter 9).
(c) Data (Message) integrity and authentication
We have assumed the use of data origin authentication (hence data in-
tegrity) mechanisms in our proposed protocols (see Section 9.1.3). This
provides a means for both group members and key manager(s) to verify
the integrity of data received.
(d) Secure data exchange
Our framework supports secure data exchange, which can be achieved
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through careful application of security techniques and mechanisms, as dis-
cussed in Section 9.1.2. We have assumed secure use of these techniques
and mechanisms, and the availability of secure encryption algorithms (as
mentioned earlier, see Section 10.2). These provide a means for all group
communicating entities to ensure that their communications remain con-
fidential, and that access is only allowed to authorized group members.
(e) Secure key distribution
Our framework supports secure distribution of the keys needed in the
framework. We have assumed that the distribution of long-term keys to
key managers and group members (Section 8.3.6.1) is done in a secure
manner, as discussed in Section 8.3.6.3. This provides a means for key
managers to protect the distribution of short-term keys (Section 8.3.6.2)
to all group members prior to group communication.
(f) Secure key updates (re-keying)
Our framework supports re-keying of short-term keys (in particular the
traffic key of a multicast group and the area key of a particular area),
which may need to occur whenever there is a change in group membership
(either due to new joins, member leaves, or member moves). We have
provided re-keying of these keys, which can be managed using Protocol
V: Re-keying the traffic key (Section 9.10) and Protocol VI: Re-keying the
area key (Section 9.11).
We have also provided options for re-keying to occur if provision for back-
ward and/or forward secrecy is required. These can be managed using
Protocol II(b): New member joining with backward secrecy (Section 9.4),
Protocol III(b): Existing member leaving with forward secrecy(Section 9.6),
and Protocol IV(b): Member moving with backward secrecy (Section 9.8).
We have assumed secure establishment of long-term keys between key man-
agers and group members (Section 8.3.6.1), the use of secure entity and
data origin authentication mechanisms in the protocols as discussed in
Chapter 9, and the availability of secure encryption algorithms (as men-
tioned earlier, see Section 10.2). These provide a means for key managers
to protect re-keying that needs to occur at the domain and area levels,
and to securely inform group members when re-keying of a particular key
is required.
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Table 10.1: Re-keying of traffic key and area key.
(g) Additional key management during host mobility
Our framework supports host mobility. We have provided the establish-
ment of short-term session mobility key that needs to occur prior to host
mobility using Protocol IV(c): Establishment of session mobility key (Sec-
tion 9.9). Also, we have demonstrated that in order to preserve backward
secrecy, a re-keying operation must occur whenever a member moves to an-
other area, which can be managed using Protocol IV(b): Member moving
with backward secrecy (Section 9.8).
Table 10.1 summarizes re-keying operations of both a traffic key T
−
Key
and an area key A
−
Key, which occurred due to group membership change.
We indicate re-keying of each key with a
√
notation, otherwise they are
indicated with a dash. From the table, with the exception of member
moving, provision of backward and forward secrecy require re-keying of
both T
−
Key and A
−
Key.
Re-keying of T
−
Key does not need to occur during host mobility because
moving members are still in a same group session. When a member moves
into an area, the A
−
key of the visited area (where the member is moving
to) is re-keyed with a new area key.
(h) Provision of trust model
We have assumed the availability of secure environments for key manage-
ment, as discussed in Section 8.3.6.3, and the existence of trustworthy and
reliable key managers in a domain, as specified in Section 8.3.2. These pro-
vide a secure foundation for our framework to exercise the proposed group
key management protocols for secure multicast group communication.
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10.2.2 Protocol I: Creation of New Group and Initial Dis-
tribution of Keys
In this protocol, a new multicast group is created and initial distribution of
a traffic key T
−
Key and an area key A
−
Key is conducted for all AKMs in
a domain, and to the first member of a multicast group. The requirements
for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.1, and the protocol specified in
Section 9.2.
We analyze the protocol as follows:
(a) Any host M who wishes to create a multicast group must first establish
a secret Area-Member key with an AKM, and we have assumed that this
was done securely (see Section 8.3.6.1).
(b) We have implicitly assumed that data origin authentication is provided
by using a MAC. Thus, we can conclude that if an adversary wants to
masquerade or initiate a bogus multicast group, the adversary will not be
able to do so unless he has access to the MAC key. In the event that the
MAC value received is not the same as the value a member computes, the
message will be discarded. The same process applies to the key managers
involved (DKM and AKM).
(c) The host M uses the Area-Member key for protecting the communications
between itself and the AKM. If an adversary gets hold of the encrypted
messages between M and AKM, the adversary has no way of decrypting
the messages because he does not have access to the Area-Member key.
(d) After granting the permission to create a multicast group, DKM generates
and distributes a traffic key T
−
Key to all AKMs. The distribution of this
key to all AKMs is protected either by the Domain-Area key (if the key is
to be sent separately via unicast to every AKM), or a common domain key
D
−
Key (if the key is to be sent one time via multicast). If an adversary
wants to get hold of the T
−
Key, the adversary has no access to either of
these keys (Domain-Area or D
−
Key), so he cannot obtain the T
−
Key.
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(e) Similarly, an AKM (when the host joins a multicast group) generates and
distributes an area key A
−
Key to the host M along with the T
−
Key it
receives from the DKM. The distribution of these keys is protected under
the Area-Member key which is shared only between the AKM and host
M . The adversary has no access to the Area-Member key, so he cannot
obtain the T
−
Key or the A
−
Key.
(f) Other information distributed during this protocol is also protected under
secret keys known only to key managers (DKM and AKMs) and host M .
Thus, a passive observer knows nothing about the properties of the new
multicast group.
10.2.3 Protocol II(a): New Member Joining without Back-
ward Secrecy
In this protocol, a new join of a host to become a member of a multicast group
is conducted with no provision of backward secrecy. This means that when a
new member joins a multicast group, the same keys (T
−
Key and A
−
Key) that
are currently in use are given to the newly joined member. We have assumed
that Protocol I (Section 9.2) was successfully conducted. The requirements
for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.2 and the protocol specified in
Section 9.3.
We analyze the protocol as follows:
(a) Any host M who wishes to join a multicast group must first establish a
secret Area-Member key with an AKM, and we have assumed that this
was done securely (see Section 8.3.6.1).
(b) As for (b) in Section 10.2.2, we have implicitly assumed that data origin
authentication is provided by using a MAC. Thus, we can conclude that
if an adversary wants to masquerade as someone else to join a multicast
group, the adversary will not succeed as he has no access to the MAC key
and cannot produce the same MAC value. In the event that the MAC value
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received is not the same as the value a member computes, the message will
be discarded. Other entities (DKM and AKM) can check the integrity of
the message received via the same process.
(c) As for (c) in Section 10.2.2, the host M uses the Area-Member key for pro-
tecting the communications between itself and the AKM. If an adversary
gets hold of the encrypted messages between M and AKM, the adversary
has no way of decrypting the messages because he does not have access to
the Area-Member key.
(d) After receiving the join
−
request from M , AKM relays the request to the
DKM protected under the Domain-Area key. If an adversary gets hold of
the encrypted messages between AKM and DKM, the adversary has no
way of decrypting the messages because he does not have access to the
Domain-Area key shared only between AKM and DKM.
(e) After receiving the join
−
granted message from DKM, the AKM sends the
current keys to M in the form of Join
−
Token. This message is protected
under an Area-Member key shared only between AKM and M . If an
adversary wants to get hold of the token, the adversary has no access to
the Area-Member key, so he cannot obtain T
−
Key, A
−
Key or other group-
related information. If an adversary intercepts or modifies the message
content, this can easily be detected by DKM, AKM or M when the implicit
MAC value is checked against the value received.
10.2.4 Protocol II(b): New Member Joining with Backward
Secrecy
In this protocol, a new join of a host to become a member of a multicast
group is conducted with provision of backward secrecy. When a new member
joins a multicast group, re-keying of cryptographic keys occurs. This results in
the new member and other members in the area (where the new join occurs)
obtaining new keys T
−
Keynew and A−Keynew. This also results in other group
members across the domain obtaining a new T
−
Keynew. The requirements
for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.2 and the protocol specified in
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Section 9.4.
As for Protocol II(a) Section 10.2.3, we have assumed that Protocol I (Sec-
tion 9.2) was successfully conducted. Due to similarity with Protocol II(a), we
only analyze the differences, as follows:
(a) After receiving the join
−
granted message from DKM, AKM initiates the
re-keying of its area key A
−
Key, which results in all members in the area
(including the newly joined member) obtaining a new area key A
−
Keynew.
AKM can send this new area key (in the form of Join
−
Token, as in Sec-
tion 10.2.3) to the existing members in the area under protection of the old
area key A
−
Key (via multicast), or under protection of Area-Member keys
(via unicast). AKM sends this key to the new member protected under an
Area-Member key, and we have assumed that this was done securely (see
Section 8.3.6.1). If an adversary wants to get hold of A
−
Keynew, then as
the adversary has no access to either of these keys (Area-Member key, or
A
−
Key), he cannot obtain A
−
Keynew.
(b) After granting the host permission to join the multicast group, DKM ini-
tiates the re-keying of the group’s traffic key T
−
Key, which results in all
AKMs and all group members (via AKM) in the domain obtaining a new
traffic key T
−
Keynew. DKM can send this new traffic key to all AKMs
under protection of the domain key D
−
Key (via multicast), or under pro-
tection of the Domain-Area keys (via unicast). If an adversary wants to
get hold of T
−
Keynew, then as the adversary has no access to either of
these keys (Domain-Area or D
−
Key), he cannot obtain T
−
Keynew.
(c) The delivery of T
−
Keynew to group members across the domain is done
by each AKM governing an area. Similarly to (a), AKM can multicast
this T
−
Keynew to members in the area protected under A−Key, or unicast
under the Area-Member keys. If an adversary gets hold of the encrypted
messages between AKM and the group members, the adversary has no
way of decrypting the messages because he does not have access to the
secret shared only between AKM and M , or the area key A
−
Key.
(d) AKM can delay the delivery of A
−
Keynew to the newly joined member
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until it receives T
−
Keynew from the DKM. AKM can send both keys (in
the form of Join
−
Token) under the protection of the Area-Member key,
and we have assumed that this was done securely.
10.2.5 Protocol III(a): Existing Member Leaving without
Forward Secrecy
In this protocol, an existing member leaving a multicast group is conducted
with no provision of forward secrecy. This means that when a member leaves
a multicast group it requires no further processing. A member is excluded
from a group and the reason of leaving is logged in HisList. We have assumed
that there is an established multicast group (Section 9.5). The requirements
for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.3 and the protocol specified in
Section 9.5.
We analyze the protocol as follows:
(a) Any member M wishing to leave a multicast group sends a leave
−
notify
message to AKM protected under an Area-Member key, who then passes
the message to the DKM protected under a Domain-Area key, and we have
assumed that these keys were established securely between the member M
and AKM, and between AKM and DKM (see Section 8.3.6.1).
(b) As in (b) Section 10.2.2, we have implicitly assumed the provision of data
origin authentication using MACs. Thus, we can conclude that if an ad-
versary wants to masquerade as someone else in order to leave a multicast
group (or to send an eject
−
notify message), the adversary will not able
to do so as he has no access to the MAC key. Even if the adversary
could forge a key and produce a MAC, this can be easily detected by the
managing entities (such as DKM and AKM) when the MAC value they
produce (using the correct key) is not the same as the value obtained from
the message (using the forged key). Through this process, a DKM or an
AKM governing the leave operations can conclude that integrity of the
leave
−
notify message received is no longer guaranteed, and the message
168
10.2 Security Analysis
can be discarded.
(c) As in (c) Section 10.2.2, the member M uses the Area-Member key for
protecting the communications between itself and the AKM. If an adver-
sary gets hold of the encrypted messages between the host M and AKM,
the adversary has no way of decrypting the messages because he does not
have access to the Area-Member key. Likewise with the unicast communi-
cations between AKM and DKM, which are protected under the Domain-
Area key. The adversary has no access to this key, hence cannot decrypt
the encrypted messages between them.
(d) After receiving the leave
−
notify message from AKM, DKM updates its
HisList, and the reason for leaving is logged. We have assumed that this
list is maintained and kept securely by the DKM.
10.2.6 Protocol III(b): Existing Member Leaving with For-
ward Secrecy
In this protocol, an existing member leaving a multicast group is conducted
with provision of forward secrecy. When a member leaves, the remaining mem-
bers of the multicast group need to be re-keyed. This results in all remaining
group members in an area where the leave occurs obtaining a new area key
A
−
Keynew, and all AKMs and group members in the domain obtaining a new
traffic key T
−
Keynew. The requirements for this protocol were identified in
Section 8.4.3 and the protocol specified in Section 9.6.
As in Protocol III(a) (Section 10.2.5), the information about the leaving mem-
ber is logged in HisList. Due to the similarity with Protocol III(a), we just
analyze the differences, as follows:
(a) After receiving the leave
−
notify message from M (or an eject
−
notify
message from DKM), AKM initiates the re-keying of its area key A
−
Key.
This results in all remaining group members in the area (excluding the
leaving member) obtaining a new area key A
−
Keynew. This new key is
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sent via unicast, protected under the Area-Member keys. If an adversary
gets hold of the encrypted message, he will not be able to decrypt it as he
has no access to the secret shared only between each member and AKM.
(b) After receiving the leave
−
notify message from AKM (or after sending an
eject
−
notify to AKM), DKM initiates the re-keying of the group’s traffic
key T
−
Key. This results in all AKMs and group members (via AKM) in
the domain obtaining a new traffic key T
−
Keynew. As in Protocol II(b)
(see Section 10.2.4), DKM can send this new key to all AKMs either via
multicast protected under D
−
Key, or via unicast protected under Domain-
Area keys. If an adversary wants to get hold of this new key, he will not
be able to do so because he has no access to either of the keys (D
−
Key,
or Domain-Area keys) used to protect the new key.
(c) As in Section 10.2.5, we have implicitly assumed the provision of data
origin authentication using MACs. We can conclude that if an adversary
wants to masquerade as someone else in order to leave a multicast group
(or to eject a member), this can be easily detected by the managing entity
(DKM or AKM) when the MAC value computed differs from the value
obtained from the received message. Likewise with the group member
who might receive a false eject
−
notify from an alleged DKM or AKM.
In either case, DKM, AKM or M can conclude that the integrity of the
message received is no longer guaranteed, and the message can be discarded
without further processing.
10.2.7 Protocol IV(a): Existing Member Moving without
Backward Secrecy
In this protocol, the transfer of a group member from one area to another
is conducted with no consideration for backward secrecy. This means that
when a member moves from one area to another, the member is given the area
key A
−
Keyv of the visited area. All key managers (DKM and all AKMs) in
the domain need to update their MobList whenever a move occurs. We have
assumed that these lists are maintained and kept securely by the key managers
(see Section 9.1.4). We have also assumed that there is an established multicast
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group (see Section 9.7). The requirements for this protocol were identified in
Section 8.4.4 and the protocol specified in Section 9.7.
We analyze the protocol as follows:
(a) A member Mi who wishes to move into another area must first establish
a short-term session mobility key with the AKM of the visited area, and
we have assumed that this was done securely (see Section 9.7).
(b) A member Mi uses this short-term key to secure communications with the
AKM of the visited area. If an adversary wants to masquerade as some
moving member in order to get hold of the area key A
−
Keyv of the visited
area, he will not be able to do so because he has no access to the session
mobility key shared only between the moving member and the AKM of
the visited area.
(c) We have implicitly assumed the provision of data origin authentication
using MACs. Thus, we can conclude that if an adversary wants to mas-
querade as some moving member in order to get hold of A
−
Keyv, the
adversary will not able to do so because he has no access to the MAC
key. Other entities (DKM, AKM and Mi) can easily check the integrity of
messages received via the same process.
(d) After obtaining the session mobility key, Mi initiates the move protocol
by sending a move
−
notify message to its local area key manager AKMi,
protected under the Area-Member key, and to the visited area key manager
AKMv, protected under the session mobility key. If an adversary gets
hold of the enciphered messages between the entities, he has no way of
deciphering the message as he has no access to either of the keys (Area-
Member key, or session mobility key).
(e) After receiving the move
−
notify message from Mi, AKMi passes the mes-
sage to DKM, protected under the Domain-Area key. As in (d), if an
adversary gets hold of the enciphered message between DKM and AKMi,
he has no way of deciphering the message as he has no access to the
Domain-Area key.
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(f) After receiving the move
−
notify message from AKMi, DKM notifies AKMv
of the move (in the form of a token, see Section 9.7), protected under the
Domain-Area key. Similarly, if an adversary gets hold of the enciphered
message between DKM and AKMv, he has no way of deciphering the mes-
sage as he has no access to the Domain-Area key.
(g) After receiving themove
−
notify message from DKM, AKMv acknowledges
the move by Mi and sends its area key A−Keyv (A−Keyvnew is sent if
there has been re-keying of its area key) to Mi protected under the session
mobility key. If an adversary wants to get hold of A
−
Keyv or A−Keyvnew,
he will not be able to do so because he has no access to the session mobility
key.
(h) All affected key managers (DKM, AKMi and AKMv) update theirMobList,
and area(s) visited are logged. We assume that these lists are maintained
and kept securely by the key managers.
10.2.8 Protocol IV(b): Member Moving with Backward Se-
crecy
In this protocol, the transfer of a group member from one area to another is
conducted with provision for backward secrecy. When a member moves from
one area to another, the area where the member is moving to (visited area)
needs to be re-keyed with a new area key. This results in all group members
in the visited area, including the moving member, obtaining a new area key
A
−
Keyvnew. The requirements for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.4
and the protocol specified in Section 9.8.
As in Protocol IV(a) Section 10.2.7, the information on the member moved is
logged in each affected key manager’sMobList. Due to similarity with Protocol
IV(a), we only analyze the differences, as follows:
(a) After receiving the move
−
notify message from DKM and Mi (and if Mi is
not in the MobList), AKMv initiates the re-keying of its area key A−Keyv.
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This results in all members residing in the visited area, including the mov-
ing member Mi, obtaining the new area key A−Keyvnew. AKMv can send
this key to group members (excluding Mi) in the area either via multicast,
protected under the old area key A
−
Keyv, or via unicast, protected under
the Area-Member keys. AKMv sends A−Keyvnew to Mi (in the form of
Move
−
TokenA, see Section 9.8), protected under the session mobility key.
If an adversary wants to get hold of A
−
Keyvnew, he will not be able to do
so because he has no access to the keys (A
−
Keyv, Area-Member keys, or
session mobility key).
(b) We have implicitly assumed the provision of data origin authentication, so
we can conclude that if an adversary wants to masquerade as some moving
member in order to get hold of A
−
Keyvnew, the adversary will not be able
to do so as he has no access to the MAC keys.
(c) On a member’s first move into an area, the area needs to be re-keyed with
a new area key, and information about the moving member is logged in
MobList. If it is necessary to control the number of area keys that are kept
by a group member (which corresponds to the number of areas that he
visited), MobList may need to be reset for that particular member after a
period of time, for example when the number of area keys collected by a
member (as he moves from one area to another) has reached a threshold
limit. In this case, re-keying of the area key may need to occur when the
member moves into an area. This will be determined by the group security
policy at the creation of a multicast group, prior to the commencement of
group communication. This is useful to avoid a group member moving from
one area to another with intent to collect all the area keys. If colluding
members want to exchange security information, such as area keys, to
gain unauthorized access to different areas, this could also be prevented
(periodically).
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10.2.9 Protocol IV(c): Establishment of Session Mobility
Key
In this protocol, a session mobility key for host mobility is established between
the moving member Mi and the AKM of the visited area AKMv. This results in
Mi and AKMv obtaining the session mobility key Sm−Keyiv. The requirements
for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.4 and the protocol specified in
Section 9.9.
As part of Protocol IV(a) and Protocol IV(b) (see Section 10.2.7 and Sec-
tion 10.2.8), we have assumed that there is an established multicast group.
We analyze the protocol as follows:
(a) A member Mi who wishes to establish a session mobility key with AKMv,
must first send a move
−
wish message to its local area key manager AKMi.
This message is protected under the Area-Member key shared only between
Mi and AKMi, and we have assumed that this was done securely (see
Section 8.3.6.1).
(b) After receiving the move
−
wish message from AKMi, DKM generates a
session mobility key, and we have assumed that this was done securely
(see Section 8.3.6.3).
(c) DKM sends this key to AKMi (in the form of SKey−TokenD, see Sec-
tion 9.9), and to AKMv, each protected under a Domain-Area key. AKMi
then sends the key to Mi (in the form of SKey−TokenA) protected under
an Area-Member key. If an adversary wants to get hold of the session
mobility key, he will not be able to do so because he has no access to the
keys (Domain-Area key, or Area-Member key).
(d) We have implicitly assumed the provision of data origin authentication, so
we can conclude that if an adversary tampers with any part of the message
contents, the group entities (such as AKMi and M) can easily check the
integrity of the received message using a MAC value. The same process
applies to other entities such as DKM and AKMv.
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10.2.10 Protocol V: Re-keying the Traffic Key
In this protocol, the re-keying of a traffic key T
−
Key is conducted. This
protocol occurs during Protocol II(b): Member joining with backward secrecy
(see Section 9.4) and Protocol III(b): Member leaving with forward secrecy
(see Section 9.6). This results in all group members, including the newly
joined member (during Protocol II(b)), and remaining members, excluding the
member who is leaving (during Protocol III(b)), obtaining a new traffic key.
The requirements for this protocol were identified in Section 8.4.5 and the
protocol specified in Section 9.10.
As we have analyzed these protocols, which include the re-keying of traffic key
(see Section 10.2.4 and Section 10.2.6), we just analyze the differences:
(a) To re-key a traffic key T
−
Key, DKM generates a new traffic key T
−
Keynew,
and we have assumed that this was done securely (see Section 8.3.6.3).
(b) DKM sends the T
−
Keynew (in the form ofRKey−TokenD, see Section 9.10)
to all area key managers AKMD protected either under D−Key (via mul-
ticast), or Domain-Area keys (via unicast).
(c) After receipt, each AKM sends the T
−
Keynew (in the form ofRKey−TokenA,
see Section 9.10) protected either under A
−
Key (via multicast), or Area-
Member keys and session mobility keys (for mobile members in the area)
(via unicast). If an adversary wants to get hold of T
−
Keynew, he will not
be able to do so as he has no access to the keys (D
−
Key, A
−
Key, Domain-
Area keys, Area-Member keys, or session mobility keys). If an adversary
manages to tamper with all or some parts of the messages, this can be
easily detected by the group entities (DKM, AKMD and M) through ap-
plication of the implicit MACs.
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10.2.11 Protocol VI: Re-keying the Area Key
In this protocol, the re-keying of an area key A
−
Key is conducted. This pro-
tocol occurs during Protocol II(b): Member joining with backward secrecy (see
Section 9.4), Protocol III(b): Member leaving with forward secrecy (see Sec-
tion 9.6), and during Protocol IV(b): Member moving with backward secrecy
(see Section 9.8). This results in group members including the newly joined
member (during Protocol II(b)), remaining members excluding the member
who is leaving (during Protocol III(b)), and the moving member (during Pro-
tocol IV(b)), obtaining a new area key. The requirements for this protocol
were identified in Section 8.4.5 and the protocol specified in Section 9.11.
As we have analyzed these protocols, which include the re-keying of area key
(see Section 10.2.4, Section 10.2.6 and Section 10.2.8) we only analyze the
differences:
(a) To re-key an area key A
−
Key, AKM generates a new area key A
−
Keynew,
and we have assumed that this was done securely (see Section 8.3.6.3).
(b) AKM sends theA
−
Keynew (in the form ofRKey−TokenA, see Section 9.11)
to all group members in the area, protected either under an old area key
A
−
Key (via multicast), or Area-Member keys (via unicast).
(c) AKM can use the old area key to delivery the A
−
Keynew via multicast (as
mentioned in (b)) for Protocol II(b) and Protocol IV(b) (member joining
and member moving). However, for Protocol III(b) (member leaving) AKM
needs to use unicast protected under Area-Member keys to exclude the
leaving member. If a leaving member wants to access the group traffic
after he leaves the group, he will not be able to do so because he has no
access to the new key.
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10.3 Performance Analysis
This analysis is concerned with the performance requirements specified in Sec-
tion 8.2.3. As mentioned earlier, the analysis on performance and scalability
of the proposed framework is presented in terms of operational complexity,
re-keying complexity, storage complexity, and communication complexity.
We use the following notation to analyze the performance of the protocols:
(a) Generic notation such as DKM, AKM and M (or Mi) to denote domain key
managers, area key managers and group members of a multicast group as
in earlier protocol designs are also used here (see Section 9.1). In addition:
• Let |Ax| be the number of group members in an area x.
• Let |AD| be the number of areas in a domain D (and hence AKMs).
• Let |TKD| be the number of traffic keys in a domain.
• Let |TKA| be the number of traffic keys in an area.
• Let |hMob| be the number of hMob in an area, where an hMob is a set
of security parameters, consisting a session mobility key and an area
key of a visited area, needed by a group member for host mobility.
The performance assessment of our basic protocol designs is categorized based
on the costs incurred, as follows:
(a) Operational complexity
This assessment demonstrates the framework performance with respect to:
• the number of encryptions (or decryptions) that need to be performed
during secure group operations. We note that one encryption (or
decryption) is equivalent to one cost, and denote this by E.
• As host mobility may require additional key management, member
moving protocols require additional operational costs with respect to
establishing an hMob, prior to moving (between a member Mi and
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Table 10.2: Cost assessment based on operational complexity.
key managers (DKM, AKMi and AKMv)). We note that one hMob is
equivalent to one cost, and denote this by TMob
−
agree.
The assessment for all protocols is summarized in Table 10.2.
From Table 10.2, the main cost for each group operation can be seen
as reasonably spread amongst the key managers (see column DKM and
column AKMi). As illustrated, the cost for the provision of backward
and/or forward secrecy during new joins and leaves operations is slightly
higher compared to when it is not required.
Importantly, group members are only required to perform minimal com-
putations, which mostly involve one or two E during most of the group
operations (see column M (or Mi)).
For example, member move protocols (for all entities including the group
members) require additional costs, which is TMob
−
agree for establishing the
hMob, prior to moving. The overall cost for member moves is considered
reasonably minimal for a group member (see column M (or Mi)). This is
suitable for members (i.e. mobile devices) in wireless mobile environments,
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which mostly have limited computation capabilities and limited battery
power for more cryptographic computations. For example, a typical mobile
device 206MHz processor with 64MB of RAM, powered by a 950 mAH
rating Li-Polymer battery (Potlapally et al., 2006) can easily cope with
the operational cost of 3E+TMob
−
agree, incurred by a group member during
member moves (see column M (or Mi)).
The use of symmetric encryption (as discussed in Section 8.3.6) is also an
advantage as it is computationally faster, hence saves battery power.
Table 10.3 illustrates an example of performance overhead that may incur
in a larger scale of network size. (BBC, 2007) and (TechNews, 2007) report
that at least 7 millions (MIL) people are anticipated to be using iPhone
(the latest smart phone technology) (Apple, 2007) in UK by the end of
2008. Based on this information, we illustrate the example by using the
same network size.
Thus, assuming that a network service provider (NSP) such as Vodafone,
Orange, T-Mobile or O2 will have at least 7 millions iPhone users, each
of which has the multicast capability to engage in group communication.
With some degree of host mobility that may occur during the participation
in a multicast group across multiple areas (which is assumed to be under
the NSP’s jurisdiction), Table 10.3 provides some estimations in terms of
performance overhead that an NSP will need to bear if secure group com-
munication is to be deployed in WMobEs. The estimation cost provided
is based on the E cost obtained from Table 10.2.
From Table 10.3, based on the network size of 7 MIL with 50% are potential
for mobility, note that:
• The first column represents the number of user participation (%) in
multicast group communication (in other words, number of people
who use group-based services such as taking part in multimedia con-
ferencing or getting special news updates).
• The other columns represent cost estimation in terms of performance
overhead due to provision of security and host mobility.
Note that the average cost listed in each performance overhead (see
2nd, 3rd and 4th columns) is obtained from Table 10.2. For example,
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Table 10.3: An example of cost estimation on performance overhead.
the average cost of 6E per user (in 2nd column) is the average of
operational cost incurred by DKM and AKMi (see DKM and AKMi
columns in the 1st row Table 10.2). Similarly, the average cost of
15E for host mobility (last column) is the average of operational cost
incurred during member moves protocol in Table 10.2 (see last row
in DKM, AKMi and AKMv columns).
It shows that as the network size increases along with host mobility, as
well as group membership, the amount of performance overhead (that the
network has to manage) also increases. For example, with no provision
of security, 10% user participation (700,000 out of 7 MIL users) requires
overhead cost of ≈ 4.2 MIL, while ≈ 5.25 MIL may be needed for host
mobility. Evidently, host mobility requires additional ≈ 1 MIL overhead
cost to operate.
Although it seems that the amount of overhead for host mobility is quite
high (even for 10% user participation), it is still reasonably small consid-
ering the network size of 7 MIL users.
With the advance of mobile technology and economic growth, wide spread
deployment of secure group communication in WMobEs may be possible.
For example, Vodafone UK (Vodafone, 2007) claims to have at least 20
MIL active users, and that it has established around 80% out of coverage
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areas in UK with at least 20,000 base stations. With such established
infrastructures, we believe that it can comfortably cope with the amount
of overhead that may be incurred by the network size of 7 MIL users as
discussed.
(b) Re-keying Complexity
This assessment demonstrates the cost in terms of the number of key
updates (or re-keying) that has to occur. Assessment is based on one
re-keying is equivalent to one cost, and we summarize this in Table 10.4.
Table 10.4: Cost assessment based on re-keying complexity.
Table 10.4 shows that while there is no re-keying cost at creation of a
multicast group, two key updates (re-keying of a traffic key T
−
Key and
re-keying of an area key A
−
Key) are required every time a new join, or a
leave occurs. There is no need for key update if provision of backward and
forward secrecy is not required, thus no cost in terms of re-keying incurs.
On the other hand, a move requires only one re-keying cost, and that is for
re-keying the area key of the visited area (where a member is moving to).
Depending on requirements of multicast applications, the cost of re-keying
can be reduced to half of the key updates normally required (as shown in
Table 10.4), if only one provision for either backward or forward secrecy
is required. For example, if provision of security is not required during
host mobility (in other words, no backward secrecy) and group members
are free to move between areas, no re-keying needs to occur, thus no cost
incurs.
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(c) Storage complexity
This assessment demonstrates the cost in terms of the amount of key
storage required by communicating entities. Assessment is based on one
key stored is equivalent to one cost. We summarize the cost of key storage
at each entity in Table 10.5.
Table 10.5: Cost assessment based on storage complexity.
We conclude that the main cost of key storage is reasonably distributed
amongst key managers (DKM and AKMs), while keeping the cost of key
storage at group members M minimal. A group member with a typi-
cal mobile device 206MHz processor with 64MB of RAM (as mentioned
earlier) can comfortably cope with the total cost of 3+|hMob| keys stor-
age (see Table 10.5), with each key length of 128 bits (as discussed in
Section 8.3.6). Also, as the main key manager in a domain, DKM usually
carries a lot of weight as the primary entity for managing group operations.
The load for storing keys is shared with other key managers (AKMs) in a
domain, hence the operational load is reasonably balanced amongst DKM
and AKMs. For example, DKM does not need to keep Area-Member key
pairs shared between an AKM and a group member, which are managed
at the area level by the AKM.
We observe that the number of keys kept by DKM increases as the number
of multicast groups increases. Similarly, the number of keys kept by an
AKM increases as the number of group members residing in that area
increases.
(d) Communication complexity
This assessment demonstrates the framework performance with respect
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Table 10.6: Cost assessment based on communication complexity.
to the number of messages sent by each communicating entity (key man-
agers and group member) involved in group operations. For every group
operation, one cost is incurred when:
• A unicast message is sent, and we denote this by a u.
• A multicast message is sent, and we denote this by an m.
This is summarized in Table 10.6. Note that we do not specify where the
messages were being sent to, but rather analyze the number of messages
originating from a particular entity.
From Table 10.6, we observe that the number of messages sent by a group
member M throughout group operations is reasonably low, at most 2u.
The cost incurred during new join and leave operations (with provision of
backward and forward secrecy) varies depending on whether a unicast or
multicast message is sent.
For example, in new joins with backward secrecy (see 2nd column: AKMi),
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the cost from AKMi is (2+(|Ax|−1))u, which is equivalent to two unicast
messages plus |Ax|−1 unicast messages, which were sent to group members
in an area (excluding the newly joined member). This cost from AKMi
can be reduced significantly if multicast is used. In the same example, it
is reduced to 2u+m, which is a total cost of just three messages.
Similarly, DKM can reduce the cost of messages sent to all AKMs in the
domain (see 3rd column: DKM ) by using multicast, which costs only one
message, instead of |AD| messages if unicast is used.
By using the multicast functionality, a message intended to a group of recip-
ients, such as all group members in an area, can be sent once by the AKM
of that area. This is important in WMobEs where only limited bandwidth
is available. A typical wireless network with 1700-1800 MHz (for upload
and download traffic) (IIyas, 2003) connected using a wireless access point
at 115Kbps data rate (Potlapally et al., 2006), can still comfortably cope with
the number of messages exchanged during the group operations. As discussed
in Section 8.2.3, we can conclude that the communication overhead and the
bandwidth usage are suitably low for the intended environments.
10.4 Summary
In this chapter we have assessed the proposed framework. We have shown
the extent to which the framework meets its specified requirements and design
objectives. These, we believe have been addressed and achieved reasonably
well, although the actual feasibility of the framework can probably only be
verified through practical implementation.
184
Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes our work and provides directions for future research.
In Section 11.1 we present the research achievements of the thesis. Finally, in
Section 11.3, we provide several suggestions for future work.
11.1 Research Achievements
Multicast functionality enables group communication to occur between groups
of network hosts over vast and open networks. There are many applications,
such as video conferencing and digital content broadcasting, that require com-
munication between groups of entities. Such applications have a strong need
for communication security, which is conventionally supplied through the im-
plementation of appropriate cryptographic mechanisms, whose security in turn
is provided by managing the cryptographic keys involved.
With the increasing popularity and demand for group-based applications, the
need for security has become more important. This effort has been recognized
by the network community who included multicast functionality as part of
the IPv6 (Internet protocol version 6) design for enabling multicast group
communication.
As most proposals are intended for deployment in wired environments, little
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consideration has been given for deployment in other networking environments.
Applications which were made available in wired environments should also
be made available in wireless environments. With the increasing need for
host mobility in networked devices, it is thus important to develop security
techniques for group communication in mobile environments.
The overall goal of this thesis is to specify a group key management framework
for secure group communication in wireless mobile environments.
We started our investigation by looking at the main security (research) problem
areas in multicast group communication, and we identified that the main issues
pertaining to multicast group communication security are group membership,
key management processes (protocols), group security and authentication, and
scalability. Each of these affects how cryptographic keys are managed.
While many key management issues are generic to any networking environ-
ment, we have identified specific issues necessary for establishing secure group
communication in wireless mobile environments. To provide us with a blueprint
for a detailed specification of a GKMF in such environments, we proposed a
generic model of a suitable GKMF.
Based on the generic model, we then described a specification of a GKMF for
secure group communication, based on a specific wireless mobile architecture
with a fixed infrastructure that supported key management entities for the
provision of key management services. Our proposed GKMF has a number of
notable features:
(a) It draws on several design properties of previous GKMFs that facilitate
scalable key management. In particular, the architecture is based on the
notion of domains and areas to contain the impact of re-keying events.
(b) It includes a protocol to support members moving from one key manage-
ment area to another. This facility has not been provided in previous
GKMFs, and is one of several features that are incorporated explicitly for
deployment in wireless mobile environments.
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(c) To support membership changes and host mobility, we introduce the use of
lists. The HisList allows a key manager to keep track of member leaving a
multicast group and the reason for the leave. This is useful when the same
member wishes to re-join the group at a later time. The MobList allows
key managers in a domain to manage host mobility more efficiently. This
list can be used to keep track of host mobility, so that when a member
moves into an area, a key manager can determine whether the member is
a returning member or a first time mover into the area. In the case where
a member is moving back into a previously visited area, re-keying may not
always be necessary.
We have conducted a basic analysis of the proposed GKMF to assess the extent
to which the framework meets its specified objectives and design requirements.
This analysis was conducted at the level of the framework as a whole, as well
as at the level of specific protocols. The analysis considered general issues,
security issues and performance issues. We have argued that in general our
GKMF meets the identified requirements for implementation in wireless mobile
environments.
To conclude, we believe that this thesis has achieved its research aim and
objectives as stated in Chapter 1, as follows:
• We have provided adequate backgrounds on multicast technology and its
capability to enable group communication.
• We have identified different security challenges for establishing secure
group communication in wired and wireless networks.
• We have established a generic GKMF, which describes the essential and
desirable components that need to be addressed if a GKMF for WMobEs
is to be specified.
• We have designed a GKMF for secure group communication for a WMobE
(with fixed infrastructure). This includes specifications of the main com-
ponents and key management protocols identified within the GKMF.
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• We have conducted basic analysis of the proposed GKMF in terms of
functionality, security and performance to see the extent that the frame-
work meets its design requirements and its security objectives.
11.2 Research Limitations
We have demonstrated that this thesis has adequately achieved its research
aim and objectives for establishing secure group communication in a wireless
mobile environment.
In this section, we list out research limitations of this thesis, which may be
useful for researching future work (see also Section 11.3):
(a) We focused our GKMF for provision of backward and/or forward secrecy
(confidentiality services), which primarily determined by appropriate key
management techniques for updating cryptographic keys. We thus ad-
dressed simplified protocols where provision of other security services such
as entity authentication and data origin authentication is implicitly as-
sumed. We do not explicitly treat these here because their solutions can
be provided using generic techniques, which are not specific to multicast
group communication.
(b) One of the main security research issues that we attempted is scalabil-
ity. From the perspective of key management for group communication,
scalability primarily affects the methods by which cryptographic keys are
updated. Host mobility in dynamic wireless mobile environments may ag-
gravate the scalability issue further as group members are not only allowed
to join and/or leave a multicast group at any time (for dynamic group
membership), also allowed to move between areas while still remaining
in a group session. Our GKMF proposed to place group members (each
member may belong to different multicast groups) in an area, in order to
alleviate scalability problem which may occur in particular for re-keying
the traffic key during group operations (such as during member joining
and leaving protocols, see Chapter 9).
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As group members of a multicast group may disperse across multiple areas,
re-keying of the traffic key (which is unique to a multicast group) may have
to span all areas in a domain, which could result in scalability problem
because all areas will have to process the re-keying whenever there is a
change in group membership (for backward and/or forward secrecy).
This problem may be mitigated by placing group members of a multicast
logically in an area. However, in practice this may not be the case, as group
members may physically exist and move between areas. Every member (or
every area where the member residing) may still need to be treated and
processed individually.
(c) The result on the performance of framework is done based on paper anal-
ysis. Although the actual feasibility of framework can probably only be
verified through practical implementation, results obtained from the anal-
ysis may be useful prior to the implementation.
11.3 Future Work
While this thesis provides a useful contribution to the understanding of group
key management in wireless mobile environments, there is plenty of scope for
further investigation of this subject.
There are two different directions in which the work covered by this thesis
could be extended.
(1) Further analysis of the proposed GKMF. We have only provided a partial
specification and analysis of the proposed GKMF. This could be extended
by:
• Fully specifying the GKMF for a particular type of wireless mobile
environment, down to protocol level.
• Adding extra key management functionality, such as support for key
recovery.
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• Conducting a more formal security analysis of the fully specified pro-
tocols.
• Implementing the GKMF and conducting a more detailed perfor-
mance analysis.
While we have conducted an acceptable paper analysis of our GKMF, the
above further research activities would provide the ultimate test of the
proposal’s viability. This work requires a greater time resource than was
available in the study period covered by this thesis, but provides a natural
next step.
(2) This thesis includes a generic GKMF for establishing secure group com-
munication in wireless mobile environments. It can thus be used as a basis
for developing other GKMFs for different types of wireless mobile environ-
ments. Particular design changes that would lead to alternative GKMF
designs are:
• Other WMobEs. To extend the framework design to other wireless
mobile networks such as wireless MANETs.
• Asymmetric key cryptography. To use the generic framework to design
a GKMF for WMobEs where the use of asymmetric cryptography was
deemed acceptable from a performance perspective.
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